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Reason, Passion, and Action: the Third Condition of the Voluntary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

T. D. J. Chappell
T. D. J. Chappell
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
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Extract

1. ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them.’ (Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (THN) 2.3.3) Unfortunately, Hume uses ‘reason’ to mean ‘discovery of truth or falsehood‘ (THN 3.1.1) as well as discovery of logical relations. So suppose we avoid, as Hume I think does not, prejudging the question of how many ingredients are requisite for action, by separating these two claims out:

A. Reason (= logical powers) is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.

B. Reason (= belief(s)) is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 70 , Issue 273 , July 1995 , pp. 453 - 459
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1995

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References

1 Dancy, Jonathan, ‘Why there is really no such thing as the theory of motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1995; John McDowell, ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Suppl.) 1978Google Scholar

2 If, at any rate, ‘motivate’ means ‘get us going into action’. But how else is it to be construed, except in the circularity-generating sense 'get us going into action in the way that desires do'?Google Scholar

3 Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy 1958Google Scholar

4 Nonetheless I mean it when I say that practical wisdom, excellence in practical reason, is an ideal, and part of what I mean by saying that is that, although there may be much to learn from exemplars of practical reason or wisdom in action, it is always possible for us to reject or transcend any particular exemplar. Those persons or actions which we take to be exemplars of practical reason or wisdom do not set boundaries to what we may learn.Google Scholar