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Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jan Sprenger
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Abstract

To what extent does the design of statistical experiments, in particular sequential trials, affect their interpretation? Should postexperimental decisions depend on the observed data alone, or should they account for the used stopping rule? Bayesians and frequentists are apparently deadlocked in their controversy over these questions. To resolve the deadlock, I suggest a three-part strategy that combines conceptual, methodological, and decision-theoretic arguments. This approach maintains the pre-experimental relevance of experimental design and stopping rules but vindicates their evidential, postexperimental irrelevance.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 5 , December 2009 , pp. 637 - 649
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank José Bernardo, Bruce Glymour, Valeriano Iranzo, Kevin Korb, Deborah Mayo, Jonah Schupbach, Gerhard Schurz, Aris Spanos, Kent Staley, Roger Stanev, Carl Wagner, the referees of Philosophy of Science, and especially Teddy Seidenfeld for their helpful and stimulating feedback.

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