Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T08:07:52.017Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Local Philosophies of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Nick Huggett
Nick Huggett*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Chicago
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, M/C 267, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Since the collapse of the ‘received view’ consensus in the late 1960s, the question of scientific realism has been a major preoccupation of philosophers of science. This paper sketches the history of this debate, which grew from developments in the philosophy of language, but eventually took on an autonomous existence. More recently, the debate has tended towards more ‘local’ considerations of particular scientific episodes as a way of getting purchase on the issues. The paper reviews two such approaches, Fine's and Hacking's, describing their positions, their prospects, and how they are related. Finally, the paper suggests that local philosophies of science offer a way for our discipline to engage more fruitfully with the public and the scientific community.

Type
Metaphilosophy and the History of the Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S128 - S137
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

My thanks to Mauricio Suárez for bibliographic suggestions.

References

Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198247044.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, Nancy. (1989), Nature's Capacities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dupré, John (1993), The Disorder of Things: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Feyerabend, Paul (1975), Against Method. London: New Left Books.Google Scholar
Fine, Arthur (1986a), The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Fine, Arthur. (1986b), “Unnatural Attitudes”, Mind 95: 149–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, Arthur. (1991), “Piecemeal Realism”, Philosophical Studies 61:79–96.10.1007/BF00385834CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galison, Peter and Stump, David J. (eds.) (1996), The Disunity of Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Giere, Ronald N. (1988), Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.10.7208/chicago/9780226292038.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1983), Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511814563CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, Larry and Laudan, Rachel (1989), “Dominance and the Disunity of Method”, Philosophy of Science 56: 221–237.10.1086/289484CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Musgrave, Alan (1989), “NOA's Ark—Fine for Realism”, Philosophical Quarterly 39: 383–398.10.2307/2219825CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Papineau, David (1996), The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rorty, Richard (1979), Philosophy and Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Stump, David (1993), “Fallibilism, Naturalism and the Traditional Requirements for Knowledge”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 22: 451–469.10.1016/0039-3681(91)90004-CCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppe, Frederick (ed.) (1977), The Structure of Scientific Theories. Urbana: University of Illinois.Google Scholar
Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980), The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198244274.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar