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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2017
In a recent essay Duncan Pritchard argues that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between religious belief and ordinary or non-religious belief. Both of them – so he maintains in the footsteps of Wittgenstein's On certainty – are ultimately grounded on a-rational commitments, namely, commitments unresponsive to rational criteria. I argue that, while this view can be justified theologically, it cannot be advanced philosophically as Pritchard assumes.
I offer an account of Aquinas's reflection on faith and reason to show that the theologian – not the philosopher – is entitled to deal with a-rational commitments, because the truths of faith can be seen as simply intellectual – like the rational statements considered by the philosopher – but also as decisions made by way of divine grace. I also suggest that Pritchard's thesis may be re-proposed on a new basis, if Aquinas's theological stance were reinterpreted so as to point out unexpected connections between theology and philosophy.
1 D. Pritchard, ‘Faith and reason’, Philosophy (Supplement on Religious Epistemology, ed. S. Law), forthcoming (henceforth FR).
2 The expression ‘parity argument’ was first employed by Penelhum, T., God and Skepticism (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Chaps. 2, 5, and 6. Roughly speaking, it requires that the epistemic standard applied to religious belief be no more severe than the one applied to any other belief. This argument was first used by Plantinga, A. in God and Other Minds (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967)Google Scholar, and has since been widely used and also modified. See Alston, W., ‘Religious Experience and Religious Belief’, Noûs 16 (1982), 3–12 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cornell, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Plantinga, A., ‘Reason and Belief in God’, in Plantinga, A. and Wolterstorff, N. (eds) Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame-London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 16–93 Google Scholar; Warranted Christian belief (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Wolterstorff, N., Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.
3 FR, 3.
4 Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty, eds Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §§ 341–343 Google Scholar, cited in FR, 5.
5 Ibid., § 613, cited in FR, 5.
6 See D. Pritchard, ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: the Influence of Newman’, unpublished.
7 Newman, J.H., An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979 [1870]), IX,3,2,2Google Scholar.
8 FR, 5.
9 D. Pritchard, ‘Wittgenstein on faith and reason: the influence of Newman’, 9.
10 ‘Actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam’. (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, tr. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, second and revised edition [London: Oates and Washbourne, 1920]Google Scholar, henceforth ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 9)
11 ‘… per seipsa movent intellectum nostrum vel sensum ad sui cognitionem’. (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 4)
12 ‘Ea enim quae sunt fidei excedunt rationem humanam: unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis nisi Deo revelante. … Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus.’ (ST, II-II, q. 6, a. 1)
13 According to Aquinas, the believer is moved to believe for many reasons such as miracles and, what is more (quod plus est), ‘by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation (interiori instinctu Dei invitantis).’ (See ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 9, ad 3)
14 Aquinas states that ‘science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith (principalis et propria causa fidei) is that which moves man inwardly to assent.’ (ST, II-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1)
15 ‘In so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.’ (ST, II-II, q. 4, a. 8, ad 3)
16 Jenkins, J., ‘Faith and revelation’, in Davies, B. (ed.), Philosophy of religion. A guide to the subject (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007), 202–227 Google Scholar: 216f.
17 ‘Ea quae subsunt fidei dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, in speciali, et sic non possunt esse simul visa et credita, sicut dictum est. Alio modo, in generali, scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis. Et sic sunt visa ab eo qui credit, non enim crederet nisi videret ea esse credenda, vel propter evidentiam signorum vel propter aliquid huiusmodi.’ (ST, II-II q. 1 a. 4, ad 2).
18 They are those revealed truths that for Aquinas can be attained by demonstration: ‘Early, middle and late in his writings, St. Thomas speaks of a twofold knowledge of God, one that was achieved by pagan philosophers and which is based on knowledge of material things, another that results from God's revealing Himself to men’ ( McInerny, R., ‘On Behalf of Natural Theology’, Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 [1980], 63–73: 64CrossRefGoogle Scholar).
19 ‘Per hunc modum fideles habent eorum notitiam, non quasi demonstrative.’ (ST, II-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 1)
20 ‘Rationes quae inducuntur a sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur. Vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, scilicet ex auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae, sicut Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom. Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes.’ (ST, II-II q. 1 a. 5 ad 2)
21 ‘Lumen fidei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis rationis divinitus nobis inditum. Et quamvis lumen naturale mentis humanae sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum quae manifestantur per fidem, tamen impossibile est quod ea, quae per fidem traduntur nobis divinitus, sint contraria his quae sunt per naturam nobis indita.’ (Aquinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, tr. by Brennan R.E. [NewYork: Herder and Herder, 1946], q. 2).
22 ‘Ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem.’ (Ibid.)
23 See Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’. Plantinga seems later to have revised his position in light of an interpretation put forward by various scholars of Aquinas. According to them, Aquinas can be seen as an evidentialist with respect to scientia but not with regard to faith. (See Warranted Christian belief, 83, note 72). It has been argued, however, that it is not clear if Plantinga has seriously rethought the claims advanced in 1983 (see Ceglie, R. Di, ‘Alvin Plantinga and Thomas Aquinas on Theism and Christianity’, Philosophy & Theology 27 [2015], 235–252 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).
