¹ Kvanvig, Jonathan, ‘Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?’, The Monist 81 (3) (1998), 426–451CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In this paper, Kvanvig couches the challenge as a challenge to epistemology, but it seems from this and subsequent papers, for example Kvanvig, Jonathan, ‘Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal’, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, (eds) Sosa, E. and Steup, M., 285–96, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005)Google Scholar, that the challenge is motivated by worries about the importance of the study of knowledge rather than epistemology as a whole. It should, however, be noted though that in his earlier paper, Kvanvig explicitly takes the ‘pre-eminence of knowledge’ in philosophical inquiry to be the same thing as the ‘pre-eminence of epistemology’.

² Pritchard, Duncan, ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, in Haddock, , Millar, and Pritchard, , The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, 3–88, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 10–14. For the sake of space and the for the focus of the paper, I won't provide a detailed defence of Pritchard's articulation of the value problems. For a brief discussion regarding the appropriateness of the tertiary problem, however, see the next footnote.

³ Miranda Fricker, considering the claim that knowledge has a value that is different in kind from the value of whatever falls short of knowledge, writes that the claim corresponds ‘to no natural philosophical intuition or question’. Fricker, Miranda, ‘The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64) (2009), 121–138 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 127–128. A thought that might motivate the claim is that knowledge is a different and superior sort of epistemic standing than justified true belief and other epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge, and that it would seem odd if this was not somehow reflected in the account of it's value.

⁴ Note that ‘true opinion’ here is often read as true belief. For example, see Duncan Pritchard, ‘The Value of Knowledge’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, (Fall 2008 Edition). When this is so the question of comparative value that is being raised relates to the primary problem. It would be a mistake to simply assume that Socrates’ use of what is translated as ‘knowledge’ and ‘true opinion’ or ‘true belief’ fits neatly with how we understand those terms today. For example, Scott interprets Socrates’ use of, what is often translated as, ‘knowledge’ as playing the role of understanding why something is the way it is. Scott, Dominic, Plato's Meno (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 179. Nevertheless, the Socratic discussion still serves as a rich starting point for the discussion of the value of knowledge.

⁵ Plato, , Meno in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, translated by Guthrie, W. K. C., 353–384 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁶ Benjamin Jowett translates Socrates as saying it is wrong. Plato, Meno, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (Online: Forgotten Books, 2008). In contrast, W. K. C. Guthrie translates Socrates as saying that it appears to be wrong. Op. cit. note 5, at 380.

⁷ Ethics, knowledge, and inquiry are each discussed in the Meno, but a recurring topic is virtue.

⁸ The discussion of the distinction is brief and what is meant can be interpreted in different ways. Interpreting the Meno is generally a knotty task as the dialogue quickly traverses a range of topics, makes numerous references – the significance of many of which are oblique, and many of the comments made in the dialogue seem best understood as displays of Platonic irony. For example, near the beginning of the dialogue Socrates tells Meno that he, Socrates, is a forgetful person and towards the end of the dialogue Socrates asks Meno to convince Anytus about what Meno believes to be true following their discussion of virtue. Op. cit. note 5, at 354 and 384). These comments are ironic because during the dialogue the case is made that knowledge comes about through a process of recollection and that virtue can't be taught. Op. cit. note 5, at 371 and 380). Furthermore, as Dominic Scott notes, Anytus ‘was one of two people most active in bringing about Socrates’ trial and execution’. Op. cit. note 4, at 163. A joint reading of the Meno and Robin Waterfield's work creates an impression that the Meno is closely connected to representing Socrates’ role and responsibility in Athenian society. Waterfield, Robin, Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (New York: Norton, 2010)Google Scholar.

⁹ Op. cit. note 5.

¹⁰ More specifically, Socrates claims that the explanatory reasoning or the working out of the reason for something is accomplished by the process of recollection. Op. cit. note 5, at 381.

¹¹ Op. cit. note 5, 381.

¹² Kvanvig, Jonathan, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15–16 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Fricker discusses, in the context of discussing the value of knowledge, both dogmatic true beliefs and knowledge that is more easily lost than true beliefs. Op. cit. note 3. The latter would be particularly troubling if it could be shown that knowledge more often has this feature in comparison to true belief, as then the Socratic account of the value of knowledge would be untenable; knowledge just wouldn't be more stable than true belief. In the broader discussion of the value of knowledge, Fricker herself defends a Meno-type response according to which knowledge is generally more valuable than true belief, as knowledge generally yields resilient true belief.

