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Malcolm and Smart on Brain-Mind Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Robert Hoffman
Affiliation:
New york University.

Extract

In ‘Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory’ Malcolm argues that Smart's brain-mind identity theory is not even false, but is unintelligible. I want to comment on his arguments.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1967

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References

page 128 note 1 Malcolm, Norman, ‘Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory’, Dialogue, III, 2 (1964), pp. 115125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 128 note 2 Smart, J. J. C., ‘Materialism’, The Journal of Philosophy, LX, 22 (1963), pp. 651662CrossRefGoogle Scholar and ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, The Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 2 (1959), pp. 141–156.

page 129 note 1 In Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed., Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, 2nd edit. (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 31, 33.Google Scholar

page 129 note 2 Hampshire, Stuart, ‘The Interpretation of Language: Words and Concepts’, in Mace, C. A., ed., British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, 1957, p. 275.Google Scholar

page 130 note 1 Moore, George Edward, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, 1953, p. 1.Google Scholar

page 130 note 2 Russell, Bertrand, ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’, reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, 1917, pp. 97124.Google Scholar

page 131 note 1 Lashley, K. S., ‘In search of the Engram’, Symposia of the Society of Experimental Biology, 4: 454482 (1950).Google Scholar

page 135 note 1 Smart, J. J. C., ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, p. 150.Google Scholar

page 136 note 1 ‘Experience’ is a syncategorematic expression in this context, so no question of where ‘the experience’ is, etc., arises.