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Border-Line Cases, Vagueness, and Ambiguity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Irving M. Copilowish
Irving M. Copilowish*
Affiliation:
The University of Chicago
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Extract

This paper is concerned with two closely related problems: the first is the general question of border-line cases; the second is a suggested identification of the notions of ambiguity and vagueness. In the first part of the paper I propose to discuss border-line cases in the following way: I shall say what is meant by “border-line cases,” discuss their genesis, enumerate and evaluate the different methods of resolving such cases, and make a brief comment or two the bearing, if any, that such cases have on logical theory. In the second part it will be suggested that the notion of vagueness can be reduced to the status of a special but important case of ambiguity; I hold that such a reduction would effect both an economy and a clarification.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , April 1939 , pp. 181 - 195
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Notes

1 Foundations of the Theory of Signs: Charles W. Morris. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 2; The University of Chicago Press, 1938. I am greatly indebted to Professor Morris for a number of points expressed in this paper. I have also to thank my friend Dr. Bruce Waters for valuable criticism and help in preparing this paper.

2 Vagueness: Max Black. Philosophy of Science, Vol. IV, no. 4, pp, 427 ff.

3 Concepts and Twilight Zones: M. R. Cohen. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, no. 25, pp. 673 ff.

4 That is, for objects such as tables and chairs. I should not care to make the statement for entities of a higher logical type, or for entities on different type levels.

5 Stout has suggested “any m of n listed properties“. The comments made in this paper would remain essentially unchanged if his formulation were adopted.

6 The Law of the Excluded Middle may be formulated in either of two ways: ontologically, as “A is either B or not-B“; or semantically, as “For any A, either B can be predicated truly of A, or not-B can be predicated truly of A.” It is of course only with respect to the second formulation that a border-line case may be said to occasion difficulty.

7 Science and Sanity: Alfred Korzybski. Lancaster, Pa., 1933.

8 We focus our attention on the particular case iv only for the sake of greater definiteness. The analysis holds for any such type of case, with only the most minor alterations.

9 At least, there is the two-fold denoting mentioned. Whether or not this is the source of satisfaction is a matter for the aesthetician to decide.