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Science Nominalized?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Susan C. Hale  and
Michael D. Resnik
Susan C. Hale
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Michael D. Resnik
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Abstract

We argue that Horgan's program for nominalizing science fails, because its translation of quantitative statements destroys the inferential structures of explanations, predictions and retrodictions of nonquantitative scientific facts.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 277 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

Horgan, T., (1984), “Science Nominalized”, Philosophy of Science 51: 529–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar