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Fair Division and Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Steven J. Brams  and
Alan D. Taylor
Steven J. Brams
Affiliation:
New York University
Alan D. Taylor
Affiliation:
Union College
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Extract

In the Hebrew Bible, the issue of fairness is raised in some of the best-known narratives. Cain's raging jealousy and eventual murder of Abel is provoked by what he considered unfair treatment by God, who “paid heed” to Abel's offering but ignored his (Gen. 4:4). Jacob, after doing seven years of service in return for Laban's beautiful daughter, Rachel, was told that his sacrifice was not sufficient and that he must instead marry Laban's older and plainer daughter, Leah, unless he did seven more years' service, which he regarded as not only the breaking of a contract but also flagrantly unfair.

Fairness triumphed, however, when King Solomon proposed to divide a baby, claimed by two mothers, in two. When the true mother protested and offered the baby to the other mother (whose baby had died), the truth about the baby's maternity became apparent, and “all Israel … stood in awe of the king; for they saw that he possessed divine wisdom to execute justice” (1 Kings 3:28).

Solomon's proposed solution is the first explicit mention of fair division that we know of in recorded history. But it is, of course, no solution at all. Solomon had no intention of dividing the baby in two. Instead, his purpose was to set up a game between the two women, described in Brams (1980, 118–23; 1990, 17–24), that would distinguish the mother from the impostor.

The solutions of the fair-division procedures we shall discuss are for two players.

Type
Research Article
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , December 1995 , pp. 697 - 703
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1995

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