Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T01:40:41.793Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On the Seriousness of Mistakes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Isaac Levi
Isaac Levi*
Affiliation:
Western Reserve University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense—i.e., in a sense which reduces “accepting P” to “acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O”. In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of “accepting a hypothesis”; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , January 1962 , pp. 47 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1962

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

∗∗

Acknowledgements are due to Professors Ernest Nagel and Sidney Morgenbesser and to Mr. John McLellan for their helpful comment, and encouragement.

References

[1] Braithwaite, R.B. Scientific Explanation, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1953.Google Scholar
[2] Carnap, R., “Remarks on Induction and Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. 6, 1945–46, pp. 590–602.10.2307/2103107CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Chernoff, H. and Moses, L., Elementary Decision Theory, New York: Wiley, 1959.Google Scholar
[4] Churchman, C.W., “Science and Decision Making,” Philosophy of Science, v. 23, 1956, pp. 247–249.10.1086/287490CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Churchman, C.W., Theory of Experimental Inference, New York: MacMillan, 1948.Google Scholar
[6] Edwards, Allen L., Statistical Analysis for Students in Psychology and Education, New York: Rhinehart, 1946.Google Scholar
[7] Hempel, C.G., Review of (5) in Journal of Philosophy, v. 46, 1949, pp. 557–561.10.2307/2019448CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[8] Jeffrey, R.C., “Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses,” Philosophy of Science, v. 23, 1956, pp. 237–246.10.1086/287489CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[9] Levi, I., “Must the Scientist Make Value Judgements?” Journal of Philosophy, v. 58, 1960, pp. 345–357.10.2307/2023504CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[10] Neyman, J., “Basic Ideas and Some Recent Results of the Theory of Testing Statistical Hypotheses,” Royal Statistical Society, v. 105, 1942, pp. 292–327.10.2307/2980436CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[11] Neyman, J. and Pearson, E.S., “The Testing of Statistical Hypotheses in Relation to Probabilities a priori,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, v. 29 (1932–33).Google Scholar
[12] Rudner, R., “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgements, Philosophy of Science, v. 20, 1953, pp. 1–6.10.1086/287231CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[13] Savage, L.J., The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley, 1954.Google Scholar
[14] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1947.Google Scholar
[15] Wald, A., Statistical Decision Functions, New York: Wiley, 1950.Google Scholar