¹⁴ Greco develops his position across a number of works: Greco, John, ‘The Value Problem’, The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Bernecker, Sven and Pritchard, Duncan, 219–231 (New York: Routledge, 2011)Google Scholar; Greco, John, Achieving Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Greco, John ‘The Value Problem’, Epistemic Value, edited by Haddock, Adrian, Millar, Alan, and Pritchard, Duncan, 313–321 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)Google Scholar. More recently Greco has offered a somewhat different account of knowledge, though this account doesn't seem better equipped to solve each of the value problems identified by Pritchard. The account requires that the knowing agent's exercise of an intellectual ability is such that it ‘regularly serve relevant informational needs, both local (actual) and global (typical and/or likely)’ and that the belief being produced by an intellectual ability of this sort contributes ‘in a way that would regularly serve relevant informational needs, both local and global’. Greco, John, ‘A (Different) Virtue Epistemology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1) (2012), 1–26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 27.

¹⁵ A cognitive ability fits into the broader category of epistemic virtue. Sosa offers a similar virtue, albeit one that appeals to competence rather than ability. Sosa, Ernest, A Virtue Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ The idea is that as such, the success is credit worthy, the success wasn't just, say, down to luck. See the following for further discussion of the credit thesis: Zagzebski, Linda, ‘The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good’, Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 12–28 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Greco, John, ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, edited by DePaul, Michael and Zagzebski, Linda, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Riggs, Wayne, ‘Two Problems of Easy Credit’, Synthese 169 (2009), 201–216 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ John Greco ‘The Value Problem’, Epistemic Value, op. cit. note 14, at 318.

¹⁸ He claims that ‘virtuous belief that is not true’ is not ‘intrinsically valuable, or constitutive of what has intrinsic or final value, in just the way that knowledge is’. John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, op. cit. note 14, at 99. In the context of his overall account, what he writes here is vague. He seems to be leaving open the possibility that virtuous belief that is not true might also have the same kind of value as knowledge albeit in some other way. However, later Greco clearly endorses the knowledge as achievement argument as providing a solution to the tertiary value problem, i.e. showing that knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge. John Greco, ‘The Value Problem’, The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, op. cit. note 14.

¹⁹ John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, op. cit. note 14, at 97–98. Rather than being about value in virtue of an internal property, a good that is finally valuable is valuable for its own sake either in virtue of relational properties or intrinsic properties. Pritchard identifies the first book off the first printing press as an example of something that is finally valuable. This first book's relational property with the first printing press is what makes the book valuable. Op. cit. note 2, at 30.

²⁰ Greco previously characterised knowledge as having intrinsic value, and later as having both intrinsic and final value. John Greco ‘The Value Problem’, Epistemic Value, op. cit. note 14; John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, op. cit. note 14.

²¹ Op. cit. note 2, at 31.

²² Op. cit. note 2. Pritchard also charges that Greco's account of the nature of knowledge fails to predict knowledge in intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Given that Greco's account of the value of knowledge falls out of his account of the nature of knowledge, if Pritchard is right, then there is a corresponding gap in his account of the value of knowledge. In other words, if Pritchard is right, then then Greco needs to explain why testimonial knowledge enjoys the same value as other cases of knowledge. In fact, Greco denies that Pritchard is right. John Greco ‘The Value Problem’, Epistemic Value, op. cit. note 14. Pritchard is drawing on Jennifer Lackey's research for both the objections to Greco's account of the nature of knowledge discussed in this section. Lackey, Jennifer, ‘Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know’ Synthese 158 (2007), 345–361 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Roughly, Greco's own response is that the case is underdescribed and that abilities are enviroment-relative. As we'll see, however, there are other reasons to reject Greco's account of the value of knowledge. John Greco ‘The Value Problem’, Epistemic Value, op. cit. note 14.

²⁴ It's important to note that I'm using ‘justified belief’ interchangeably with ‘epistemically virtuous belief’.

²⁵ Of course this is an example of an epistemic virtue being conceived of as an ability. Within virtue reliabilism it's typical for the virtues relevant for the attainment of knowledge to be conceived of as abilities or competences. Even if, however, one conceives of an epistemic virtue as an intellectual character trait, one can still get the result that the virtuous belief is an achievement. This is regardless of whether the belief is knowledge. Imagine a judge who arrives at a fair-minded belief about a defendant, when so many others would have arrived at a prejudiced belief. Plausibly the judge has a cognitive success because of intellectual virtue.

²⁶ Ernest Sosa is explicit in his assumption of a ‘teleological conception of intellectual virtue, the relevant end being a proper relation to truth’. Sosa, Ernest, ‘Knowledge and intellectual virtue’, The Monist 68(2) (1985), 226–245 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 227.

