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Justification, Discovery and the Naturalizing of Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Harvey Siegel
Harvey Siegel*
Affiliation:
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
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Abstract

Reichenbach's well-known distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification has recently come under attack from several quarters. In this paper I attempt to reconsider the distinction and evaluate various recent criticisms of it. These criticisms fall into two main groups: those which directly challenge Reichenbach's distinction; and those which (I argue) indirectly but no less seriously challenge that distinction by rejecting the related distinction between psychology and epistemology, and defending the “naturalizing” of epistemology. I argue that these recent criticisms fail, and that the distinction remains an important conceptual tool necessary for an adequate understanding of the way in which scientific claims purport to appropriately portray our natural environment.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 297 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1980

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Footnotes

†

I should like to thank Max Black, Lyle Eddy, Sing-nan Fen, Robert Halstead, Sophie Haroutunian, Ralph Page, Hugh Petrie, Israel Scheffler, the members of the Philosophy Department of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, especially Hardy Jones, and the referees of Philosophy of Science, for helpful comments on and criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.

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