With the explosion of courses in the ethics of various fields, medical, managerial, environmental and so on, the question of the nature of the philosophical enterprise is once again a live topic. Maybe as a result of sensitivity to accusations of bias and preaching in the way individual philosophers might teach these courses, the supposedly discredited conceptual analysis view is once again gaining adherents. Philosophers ought to clarify concepts and commitments, but they ought not to argue for particular concepts or commitments. When they do, they exceed their brief as philosophers, and become proponents of particular causes and world-views. And this is unprofessional, not to be tolerated in the academy.

Hasok Chang

Lecturer in Philosophy of Science at University College London. His chief research interests are in the history and philosophy of the physical sciences from the 18th century onwards.

Fiona Ellis

Lecturer in Philosophy at Wadham College, Oxford. She works in metaphilosophy, metaphysics, and aesthetics. An article on Sartre is forthcoming in Sartre Studies.

James Somerville

Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Hull. He is author of The Enigmatic Parting Shot. His book The Epistemological Significance of the Interrogative is in preparation.

J. Angelo Corlett

Professor of Philosophy at San Diego State University. He is author of Responsibility and Punishment (Kluwer, forthcoming) and Analyzing Social Knowledge (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), as well as over 50 articles on moral, social, political and legal philosophy, and epistemology. He is also the founding Editor-in-Chief of The Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review.

Charles Taliaferro

Professor of Philosophy, St Olaf College. He is currently writing The Evolution of Modern Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge University Press).

Stephen Hetherington

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He is the author of two books, Epistemology's Paradox (Rowman & Littlefield, 1992) and Knowledge Puzzles (Westview Press, 1996).

Timothy Chappell

Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Dundee. He has published books on ancient philosophy (Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom of Action; The Plato Reader), edited a collection on environmental philosophy (The Philosophy of the Environment), and most recently argued for an Aristotelian pluralism in ethics in Understanding Human Goods.

Jenny Teichman

An Emerita Fellow of New Hall in the University of Cambridge. Her previous publications in Philosophy include papers on personhood, on terrorism and on Derrida, Her last two books are Social Ethics (Blackwell) and Polemical Papers (Ashgate).

I propose a reformulation of realism, as the pursuit of ontological plausibility in our systems of knowledge. This is dubbed plausibility realism, for convenience of reference. Plausibility realism is non-empiricist, in the sense that it uses ontological plausibility as an independent criterion from empirical adequacy in evaluating systems of knowledge. Ontological plausibility is conceived as a precondition for intelligibility, nor for Truth; therefore, the function of plausibilty realism is to facilitate the kind of understanding that is not reducible to mere description or prediction. Difficulties in making objective judgements of ontological plausibility can be ameliorated if we adhere to the most basic ontological principles. The workings of plausibility realism are illustrated through a detailed discussion of how one ontological principle, which I call the principle of single value, can be employed with great effect. Throughout the paper the discussion draws on concrete examples from the history of science.

I am concerned to examine a mode of argumentation in recent analytic philosophy which, I claim, has its origin in Hegel's ‘dialectical’ method. I give examples of this mode of argumentation in McDowell and Wiggins, followed by a formal representation which distinguishes two possible models both of which have negative and positive aspects. I consider what the commitments of the negative aspect of this approach are, and argue that the desire to avoid naturalism constitutes a common goal. I turn then to its positive aspect, making explicit and criticising some of the metaphilosophical implications contained therein. Finally, I make brief contact with Hegel.

Despite some talk of ‘erotetic logic’ and ‘the logic of interrogatives’, logicians have hitherto completely overlooked the peculiar logical form of questions, also shared by interrogative clauses generally. Of relevance to an understanding of time are those interrogative clauses that are janus-like: sometimes raising a question, sometimes answering it—which can then no longer arise. Since a closed question can no longer arise, it might seem that simply the passing of time turns an open into a closed question. Instead, the passing of time itself can be understood as the closing or resolution of open questions, of the determination of what is not fixed but as yet in question.

This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position.

Surprisingly, materialists and dualists often appeal to the same factors in their depiction of being an embodied, human person: sensations, agency, and causal underpinnings. I propose that this picture be expanded to include epistemic, structural, and affective components. I further propose that these elements, taken together, be construed as virtues. Being an embodied, human person consists in the exercise of six types of virtues: Sensory Virtues, the Virtue of Agency, Constitutional Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, Structural Virtues, and Affective Virtues. This project draws on recent contributions to virtue epistemology and to the philosophical analysis of self-respect.