²⁷ Prima facie and pro tanto may be explained in terms of defeasibility. A good that is prima facie valuable may in a particular instance have that value undercut such that the particular instance has no value; similarly, a good that is prima facie valuable may in a particular instance have that value overridden such that, although the good remains valuable to some extent, it is not all things considered valuable. In contrast, a good that is pro tanto valuable does not have its value undercut.

²⁸ Duncan Pritchard and John Turri, ‘The Value of Knowledge’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (Winter 2012 Edition).

²⁹ John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, op. cit. note 14; op. cit. note 2.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ More recently, Pritchard (2014, 113–114) claims truth to be finally epistemically valuable, though he plausible argues that this does not commit one to claiming truth to be pro tanto finally valuable simpliciter. One possibility he mentions is that from the non-epistemic point of view, the only value of truth is practical value and that value he suggests is a form of instrumental value. Pritchard, Duncan, ‘Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good’, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, edited by Matheson, J. & Vitz, R., (Oxford: Oxford: University Press, 2014)Google Scholar.

³² Kagan, Shelly, ‘Me and My Life’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1994), 309–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 311; Nagel, Thomas, Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

³³ Feldman, Fred, ‘The Good Life: A Defence of Attitudinal Hedonism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(3) (2002), 604–628 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 614–615. It is perhaps natural to think that in the second case the cousin would have knowledge rather than mere true belief, but, regardless of that, the value that the case highlights is plausibly one owing to true belief rather than knowledge.

³⁴ Pritchard, Duncan, What is this thing called knowledge? (London and New York: Routledge, 2006)Google Scholar, at 154–155.

³⁵ A response to what I've outlined here might be to say that this doesn't show that true belief has prima facie or pro tanto value; rather what it shows is that some true beliefs, presumably those pertaining to important aspects of one's life, are intuitively valuable and are perhaps finally valuable. An intuition remains, however, that an agent with a true belief about the world is, prima facie, doing better than an agent with a false belief or who doesn't have any relevant belief about the world.

³⁶ For a discussion of the swamping problem, see Duncan Pritchard and John Turri, op. cit. note 28.

³⁷ Pritchard holds that a correct account of the nature of knowledge must include a safety requirement. For Greco, there is no such requirement in addition to a virtuous belief.

³⁸ Eudaimonia is sometimes translated as happiness but Aristotle doesn't conceive of eudaimonia as some kind of merely psychological state. Eudaimonia is that which the good life consists in and is alternatively translated as flourishing.

³⁹ Aristotle, ‘The Nature of Virtue’, extracts from Nichomachean Ethics (1999) translated by Irwin, Terence, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology edited by Shafer-Landau, Russ, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009)Google Scholar, at 672–673.

⁴⁰ I'm not attempting to provide a definitive interpretation of Aristotle. Rather, like Greco, I am drawing on an Aristotelian approach, which is independently plausible, in my account of the value of knowledge.

⁴¹ Op. cit. note 39, at 673.

⁴² Here I'm avoiding the diverting task of providing an account of friendship but if one holds that virtues like the ones described are necessary to be a potential friend rather than a potential good friend, then that can be granted without it detracting from my general point.

⁴³ Ryan, Shane, ‘The Value of Knowledge’, Dialogue and Universalism 3 (2014), 84–88 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 86.

⁴⁴ The viciousness is in the manner in which he gains knowledge. If he were to gain knowledge of a pointless truth simply by having happened to look in a certain direction, then the viciousness in the manner of knowledge acquisition would be absent. In such a case, although the particular knowledge is pointless, value is still present owing to its form.

⁴⁵ Michael Ridge has argued that immoral achievements aren't valuable. Immoral knowledge might, like knowledge of pointless truths, also lack pro tanto final value. Ridge, Michael, ‘Getting Lost on the Road to Larissa’, Noûs 47(1) (2011), 181–201 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 21.

⁴⁶ Pritchard, Duncan, ‘Achievements, Luck and Value’ Think 25 (2010), 1–12 Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ An alternative way of motivating the move that is made on the basis of the Pierre case is appealing to a revised conception of the unity of the virtues, not to determine what counts as virtuous in a given domain but to determine what has final value in virtue of being constitutive of the good life – a valuation that is naturally understood as neither being restricted to a particular domain, nor, with the revised conception of the unity of virtues in play, necessarily pro tanto in nature.

⁴⁸ While the account of knowledge I have provided makes sense of the eminent place of the study of knowledge in philosophy, I don't take that account to make sense of the relative neglect in post-Gettier epistemology of understanding and wisdom.

⁴⁹ Thanks to Duncan Pritchard for his helpful comments. I also thank the Taiwanese Ministry of Science and Technology. I was in receipt of funding (MOST 104-2811-H-031-006) from the Taiwanese Ministry of Science and Technology for part of the time I was working on this article.