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Impartial Perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

David H. Sanford
David H. Sanford
Affiliation:
Duke Universityx
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Extract

McTaggart's argument for the unreality of space, unlike his argument for the unreality of time, has nothing to do with token-reflexives. The argument for the unreality of time depends on the contention that there would be no time if there were no facts whose descriptions essentially contain temporally token-reflexive expressions such as ‘now’, ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. According to Michael Dummett, McTaggart was right not to make an analogous claim about space

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 58 , Issue 225 , July 1983 , pp. 392 - 395
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1983

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References

1 Michael, Dummett, ‘A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time’, Philosophical Review 69 (1960), 500–501, reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), 354.Google Scholar

2 Geach, P. T., Truth, Love and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 101.Google Scholar

3 Moore, G. E., ‘Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930–33’, Mind 64 (1955), 11, reprinted in Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959),306–307.Google Scholar