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Objective Time Flow

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Storrs McCall
Storrs McCall*
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Abstract

A theory of temporal passage is put forward which is “objective” in the sense that time flow characterizes the universe independently of the existence of conscious beings. The theory differs from Grünbaum's “mind-dependence” theory, and is designed to avoid Grünbaum's criticisms of an earlier theory of Reichenbach's. The representation of temporal becoming is accomplished by the introduction of indeterministic universe-models; each model representing the universe at a time. The models depict the past as a single four-dimensional manifold, and the future as a branched structure of such manifolds. Time flow is relativistic in that it manifests itself in a frame-dependent (but not observer-dependent) way. The indeterministic character of the universe-models is mirrored in a “temporal” theory of truth which rejects the principle of bivalence, and suitable semantics are provided for this theory. Finally, an account of physical law is given which defines it in terms of physical possibility, rather than vice versa.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , September 1976 , pp. 337 - 362
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

An earlier version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association in 1972. The author has benefitted greatly from discussion with Adolf Grünbaum, Nicholas Rescher, Nuel Belnap, Hector Castaneda, Rich Thomason, Jerry Massey, Paul Fitzgerald, Ferrei Christensen, Allen Janis, Jeffrey Winicour, and Don Maier.

References

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