I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzle was effective against its stated logicist targets, it is not thereby an enduring difficulty regarding experience's ability to impart epistemic justification via inductive evidence.

Agents have aims. Any aim can be either simple or complex. If an aim is complex, then its different components make irreducibly different demands on the agent. The agent cannot rationally respond to all these demands by promoting all her different component aims at once. She must recognise a distinction between the rational response to any component aim of promoting it, and the rational response of respecting it.

If the goods are incommensurable, then rational agents have complex aims.

So if the goods are incommensurable, rational agents do not only promote whatever aims they recognise.

But consequentialism tells agents only to promote whatever aims they recognise.

So if the goods are incommensurable, consequentialism is wrong.

I note applications of this argument to the writings of Robert Nozick, Philip Pettit, and John Harris.

David Stove's essay “The intellectual capacity of women” was first published in 1990, in the Proceedings of a Sydney philosophical society. It has been re-published twice since his death. It seems though that during his lifetime Stove himself refused to agree to its being re-printed. This raises two questions: Did Stove believe his essay on women contains mistakes? And: does it contain mistakes?

The main flaws in the essay stem from a rash adoption of simplistic ideas about probability coupled with a question-begging definition of capacity. The work also contains contradictions and exaggerations and some unwise forays into social history. Stove was an intelligent man so it seems likely that he would have recognised those flaws.

The Royal Institute of Philosophy—Jacobsen Fellowships

The Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursaries 2001–2002

In accordance with the deed of trust made by the benefactor Mr. Jens Jacobsen, The Royal Institute of Philosophy is pleased to offer for the academic year 2001–2002 seven Royal Institute of Philosophy Jacobsen Fellowships for research in certain fundamental parts of philosophy. The Fellowships, of £5,000 each, will be for one year.

The parts of philosophy are Speculative Metaphysics, Critical Metaphysics, the Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of Life, Determinism, the Nature of Life, Evolution, Moral Philosophy, Political and Social Philosophy. This list is in accordance with the philosophical interests of Mr. Jacobsen.

In addition, postgraduates are offered eight Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursaries for 2001–2002 of £1,000 each, also for one year, but with no restrictions as to area of study. Candidates may be considered for both Fellowships and Bursaries, but if awarded a Fellowship, will not also be offered a Bursary.

Fellowships and Bursaries will be available only to postgraduate students who have already completed at least one year of work for a higher degree in philosophy in a British University. In making the awards, in accordance with its own remit, The Royal Institute of Philosophy will be seeking candidates whose work, while rigorous, avoids needless technicality and is in the tradition of philosophy as a humane discipline.

In order to be considered for Fellowships or Bursaries or, where appropriate, both, applicants should submit a curriculum vitae of not more than 1,000 words, together with a statement of not more than 500 words outlining their research project. They should also arrange for two academic referees from the institution at which they are currently studying to write on their behalf direct to The Royal Institute of Philosophy. Candidates will not normally be called for interview.

No one will he awarded either a Fellowship or a Bursary who is in receipt of any other award for the academic year 2001–2002 of over £2,000. In view of this restriction, The Royal Institute of Philosophy will be unable to make its final decisions prior to the announcement of the British Academy/AHRB studentships in September 2001. In making their applications, candidates must notify the Institute of their contact address as it will be in September 2001; should their plans change the Institute must be informed immediately.

Applications and references should be sent on or before June l, 2001 to The Secretary, The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 14 Gordon Square, London WC1H 0AG.

Jacobsen Fellowships 2000–2001

The following were awarded Jacobsen Fellowships of £5,000 each for 2000–2001:

Ian Brassington – University of Birmingham

Christopher Ellis – University of Essex

William Fish – University of Nottingham

Thomas Hart – University of Durham

Julian Kiverstein – University of Edinburgh

Gianmatteo Mameli – King's College, London

Cyrus Panjvani – University of St Andrews

Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursaries 2000–2001

The following were awarded Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursaries of £1,000 each:

S. R. Bamford – University of Durham

Nils Kürbis – University of Wales, Lampeter

David Levy – King's College, London

Stefano Manfredi – University of Sheffield

Patrice Philie – University of St Andrews

Dawn Philips – University of Durham

The British Academy – Bayes's Theorem Symposium

The British Academy is holding a one day symposium on Bayes's Theorem at 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1, on Saturday March 10th, 2001, starting at 10am. The main speakers will be Elliott Sober, Colin Howson, Philip Dawid and John Earman. Details from The British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH (telephone: 020 7969 5200, email: r.lambeth@britac.ac.uk). Admission will be free, but prior registration is essential.