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On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2022

Michael Nielsen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

Abstract

In a recent paper, Pettigrew (2022) reports a generalization of the celebrated accuracy-dominance theorem due to Predd et al. (2009), but Pettigrew’s proof is incorrect. I will explain the mistakes and provide a correct proof.

Type
Discussion Note
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Aliprantis, Charalambos D., and Border, Kim C.. 2006. Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s Guide. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
de Finetti, Bruno. 1974. Theory of Probability. A Critical Introductory Treatment . Vol. 1. Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics. London-New York-Sydney: John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
Pettigrew, Richard. 2016. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettigrew, Richard. 2022. “Accuracy-first Epistemology Without the Additivity Axiom.” Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Predd, Joel B., Seiringer, Robert, Lieb, Elliott H., Osherson, Daniel N., Vincent Poor, H., and Kulkarni, Sanjeev R.. 2009. “Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules.” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar