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Probabilistic Causality and Simpson's Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Richard Otte
Richard Otte*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Cruz
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Abstract

This paper discusses Simpson's paradox and the problem of positive relevance in probabilistic causality. It is argued that Cartwright's solution to Simpson's paradox fails because it ignores one crucial form of the paradox. After clarifying different forms of the paradox, it is shown that any adequate solution to the paradox must allow a cause to be both a negative cause and a positive cause of the same effect. A solution is then given that can handle the form of the paradox that Cartwright's solution ignored, and allows causes to be both a positive and a negative cause of an effect.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 110 - 125
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author would like to thank Paul Humphreys, Tom Grimes, and two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This research was supported in part by Faculty Research funds and funds granted by the Regents of the University of California.

References

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