24 Referring to Locke's foundationalist perspective, Jenkins (‘Faith and revelation’, 226) states that the ideas expressed by Locke, especially in the fourth part of the Essay on Human Understanding, have widely shaped modern and contemporary views on faith and reason, including interpretations of Aquinas. Among such interpretations, Jenkins cites not only Plantinga's, but also John Hick's, Terence Penelhum's and Louis Pojman's. A different reading of Aquinas's epistemology has been presented by Stump, E. in ‘Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Suppl. Vol. 17, 125–158 Google Scholar. According to Stump, the medieval thinker was not a foundationalist.
25 ‘Ratio humana inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei dupliciter potest se habere ad voluntatem credentis. Uno quidem modo, sicut praecedens, puta cum quis aut non haberet voluntatem, aut non haberet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, nisi ratio humana induceretur. Et sic ratio humana inducta diminuit meritum fidei … Alio modo ratio humana potest se habere ad voluntatem credentis consequenter. Cum enim homo habet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, diligit veritatem creditam, et super ea excogitat et amplectitur si quas rationes ad hoc invenire potest. Et quantum ad hoc ratio humana non excludit meritum fidei, sed est signum maioris meriti.’ (ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 10)
26 ‘Rationes demonstrativae inductae ad ea quae sunt fidei, praeambula tamen ad articulos, etsi diminuant rationem fidei, quia faciunt esse apparens id quod proponitur; non tamen diminuunt rationem caritatis, per quam voluntas est prompta ad ea credendum etiam si non apparerent.’ (ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2)
27 ‘In scientia duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipse assensus scientis ad rem scitam, et consideratio rei scitae. Assensus autem scientiae non subiicitur libero arbitrio, quia sciens cogitur ad assentiendum per efficaciam demonstrationis. Et ideo assensus scientiae non est meritorius. Sed consideratio actualis rei scitae subiacet libero arbitrio, est enim in potestate hominis considerare vel non considerare. Et ideo consideratio scientiae potest esse meritoria, si referatur ad finem caritatis, idest ad honorem Dei vel utilitatem proximi.’ (ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 9, ad 2)
28 Perhaps this is why Claudia E. Murphy says that for Aquinas ‘it is possible for an agent to have sufficient motivation for believing a proposition, and nonetheless to be able at least to withhold assent from it, or even to dissent from it (that is, to be free with respect to coming to believe it)’ ( Murphy, C., ‘Aquinas on Voluntary Beliefs’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2000), 569–597: 586CrossRefGoogle Scholar).
29 ‘Si quid… in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis. Et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophiae huiusmodi errorem refellere vel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel ostendendo non esse necessarium.’ (Aquinas, Super Boethium De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3)
30 Moreover, it is possible to conjecture that something similar might also be affirmed in the absence of the aforementioned contrast, though Aquinas does not state it explicitly. In fact, rejecting any rational statement contrasting with faith logically implies the conviction that reason could be mistaken, even if every argument seems to support its conclusions. It is precisely what Aquinas seems to say elsewhere: ‘In order to avoid mistakes in demonstrating, one should be aware of the fact that quite often something universal seems to be demonstrated, which is not being demonstrated.’ (‘Quod non accidat in demonstratione peccatum, oportet non latere quod multoties videtur demonstrari universale, non autem demonstratur’.) (Aquinas, Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum, I, tr. by F.R., Larcher [Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, 1970 Google Scholar] I, lectio 12.) It is, therefore, possible to attribute to Aquinas the conviction that even when rational arguments confirm the truths of faith, the certainty is offered by faith (which for Aquinas is infallible) and not by reason (which for Aquinas could be mistaken even if every argument apparently suggested that it is not). This hypothesis may be supported by the following passage: ‘A man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.’ (ST, II-II, q. 4 a. 8 ad 2)
31 On this relationship between faith, love for God, and evidence, see Ceglie, R. Di, ‘Faith, Reason, and Charity in Thomas Aquinas's Thought’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2016), 133–146 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 ‘Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta.’ (ST, I, q. 1, a. 8).
33 On this, see Di Ceglie, R., ‘On Aquinas's Theological Reliabilism’, Heythrop Journal, doi: 10.1111/heyj.12243 Google Scholar.
34 ‘Ego hoc vel praecipuum vitae meae officium debere me Deo conscius sum, ut eum omnis sermo meus et sensus loquatur.’ (Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, tr. by Pegis, A., Anderson, J. F., Bourke, V. J., and O'Neil, C.J. [New York: Hanover House, 1955–57], I, 2Google Scholar).
35 FR, 6.
36 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §250, cited in FR, 4.
37 Ibid., §250, cited in FR, 5.
38 I thank Duncan Pritchard for giving comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also grateful to Anthony O'Hear, Editor of Philosophy, for providing useful suggestions and for generously advising me on matters of style and language.
