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Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

L. Nathan Oaklander  and
Silvano Miracchi
L. Nathan Oaklander
Affiliation:
University of Michigan—Flint
Silvano Miracchi
Affiliation:
Beverly Hills, California
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Abstract

Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of “negative” sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the Ideal Language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the Ideal Language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , September 1980 , pp. 434 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We wish to thank L. Addis, P. Butchvarov, T. Foster, R. Grossmann, and the anonymous referee for Philosophy of Science for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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