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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
This study is an attempt partially to describe the sociological foundations of modern science. When the question is put, under what social circumstances did the idea of science develop, one sees that there is here an inadequately explored sociological area. Perhaps a definition and a contrast will make this clearer. By the idea of science is meant simply the proposition that the valid source of human knowledge is to be found in the analysis of experience. But knowledge in this sense was not a problem in the medieval period. In the first place, it was then taken for granted that the universe was intelligible to man on the basis of divinely revealed principles. Secondly, man constituted the center of the universe, which in its entirety was thought to be subordinate to man's destiny. Thirdly, not only was the universe which existed for man then known by him, but it was endowed with human qualities. The categories of interpretation were substance, essence, form, matter, quality, and purpose. The reason why rain fell upon the earth was to grow crops; the purpose of the moon and the stars was to light the earth at night, and to act as guideposts for him on his travels. Bodies tended to their proper places, light ones upward, heavy ones earthward. Quantitative differences were inferred from these qualitative ones. It is well-known, for example, how tenaciously was the knowledge held, that heavier objects fall more quickly than lighter ones. And finally, the universe was religious. If the world existed for the benefit of man, man existed for the glory of God. Human sojourn upon the earth was merely preparation for permanent residence in eternity.
This paper was originally presented to the spring, 1946 meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society, at Lansing, Michigan.
1 Burt, E. A., The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (2nd ed.), p. 4. I am indebted to R. F. Jones' excellent Ancients and Moderns not only for some quotations below, but for the concept “idea of science,” as well as some other points not directly credited.
2 Burtt, op. cit., p. 11.
3 Turgot, On the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. by McQuilkan De Grange, p. 6. Hanover, New Hampshire, The Sociological Press. 1929.
4 J. G. Crowther, Social Relations of Science, p. 1.
5 Thorstein Veblen is one who holds that “curiousity” accounts for the scientist's scientific activity. See the first two essays in The Place of Science in Modern Civilization.
6 From the “Prologue” by Albert Einstein in Max Planck, Where is Science Going? p. 8–9.
7 Farrington, Science and Politics in Antiquity; Crowther, Social Relations of Science, p. 61–62.
8 Galileo Galilei, Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, p. 1. Trans. by Henry Crew and Alsonso De Salvio. Northwestern University Press, 1939.
9 See John Herman Randall, Jr., “The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. i, no. 2, p. 197–207 (April, 1940).
10 This is also the first time that Christian conceptions of manual work began to be accepted by the upper class, but to a great extent in complete independence of Christian morality! Cf. Nietszche, The Geneology of Morals, and H. M. Robertson, Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism (1933), who are in opposition to Max Weber on this point.
11 W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, A History of Science, p. 65, (1929 ed.). Cf. Randall, op. cit., on attempts to find this “new method”. It is not relevant to this study to inquire into “... the causes which produced the great failure of Europe to increase the stores of natural knowledge in the middle ages. ...” This has been done to a certain extent by Dampier-Whetham and other historians of science.
12 I find it necessary summarily to dismiss Draper's jaundiced view of Bacon: “... Lord Bacon ... never received the Copernican system. With the audacity of ignorance, he presumed to criticize what he did not understand, and with a superb conceit, disparaged the great Copernicus. ... The more closely we examine the writings of Lord Bacon, the more unworthy does he seem to have been of the great reputation awarded to him. The popular delusion to which he owes so much originated at a time when the history of science was unknown. ... This boasted founder of a new philosophy could not comprehend, and would not accept, the greatest of all scientific doctrines when it was plainly set before his eyes. ... Few scientific pretenders have made more mistakes than Lord Bacon. ... It is time that the sacred name of philosophy should be severed from its long connection with one who was a pretender in science, a time-serving politician, an insidious lawyer, a corrupt judge, a treacherous friend, a bad man.” John William Draper, History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol. 2, p. 258–260. Revised Edition, N. Y., no date.
13 In Galileo's Dialogues are many examples of the contrast between the reason of the scientist and the Reason of the philosophers.
14 Cf. E. Zilsel. “The Origins of William Gilbert's Scientific Method,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 11 (1941). The quotation is given in R. F. Jones, Ancient and Moderns. p. 16.
15 For a more detailed comparison of Norman and Gilbert, see Zilsel, op. cit., from which the above comparison is partially drawn. It should be noted that I am not attempting here an assay of the “causal” relations, if any, between the views and methods of these men.
16 W. E. H. Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. II (1869 edition). See particularly the sections, “The Growth of Asceticism,” “The Saints of the Desert,” “Decline of the Civic Virtues,” “General Moral Condition of the Byzantine Empire,” and “Distinctive Excellencies of the Ascetic Period.” Jesus himself was of the Essenes, who among the Jews had constituted a complete monastic society, abstaining from marriage and separating themselves wholly from the world. Cf. the story of Jesus and Mary Magdalene.
