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Do I ever directly raise my arm?1,2

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Robert A. Imlay
Robert A. Imlay
Affiliation:
University of Toronto.
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Extract

Do I ever directly raise my arm? Before dealing with this question we must make clear that the corresponding affirmation is to be taken as a way of rejecting one interpretation of the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ On the interpretation of the question I have in mind the appropriate reply, if the question were not rejected, would be, ‘I raise my arm in or by doing something internal’. The way we are employing the phrase ‘doing something internal’ will, I think, become clear when we consider candidates for the description ‘doing something internal’. But it is important to remember that to affirm that I directly raise my arm is to reject the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ on our interpretation of the question.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue 160 , April 1967 , pp. 119 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1967

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References

page 119 note 3 For a fuller discussion of what we choose to call ‘doing something directly’, see Danto's, Arthur C. article entitled ‘Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. II, 1965, pp. 141–48.Google Scholar

page 119 note 4 Prichard, H. A., ‘Acting, Willing, Desiring’, Moral Obligation, pp. 186–98.Google Scholar

page 119 note 5 James, William, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, p. 493.Google Scholar

page 121 note 1 Dawes, Hicks G., ‘The Nature of Willing’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S. vol. XIII, 1912–1913, p. 38Google Scholar. This passage is quoted by Vesey in the article referred to in note 1 on page 123.

page 122 note 1 Ladd, John, ‘Freewill and Voluntary Action’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XII, 1951–1952, p. 393Google Scholar. This passage also is quoted by Vesey in the article referred to in note 1 on page 123.

page 123 note 1 Vesey, G. N. A., ‘Volition’, Philosophy, vol. XXXVI, 1961, pp. 352–365CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 123 note 2 Vesey, G. N. A., p. 362.

page 123 note 3 Vesey, G. N. A., p. 362.

page 125 note 1 Vesey, G. N. A., p. 353.