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On “Minimal Model Explanations”: A Reply to Batterman and Rice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Marc Lange
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Abstract

Batterman and Rice offer an account of “minimal model explanations” and argue against “common features accounts” of those explanations. This paper offers some objections to their proposals and arguments. It argues that their proposal cannot account for the apparent explanatory asymmetry of minimal model explanations. It argues that their account threatens ultimately to collapse into a “common features account.” Finally, it argues against their motivation for thinking that an explanation appealing to “common features” would have to explain the common features’ own prevalence.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 292 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestions and criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. If I have misunderstood B&R’s paper, then I am sorry and hope that others can profit from my mistakes.

References

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