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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The common notion of ‘immortality’ presupposes a ‘dualism’ of mind and body, with the former alone surviving death. Such eminent Muslim thinkers as al-Kindi (A.D. 801–873), known as the Father of Muslim philosophy; al-Farabi (870–950) called ‘The Second Teacher’; ibn Sina (980–1037), that encyclopaedic genius of the Muslim world; and ibn Roshd (1126–1198), have all advocated a very strict kind of ‘dualism’, anticipating Descartes, the Father of modern philosophy, down to the present-day realist-idealists led by Professor H. D. Lewis of the University of London. The dualistic position, however, made even Descartes realize the difficulty of explaining ‘interaction’, or for that matter any kind of relation, which we experience between mind and body in our everyday life - a problem which he and his followers found hard to solve. As every student of modern Western thought knows, Descartes resorted to –interactionism’, Spinoza (like ibn Roshd) took refuge in ‘parallelism7rsquo;, while Leibniz advocated ‘pre-established harmony’ implied in the position of Asharites. Iqbal argues against any such view, ‘I am inclined to think that the hypothesis of matter as an independent existence is perfectly gratuitous. It can only be justified on the ground of our sensations of which matter is supposed to be at least a part-cause other than myself’ (a position taken up by both Locke and Kant). Iqbal contends against the Cartesian hypothesis that ‘We cannot find any observable facts to show how and where exactly their interaction takes place, and which of the two takes the initiative’. Against both ‘parallelism’ and ‘pre-established harmony’ his contention is that they reduce ‘the soul to a mere passive spectator of the happenings of the body’. Thus, Iqbal rejects both ‘interactionism’ and ‘parallelism’ as unsatisfactory.
page 373 note 1 He maintained that ‘the soul is separate from the by and different from it,’ in Rasa'il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyyah, ed. Abu Radah, M. A. (Cairo, 1950, 1953), 1, 273.Google Scholar
page 373 note 2 Al-Thamaratn al-Mardiyyah fi ba'd al-Risalat al-Farabiyyah (Leiden, 1890)Google Scholar; also al-Madinat al-Fadilah (rep. Leiden, 1895).Google Scholar
page 373 note 3 Ibn Sina affirms the ‘incorporeal substantiality’ of soul and its subsequent independence of by in Kitab al-Shifa, pt. v, ch. t (Cairo, n.d.).Google Scholar
page 373 note 4 He discusses mind-body relationship in Talkhis Kitab al-Nafs, ed. EI-Ehwany, A. F. (Cairo, 1950).Google Scholar
page 373 note 5 Lewis, H. D., Persons and Life After Death (Macmillan, 1978), ch. viCrossRefGoogle Scholar, on ‘Immortality and Dualism’.
page 373 note 6 Tahafut al-Tahafut tr. Bergh, Van den (London, 1954), where he holds that ‘…the human soul is related to by as Form to Matter’.Google Scholar
page 373 note 7 Sharif, M. M. (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), 1, 240 and 626.Google Scholar There are, of course, certain important differences between the views of Leibniz and those of the Asharites which may not be ignored, for in the case of the latter ‘harmony’ comes through the Will of God; again, the nature of ‘harmony’ is also different.
page 373 note 8 DrIqbal, M.., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Ashraf, rep. 1977), p. 104.Google Scholar
page 373 note 9 Ibid p. 105.
page 374 note 1 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 105.Google Scholar
page 374 note 2 The name ‘Mutakallimin’ was at first commonly used for all the Dialecticians, but was later applied specially to the Anti-Mutazilite and Orthodox theologians - De Boer, T. J., The History of Philosophy in Islam, Eng. tr. Jones, E. R. (London: Lozac, 1970), p. 43.Google Scholar
page 374 note 3 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 105.Google Scholar
page 374 note 4 Ibid. p. 106.
page 374 note 5 Ibid.
page 374 note 6 Ibid.
page 374 note 7 James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience (London: Longmans Green, 1952), pp.5–6.Google Scholar
page 374 note 8 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 106.Google Scholar
page 374 note 9 Ibid.
page 374 note 10 Ibid.
page 374 note 111 Ibid. p. 107.
page 374 note 12 Ibid. p. 108.
