Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Most methodological writing on economics is by economists. Although the bulk is produced by lesser members of the profession, almost all leading economists have at one time or another tried their hand at methodological reflection. The results are usually poor. If one read only their methodology, one would have a hard time understanding how Milton Friedman or Paul Samuelson could possibly win Nobel Prizes. It thus is less surprising that the economics profession professes such scorn for philosophizing than that its members spend so much of their time doing it.
Methodological reflections on economics pose other puzzles, too. Although this literature is heavily influenced by philosophy—both current and, especially, out-dated—, it is cut off from philosophical discourse. This quasi-autonomy is puzzling, since this literature is concerned with questions that appear to be instances of, if not the same as the questions with which philosophers of science are concerned.
A discussion with Larry Laudan and Gary Downing was instrumental in making me realize the point I try to argue in this paper. Comments and suggestions from Clark Glymour, Frederick Lee, Michael McPherson; Paul Thagard and the audience in Chicago were also extremely helpful.