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The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Wesley C. Salmon
Wesley C. Salmon*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Abstract

A consideration of some basic problems that arise in the attempt to provide an adequate characterization of statistical explanation is taken to show that an understanding of the nature of scientific explanation requires us to deal with the philosophical problems connected with the nature of prior probabilities.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 1965 , pp. 137 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

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