page 374 note 13 Brown, Stuart C.. (ed.), Reason and Religion (London: Cornell, on ‘Immortality and Dualism’), pp. 261 ff.Google Scholar
page 375 note 1 For al-Farabi soul is rational which is a simple, incorporeal substance - Boer, De, op. cit. pp. 118–19.Google Scholar
page 375 note 2 Sina, Ibn, op. cit. v, 7.Google Scholar
page 375 note 3 llm al-Nafs, Eng. tr. with notes by Ma'sumi, M. S. (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society), ch. 1Google Scholar, ‘On the Soul’.
page 375 note 4 For al-Ghazali, , ‘Both God and soul are invisible, indivisible, unconfined by space and time’ (Kimya-i-Sa'adat), Eng. tr. by Field, Claud, under the title The Alchemy of Happiness (Lahore: Ashraf), p. 35.Google Scholar
page 375 note 5 Sharif, (ed.), op. cit. cf. ‘Ibn Sina’, p. 495.Google Scholar
page 375 note 6 On this view see Lewis, , op. cit. p. 111.Google Scholar
page 375 note 7 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 101.Google Scholar
page 375 note 8 Ibid.
page 375 note 9 Ibid. pp. 100–1.
page 375 note 10 Ibid. p. 101.
page 375 note 11 Ibid.
page 375 note 12 Ibid.
page 375 note 13 Ibid.
page 375 note 14 Lewis's lecture on ‘Self-Identity’ delivered at Government College, Lahore and the Department of Philosophy, Punjab University (16–17 Dec. 1979) now forms part of his book The Elusive Self (Macmillan, 1982).Google Scholar
page 375 note 15 Igbal, , op. cit. p. 106.Google Scholar
page 375 note 16 Also of the Asharites who anticipated Leibniz by centuries. The Asharites were the first Muslim orthodox to use ‘Kalam’ or rational method against the Mutazilites, having their inception with Imam al-Ash'ari (A.D. 873 or 883–941): cf. Sharif, M. M., op. cit., pp. 240 f.Google Scholar
page 376 note 1 He says, ‘…unity of Being does not more reside in knowing than in willing’ - Boer, De, op. cit. p. 162.Google Scholar Again, he conceived of soul as something akin to ‘Divine Causality’ and ‘Free Creative Might’, Ibid. P. 159
page 376 note 2 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 108.Google Scholar
page 376 note 3 Nicholson, R. A., The Secrets of the Self (Eng. tr. of Iqbal's Asrar-i-Khudi), (Lahore: Ashraf, rep. 1973) p. 25.Google Scholar
page 376 note 4 Iqbal, , op. cit. pp. 98–9.Google Scholar
page 376 note 5 Ibid. p. 99.
page 376 note 6 Ibid.
page 376 note 7 Ibid.
page 376 note 8 Ibid.
page 376 note 9 Ibid. p. 103; the Quran uses the word ‘khalq’ for the creation of nature other than man.
page 376 note 10 Ibid.
page 376 note 11 Ibid.
page 376 note 12 Ibid. p. 102.
page 376 note 13 Ibid. reminiscent of G. C. Jung.
page 377 note 1 Ibid. p. 98.
page 377 note 2 Ibid. p. 123.
page 377 note 3 Ibid. p. 120.
page 377 note 4 Ibid.
page 377 note 5 Ibid.
page 377 note 6 Ibid.
page 377 note 7 Ibid.
page 377 note 8 Ibid. p. 119.
page 377 note 9 For al-Farabi, ‘only men of developed intellect survive and others perish for ever at death’ Sharif, M. M., op. cit.Google Scholar, cf. ‘Ibn Sina’, p. 495.Google Scholar
page 377 note 10 Nicholson, R. A., Commentary, III–VI, p. 306Google Scholar also Mathnavz by Rumi, Jalaluddin, v, 2826.Google Scholar
page 377 note 11 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 119.Google Scholar
page 377 note 12 Ibid.
page 377 note 13 Al-Khair al-Kathir, Eng. tr. by Jalbani, G. N. (Lahore: Ashraf, 1974), ch. IX, ‘Life After Death’, pp. 158 f.Google Scholar
page 377 note 14 Iqbal, , op. cit. p. 122.Google Scholar
page 377 note 15 Ibid.
page 378 note 1 Ibid. p. 123.
page 378 note 2 Ibid.
page 378 note 3 Ibid.
page 378 note 4 Ibid.
page 378 note 5 Ibid. Cf. the Quran, Lv: 29: ‘Every day in (new) Splendour doth He (shine)’!
page 378 note 6 Ibid.
page 378 note 7 Ibid. p. 106.
page 378 note 8 Ibid.