As the world's oil resources dwindle, the search for new supplies is touching regions of the globe previously considered too hostile for any kind of sustained operation. The ice-infested coastal waters of eastern and northern Canada are one such region. Already rigs have been at work off Newfoundland and Labrador where there is a long ice-free season and where drifting icebergs are the chief danger. Wells have been drilled on land in the Arctic islands and in one case from fast ice artificially thickened by flooding. However, a proposal to drill in the environmentally sensitive Beaufort Sea aroused widespread concern because of the enormous damage that could be caused by an accidental oil spill or by the blowout of an offshore well. People realized that the polar pack ice presents great dangers, that almost no information existed on the interactions between oil and sea ice, and that the oceanography and biology of the Beaufort Sea were understood only sketchily. To remedy these deficiencies a major environmental impact study, the Beaufort Sea Project, was undertaken in 1974–75 by the federal government of Canada and the oil industry acting in co-operation. The study also served the purpose of definng the conditions and restrictions under which the government would allow offshore drilling to proceed.

[A Commission of Inquiry into the terms and conditions that would have to be established in the event of a natural gas pipeline corridor being built along the Mackenzie Valley heard evidence for about 18 months in all the potentially affected communities, as well as in Yellowknife and some southern cities. The Commission was headed by Justice Thomas Berger, and came to be known as the Berger Inquiry. This article is based on material contained in two papers, entitled ‘Industrial impact’ and ‘An overview’, presented at the Inquiry by the author in August 1976. We are grateful to the Inquiry for allowing us to make use of the material.

Passive microwave images of the polar regions, first produced after the launch of the Nimbus-5 Electrically Scanning Microwave Radiometer (ESMR)in December 1972, have become a valuable new source of polar information. Some of the potential applications of this new capability were anticipated. Of these, the sensing of sea ice through clouds and the polar night is probably the most important application for polar research and for operations on the polar seas. Other applications, such as the measurement of certain near-surfaceice sheet parameters, have been formulated more recently. Measurement of various ocean surface parameters is expected from the forthcoming multifrequency microwave observations. Undoubtedly additional uses of passive microwave datawill be conceived and developed. Two remarkable aspects of satellite-borne microwave radiometers are the complete spatial detail obtained by the scanning sensors and the temporal detail provided by continual coverage. For example, the observations of detailed microwave emission patterns over the Antarctic ice sheet should yield information that could not be obtained by surface or even aircraft measurements. Sequences of images produced at three-day intervalsreveal short-term ice sheet and sea ice phenomena that would otherwise be missed.

Whalers and sealers were the first people to visit the southern oceans in numbers, and in the 1930's Antarctic whaling accounted for some 12 per cent (by weight) of the total harvest of fish and other animals from the sea. It was the importance of the whaling industry and the need to know more about the physical and biological system on which it was based that was the justification for the classic work organized by the Discovery Committee between the wars. Since then whale catches have declined in absolute and relative terms, and public concern for the whale as the victim of an outstanding example of bad management of a large natural resource has increased.

The British Arctic Expedition sailed from Portsmouth on 29 May 1875. It left amid considerable public enthusiasm and with a telegram from the Queen. A contemporary journal had this to say: As we hope, so we believe that they will end their northward advance only at the northernmost meeting of the meridians; that they will return in safety to receive well-won applause and reward for their achievements; and that they will have very much to tell of the circum-polar region, as well as of their hoisting the Union Jack upon the Pole, (The Navy, 1875). The tone of the same journal was very different when reporting the return of the expedition in 1876, one year earlier than expected. One of the milder statements in a highly derogatory article read: Verily the expedition of 18756 has but little of which to boast. It went out like a rocket, and has come back like the stick. The validity of such a judgement needs careful examination against the aims and logistics of the expedition, the attitudes of the officers and men, and, most importantly, the actual achievementsand shortcomingsof the voyage.

The story of the crash of Nobile's dirigible Italia to the north of Svalbard in 1928 and of the complex and often confused multi-national search for the survivors which ensued has become one of the best known themes in the history of Arctic exploration, and One which has given rise to a small library of books weighing every aspect of the story. While the role of the Soviet icebreaker Krasin in this story, as the vessel which reached and rescued the main group of survivors, has become world famous, it is not generally realized that Krasin's voyage represented only one facet of a multi-pronged Soviet assault, aimed at rescuing the Italia survivors. Two other vessels, Malygin and Sedov, were also involved in the search, in each case representing the first voyage for these vessels into the northern Arctic under the Soviet flag. Later, after a refit in Norway, Krasin made a second voyage in the autumn of 1928 to Svalbard and Zemlya Frantsa-Iosifa, still in search of any possible survivors from Nobile's Italia. This article will stress in particular these lesser known aspects of the Soviet rescue operation.

