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Some Effects of Governmental Controls on Neutral Duties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Lawrence Preuss*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan

Abstract

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Type
Third Session
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1937

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References

1 For thoughtful discussions of this problem, see Lauterpacht, H., “Neutrality and Col-lective Security,” Politica, Vol. II (1936), pp. 133-155 Google Scholar; and Jessup, Philip C., Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law, Vol. IV: Today and Tomorrow (New York, 1936), pp. 86-123 Google Scholar.

2 Bone, Senator Homer T., March 3, 1937. 81 Congressional Record, No. 43, p. 2245 Google Scholar.

3 Memorandum submitted by Borchard, Edwin M. to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 9, 1936. Hearings on H. J. Res. 422 (74th Cong., 2d Sess.), p. 75 Google Scholar.

4 “Neutrality and the Munitions Traffic,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1935, p. 46 Google Scholar.

5 49 Stat. 1081.

6 49 Stat. 1152.

7 (S. J. Res. 51), Public Res. No. 27-75th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 1, 1937).

8 See Fenwick, Charles G., The Neutrality Laws of the United States (Washington, D. C, 1913), p. 11 ff.Google Scholar, and Dumbauld, Edward, “Neutrality Laws of the United States,” American Journal Of International Law, Vol. XXXI (1937), p. 258 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See, especially, Moore, John Bassett, Statement submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Jan. 29, 1936. Hearings on S. 3474 (74th Cong., 2d Sess.), pp. 172-188 Google Scholar; also, letter to Fish, Hamilton, Feb. 18, 1937. 81 Cong. Rec, No. 84, pp. 1693-1694 Google Scholar.

10 Lawrence, T. J., The Principles of International Law (7th ed.), pp. 708-709 Google Scholar; The Collected Papers of Westlake, John on Public International Law (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 388-391 Google Scholar; Garner, James W., International Law and the World War, Vol. II (London, 1920), p. 403 Google Scholar; Dennis, W. C., “The Right of Citizens of Neutral Countries to Sell and Export Arms and Munitions of War to Belligerents,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. XL (1915), pp. 172-173 Google Scholar.

11 Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907. Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (1915), p. 209.

12 U. S. For. Rel., 1915, Supp., p. 162; Savage, Carlton, Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War, Vol. II (Washington, 1936), p. 297 Google Scholar. Also, The Secretary of State (Lansing) to the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary (Penfield), Aug. 12, 1916, U. S. For. Rel., 1915, Supp., p. 794; Savage, op. cit., p. 368.

13 Stat. 381.

14 Warren, tec. cit., p. 132.

15 48 Stat. 811; ibid., 1744.

16 Department of State Press Releases, Oct. 5, 1935, p. 255.

17 See Secretary Hull’s statement to the press concerning trade with belligerents, Nov. 15, 1935. Ibid., Nov. 16, 1935, p. 382.

18 During the Italo-Ethiopian war, the German Government placed an export embargo upon munitions and a long list of raw materials. Law of Nov. 6, 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 126, Nov. 15, 1935; Decree of Nov. 9, 1935, Reichsanzeiger, No. 265, Nov. 12, 1935; Ordinance of Nov. 18, 1935, Reichsanzeiger, No. 270, Nov. 18, 1935. Reprinted in Documents on International Affairs, 1935, Vol. II (Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 255-261. See von Freytagh-Loringhoven, "Neue Neutralität," Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. XX (1936), pp. 6-8.

19 See the testimony of representatives of various Italo-American organizations before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on H. J. Res. 422 (74th Cong., 2d Sess.), pp. 177-218 Google Scholar.

20 Albéric Rolin, Le droit moderne de la guerre, T. III (Brussels, 1921), p. 117.

21 Garner, op. cit., pp. 392, 393.

22 Denmark, Greece, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. See the lists of embargoed articles reprinted in International Law Situations, Naval War College, 1915, pp. 33-56.

23 Art. 4 of the Brazilian neutrality regulations, issued on Aug. 4, 1914, provided that “The exportation of articles of war from the ports of Brazil to those of any of the Powers at war, under the Brazilian flag or that of another nation, is absolutely prohibited.” British Yearbook of International Law, 1920-1921, p. 132.

24 U. S. For. Rel., 1915, Supp., p. 804; Savage, opt cit., p. 386.

25 Referring to these neutral embargo measures, the Secretary of State, in a note to the President of Sept. 16, 1915, stated: “It is not possible to ascertain whether the real ground for the embargoes was, in some cases, that of conservation or really to avoid the enmity of the belligerents, to retaliate against some vexatious measure of the belligerents or to maintain a strict neutrality. It may be that in some cases all of these grounds governed the action of the neutral country.” U. S. For. Rel., 1915, Supp., p. 804; Savage, op. cit., p. 386

26 See Vigness, Paul G., The Neutrality of Norway in the World War (Stanford University Publications in History, Economics and Political Science, Vol. IV, No. 1,1932), p. 80 ffGoogle Scholar.

27 See Amry Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of The Netherlands during the World War (Grand Rapids, 1927), p. 6.

28 Declaration of Neutrality of The Netherlands in the European War, Art. 4. Ibid.,p. 313.

29 Ibid., p. 131.

30 The British Government apparently admitted the right to deny access to belligerent armed vessels as a measure of internal legislation, provided that the prohibition was applied impartially and did not conflict with treaty rights. Ibid., p. 115.

