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Explaining the Success of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Rose-Mary Sargent
Rose-Mary Sargent*
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
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Ever since Hilary Putnam claimed that a realist philosophy is “the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle,” explanations for the success of science have proliferated in the philosophical literature (Putnam 1975, p. 73). Realists argue that the success of science, as exhibited by our ability to accurately predict and explain a wide range of phenomena, indicates that our theories have identified some of the underlying causal structures of the world (e.g., Boyd 1985, Ellis 1985, McMullin 1984, Salmon 1984). Nonrealists counter that success cannot provide a warrant for belief in the truth of scientific theories because there have been successful theories in the past that are now believed to be false (Laudan 1981b). Instead, they offer a naturalized account whereby our theories are designed to be successful predictors and only those which fulfill this goal survive (Laudan 1987, van Fraassen, 1980).

Type
Part II. Epistemology and the Dynamics of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 55 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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