The English explorer Martin Frobisher rediscovered Greenland in 1578, during his third attempt to find a route north of America to the East Indies, and John Davis's subsequent expeditions in 1585-87 established contact with the Eskimos in Greenland. Christian IV, King of Denmark-Norway, fitted out three ships for Greenland in 1605 with the Englishman John Cunningham as commander and the Danish nobleman Godske Lindenow as second-incommand, but he lost interest when no valuable minerals were found. He did, however, reestablish the sovereignty of the Danish crown over Greenland, and thus laid the foundation for later colonization by Denmark.

Now that the air cushion vehicle (ACV) or hovercraft has become an accepted and reliable means of transport, it is of considerable interest to examine its applicability to Arctic operations. Since there are so many different types of ACV, we should first understand the fundamental qualities of these devices, before going on to survey the range of vehicles at present operating.

Nares is perhaps best known as the commander of the Challenger expedition from 1872 to 1874, a voyage of exploration which, it has been said, laid the foundations of almost every branch of oceanography as we know it today (British Museum, 1973). He also achieved fame as commander of the British Arctic Expedition of 187576, and as the author of Seamanship, which went through many editions in the second half of the 19th century. He is a fine example of the serving naval officer in the tradition of Parry, Franklin and Ross, one who could combine a naval career with a broad interest in science and the active pursuit of geographical exploration.

The past ten years have seen a greatly increased interest in the Antarctic krill Euphausia superba Dana (Fig 1). In particular there have been several Russian expeditions whose main aim has been the evaluation of krill as an exploitable resource (Burukovskiy and Yaragov, 1965) and, more recently, Japanese expeditions have ventured into the Southern Ocean with similaraims (Nemoto and Nasu, 1975). It is obviously vital that international agreement should be reached soon to control this potential exploitation of Southern Ocean fisheries. The problem is at present receiving careful consideration by the SCAR Group of Specialists on Living Resources ofthe Southern Ocean.

In a great number of articles now, Soviet historians have dealt with the attractive theme of the enormity of western, and especially American, activities on the north-eastern fringes of Siberia—activities which, starting in the 1860's, lasted for three quarters of a century. Yet, showing no disrespect to scholars of the stamp of N. Zhikharev, S. V. Bakhrushin, and M. I. Belov, through the operation of one underlying tendency all these accounts of western penetration of Chukotka may be regarded as comprising one large group. For 40 years they have tended, if not wholly to ignore the final phase of North American commercial ‘intervention’ in Chukotka in the years following 1920, then at least to place no emphasis whatever on the awkward facts, for instance, that ‘friendly direct contact between Alaska's and Chukotka's natives went on for several years’ and that some trips between the continents ‘went on until as late as 1944’. The reasons for this are not hard to find: Chukotkan history of the third decade is potentially embarrassing to Moscow. In 1921 the question of whether or not Chukotka formed a part of the Soviet state had not been settled, nor was absolute authority exercised in the remote north-east by the Bolsheviks at that point or, indeed, in 1922. Now a White Russian force would dominate an area, now a detachment of the Japanese army. Worse, there was hostility towards the Bolsheviks in Chukotka even after the demise of the anti-Bolshevik leader Bochkarev in 1923. But more embarrassing than any anti-Bolshevik or petty-bourgeois sentiment, there can be no doubt, has proved the tiresome fact that Moscow blessed the trips to Anadyr' and other points on the Chukotkan littoral made by western schooner masters. Here is the rub: for the new government ‘found it convenient to encourage some American traders to continue, because the Government's own communications with Chukotka were so uncertain’.

The creation of a 200-nautical mile [370-km] fishing zone in December 1976 for certain marine areas off the coast of the USSR, including Arctic waters, is a significant development for a subject which has given rise in the past to diplomatic exchanges and confrontations with foreign powers.

Scientific programmes in Antarctica have depended for their fulfilment on small groups of men working in conditions of prolonged social isolation in an alien physical environment. This is true of both early and recent phases of exploration: despite massive advances in technology and, hence, in material comforts and communications over the period, the element of prolonged social isolation remains as a dominant psychological problem. Contrary to the popular image of lonely living conditions and heroic tasks, the Antarctic worker has to cope with the very opposite of loneliness, and his tasks are likely to be mundane and routine. In his work he must adapt to a close, and closed, interpersonal world, and it is with this adaptation that the present article is concerned.

The British Antarctic Survey (BAS) has relied on sledge dogs as the main form of transport for field parties since its predecessor, the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS), imported them in 1945, when it created a permanent presence on the continent. Over the years dogs have been used for extensive work over a very wide area. In 1975 BAS changed its policy with respect to work in the southern Antarctic Peninsula. In future seasons scientists will not winter in this area but will be flown to Adelaide Island and then into the field. They will carry out more detailed scientific work in particular areas of interest. This means that it is no longer practical to maintain huskies on base as they could not be kept fit and well disciplined during the winter for a short summer season. The scientists, similarly, could not be expected to learn to work the dogs efficiently in the time available, and the change in the nature of their work means that they will not move camp so frequently. The dogs, since they must be fed even if they are resting, would be uneconomic in such a situation. Finally, most of the work will be in areas that are thought to be safe so the dogs will not be needed to probe for crevasses. In future seasons BAS will rely on skidoos for field work (Figs 1 and 2).