31 In reply to a protest from the British Government, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Loudon, stated: “Nothing could be more contrary to the very principle of neutrality than to revoke during the course of a war, and at the demand of one of the belligerents, a rule of neutrality which, owing to the course of events, whatever they may be, proves to be disadvantageous to that belligerent only. This revocation would unquestionably assume the character of a favor, and would consequently be incompatible with the impartiality which is the distinctive feature of neutrality. … Your Excellency’s government will further recognize that it was the British delegates who, at the Second Peace Conference, laid particular stress on the fact that the English doctrine does not admit that a State has the right of modifying its rules of neutrality in the course of the war, except with a view to rendering them more strict.” Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of The Netherlands during the World War, p. 117.

32 Borchard, Edwin M., Jan. 9,1936. Hearings on H. J. Res. 422 (74th Cong., 2d Seas.), p. 61 Google Scholar.

33 “Affirmative changes by a neutral state in its embargo policies either after the out break or during the continuance of a war, are likely to affect the opposing belligerents un equally and the chief belligerent sufferer is bound to complain that the neutral action is a direct attempt to penalize it and so weaken its chances of success. This is true despite clean motives on the part of the neutral and notwithstanding the fact that it may take such steps without necessarily violating a legal duty toward either contestant. The grave consequences that may result from arousing a conviction of a friendly though belligerent state that affirmative neutral action taken after the beginning of a war has robbed it of the fruits of victory, may cause a country such as our own to hesitate long before it goes the whole way, and. by affirmative legislative action makes a radical change in its trade relation ships with a particular belligerent which its law existing prior to the outbreak of the conflict did not contemplate.” Charles Cheney Hyde, memorandum submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Jan. 9, 1936. Ibid., p. 80.

34 “But the difference between no embargo helping one rather than the other and an embargo helping one rather than the other, … lies in the fact that in the first case you cannot be charged with having violated your neutrality, whereas in the second case, by applying an embargo which may help one and not the other, you are doing something which subjects you to the charge of violating neutrality. That is a great difference. One is lawful, the other is lawless.” Edwin M. Borchard, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Jan. 29, 1936. Hearings on S. 3474 (74th Cong., 2d Sess.), p. 193.

35 “International Co-operation for Neutrality,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. LXXXV (1937), p. 351 Google Scholar.

36 Hearings on H. J. Res. 422 (74th Cong., 2d Sess.), p. 46. Also, Charles Warren, statement submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb. 5, 1936, Hearings on S. 3474 (74th Cong., 2d Sess.), pp. 249-251; and testimony of Joseph C. Green before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Feb. 16, 1937, Hearings on H. J. Res. 147 and H. J. Res. 242 (75th Cong., 1st Sess.), p. 20.

37 Supra, note 11.

38 Kunz, Josef L., Kriegsrecht und Neutralitatsrecht (Vienna, 1935), p. 240 Google Scholar.

39 See Vandenbosch, op. cit., pv. 205 ff.; Garner, op. cit., p. 342 ff.; Kunz, op. cit., pp. 262, 263; Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power (New York, 1924), p. 134 ff.; and Phillips Bradley, Can We Stay Out of War? (New York, 1936),'pp. 246-251.

40 Richard Kleen is not wholly consistent in his treatment of commerce by a neutral government with a belligerent. He says: “Le fait de porter secours à un belligérant par des vivres ou autres objets qui ne sont pas des munitions de guerre proprement dites, n’est interdit qu’au seul cas oú c’est I’État lui-méme qui lesjou.mil syslematiquement, dans le but manifeste d’augmenler la résistance du belligérant ou de lui facililer la continuation des hostilités. … Par contre, I’ État neutre peut librement fournir au belligérant des vivres et autres marchandises non de guerre dans un but purement commercial et étranger É la guerre, quand méme celleci en profiterait. … Nous Vavons dija dit, les devoirs de I’ État neutre different de ceux des particuliers. … C’est pourquoi il est interdit à l’, État non au particulier, de fournir à un belligérant certaines marchandises méme non spicialement militaires.” Lois et usages de la neutrality T. I (Paris, 1898), pp. 241, 242.

41 See Stoupnitzky, A., Statut international de I’U.R.S.S.: l’état commergant russe (Paris, 1936), pp. 62 ft., 270 ftGoogle Scholar.

42 See the remarks of H. J. L. Hammarskjöld, in which this distinction, as applied to the transit of contraband over state railways, is suggested. “La neutrality en gbniral,” Bibliotheca Visseriana, T. III (Leyden, 1924), p. 93.

43 “Draft Convention on Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States,” he. cil., comments on Arts. 12 and 26, pp. 641 ff., and 716 ff. Also, Stanley Reed, Thomas W. Palmer, and Louis B. Wehle, “Government-controlled Business Corporations: A Symposium,” Tulane Law Review, Vol. X (1935), pp. 79-101.

44 “See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F. (2d) 524 (Cus. and Pat. App., 1934).

45 See Daimler Co., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber (Great Britain) Co., Ltd., [1916] 2 A.C. 307, and The Hamborn, [1919] A.C. 993.

46 “La technique de la personnalié juridique en droit international public et privé,“ Revue de droit international et de législation comparie, 3° ser., T. XVII (1936), p. 476.

47 Convention on Supervision of International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, June 17, 1925.

48 Professor Hyde, in referring to governmental oversight and control over the manufacture and exportation of munitions of war, suggests that “When the state exercising such a function finds itself neutral to a war that breaks out in any quarter, it must encounter utmost difficulty in denying the allegation that exportations of such articles for a belligerent use be token neutral governmental participation in the conflict.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. LXXXV (1937), p. 355, note 22.

49 See N. Politis, Neutrality and Peace (Washington, 1935), pp. 20-21.

50 E. D. Dickinson, loc. cit., p. 49.

51 Letters by Historicus on Some Questions of International Law (London and Cambridge, 1863), p. 134.