17 G. G. Coulter, The Inquisition.
18 R. F. Jones, op. cit., p. 30.
19 This does not mean, of course, that after 1690, none have looked to an alleged “golden age”—there are many who long for the “good old days.” But, as a general view, the idea of the degeneracy of man and nature had declined. For a more detailed discussion of Hakewill and Johnstone, see R. F. Jones, op. cit., p. 30–39. Jones has in many respects an excellent statement of the “decay of nature,” discussing a number of works pro and con on the matter. See also J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress. In the discussion of Francis Bacon given below, no attempt has been made to estimate his influence in reference to the sloughing off of the idea of decay-, one may say that it was of the greatest. Nor has the discussion of the reason men have for hope been in terms of decay—a conception which Bacon combatted—but in more positive, constructive terms of developing science and scientific method. In some cases a direct connection might be difficult to establish, but it seems reasonable to me, at least, that those men who based their argument against the idea of decay, upon then recent scientific and technological inventions, received at least the cue as to the form of their argument from Bacon. It should also be stated, that if the argument of this paper is correct, the struggle against the idea of the decay of nature would have assumed the form it did, whether or not Bacon had published anything.
20 Robert H. Merton says that these three “common but unsound postulates must be avoided” in discussing the relations between science and society, in “Science and the Economy of Seventeenth Century England,” Science and Society, Vol. III, p. 3–7 (Winter, 1939).
21 R. F. Jones, Ancients and Moderns. The discussion of Carpenter is based primarily on Jones' evaluation of him.
22 Geographie Delineated Fourth in Two Books, p. 44–45. Spelling modernized. Quoted in R. F. Jones, Op. cit.
23 Op. cit., p. 141–142. Parenthesis supplied. Quotation from R. F. Jones, Op. cit.
24 The Strange and Dangerous Voyage of Captain Thomas James And an Advise concerning the Philosophy of These late Discoveries, by W. W. London, 1633. The quotations from Watts are given in R. F. Jones, op. cit., p. 75–78. Spelling modernized.
25 James, op. cit. 1740 ed.
26 James, op. cit., 1740 ed. The quotations are, respectively from pages 3–4; 121–122; 125.
27 Cf. Sir William Temple, Essay Upon the Ancient and Modern Learning (1690).
28 R. F. Jones, op. cit., p. 83.
29 Auguste Compte, Positive Philosophy, Book Six, Ch. I. Martineau Trans.
30 Works, Vo.. V, p. 308.
31 Works, Vol. VIII, p. 53.
32 Works, Vol. VIII, p. 27–28, 29–30.
33 To avoid excessive footnotes, the note (Aph.—) refers to the numbered aphorism in Novum Organum.
34 Works, Vol. VIII, p. 31.
35 “Among the parts of history which I have mentioned, the history of Arts is of most use, because it exhibits things in motion and leads more directly to practice. Moreover, it takes off the mask and veil from natural objects. ... Among the particular arts those are to be preferred which exhibit, alter and prepare natural bodies and materials of things—such as agriculture, chemistry, cooking and dyeing—the manufacture of glass, enamel, sugar, gunpowder, artificial fires, paper, and the like. Those which consist principally of the subtle motions of the hands or instruments are of less use; such as weaving, carpentry, architecture, manufacture of mills, clocks, and the like; although these too are by no means to be neglected, both because many things occur in them which relate to the alterations of natural bodies, and because they give accurate information concerning local motion, which is a thing of great importance in very many respects.” Bacon, Parasceve, Aphorism V, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 363–364.
Helps in the understanding of the Interpretation of Nature ... “I will put Instances of Power, ... which I also call Instances of the Wit, or Hands of Man. These are the noblest and the most consummate works in each art. ... For since our main purpose is to make Nature serve the business and conveniences of man, it is altogether agreeable to that object that the works which are already in man's power should ... be noted ... because starting from them we should find an easier and nearer passage to new works hitherto unattempted. ... For what we have to do is simply this: to seek out and thoroughly inspect all mechanical arts, and all liberal arts too (as far as they deal with works). ... Bacon, Novum Organum, Pt. II, Aphorism XXXI, p. 239–241, Works, Vol. VIII.
36 Ibid, Vol. VIII, p. 26, 106: One more example will suffice: “men have been kept back as by a kind of enchantment from progress in the sciences by reverence for antiquity, by the authority of men accounted great in philosophy, and then by general consent.” “... if the truth must be spoken when the rational and dogmatic sciences began the discovery of useful works came to an end.” P. 116, 118.
37 Works, Vol. VIII, p. 33–34.
38 Works, Vol. VIII, p. 31.
39 Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 36.
40 Quoted in J. G. Crowther, Social Relations of Science, p. 341.
41 Works, Vol. VIII, p. 40–41.
