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A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Hartry Field
Hartry Field*
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
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Abstract

Bayesian decision theory can be viewed as the core of psychological theory for idealized agents. To get a complete psychological theory for such agents, you have to supplement it with input and output laws. On a Bayesian theory that employs strict conditionalization, the input laws are easy to give. On a Bayesian theory that employs Jeffrey conditionalization, there appears to be a considerable problem with giving the input laws. However, Jeffrey conditionalization can be reformulated so that the problem disappears, and in fact the reformulated version is more natural and easier to work with on independent grounds.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 361 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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References

[1] Jeffrey, R. The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.Google Scholar
[2] Jeffrey, R. “Carnap's Empiricism.” In Maxwell and Anderson (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol VI. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975.Google Scholar