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Heterogeneous anchoring in dichotomous choice valuation framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Emmanuel Flachaire*
Affiliation:
Paris School of Economics, University of Paris I
Guillaume Hollard
Affiliation:
Paris School of Economics, University of Paris I, CNRS
Stéphane Luchini
Affiliation:
GREQAM-IDEP-CNRS
*
EUREOUA, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 bd de l'Hopital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France, tel: +33-144078214, fax: +33-144078231, e-mail: Emmanuel.Flachaire@univ-paris1.fr
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Summary

This article addresses the important issue of anchoring in contingent valuation surveys that use the double-bounded elicitation format. Anchoring occurs when responses to the follow-up dichotomous choice valuation question are influenced by the bid presented in the initial dichotomous choice question. Specifically, we adapt a theory from psychology to characterize respondents as those who are likely to anchor and those who are not. Using a model developed by Herriges and Shogren (1996), our method appears successful in discriminating between those who anchor and those who did not. An important result is that when controlling for anchoring – and allowing the degree of anchoring to differ between respondent groups – the efficiency of the double-bounded welfare estimate is greater than for the initial dichotomous choice question. This contrasts with earlier research that finds that the potential efficiency gain from the double-bounded questions is lost when anchoring is controlled for and that we are better off not asking follow-up questions.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans cette étude, nous nous intéressons au problème de l'ancrage dans les enquêtes d'évaluation contingente à doubles offres successives. Un tel problème apparaît lorsque les réponses obtenues sont influencées par les offres proposées aux individus.

Nous proposons une méthodologie, issue de la psychologie, afin de caractériser deux groupes distincts d'individus : un groupe sensible à l'ancrage et un autre qui ne l'est pas. Adaptant un modèle, proposé par Herriges and Shogren (1996) pour contrôler l'ancrage, nous montrons que la prise en compte d'une telle hétérogénéité permet d'obtenir des estimations plus précises que celles obtenues avec la prise en compte d'une seule offre. Ce résultat contraste avec ceux de la littérature, qui trouvent que le gain de précision obtenu avec la prise en compte d'une deuxième offre est en général perdu en présence d'ancrage significatif, à tel point qu'il vaut mieux ne pas proposer une deuxième offre.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2007 

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