^{page 85 note 1} The importance of contemplation in Plato's thought and its influence on Christian contemplative thought and practice is, of course, well known. See, for example, Festugière, A. J., Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1950Google Scholar). But it is generally believed that Plato's ethical and political doctrines can be intelligibly discussed apart from the contemplative side of his thought.

^{page 85 note 2} The Cloud of Unknowing, ed. Wolters, C. (London, 1961Google Scholar). The author is unknown.

^{page 85 note 3} (London, 1969).Google Scholar

^{page 86 note 1} The Cloud, pp. 58–9.Google Scholar

^{page 86 note 2} ‘Now as they went on their way, he entered a village; and a woman named Martha received him into her house. And she had a sister called Mary, who sat at the Lord's feet and listened to his teaching. But Martha was distracted with much serving; and she went to him and said, “Lord, do you not care that my sister has left me to serve alone? Tell her then to help me.” But the Lord answered her, “Martha, Martha, you are anxious and troubled about many things; one thing is needful. Mary has chosen the good portion, which shall not be taken away from her”.’ ( Luke, 10: 38–42Google Scholar), Revised Standard Version.

^{page 86 note 3} The Cloud, p. 80.Google Scholar

^{page 86 note 4} Ibid. p. 66.

^{page 87 note 1} Ibid. p. 79.

^{page 87 note 2} Ibid. p. 100.

^{page 87 note 3} Ibid. p. 70.

^{page 87 note 4} Ibid. pp. 83–4.

^{page 87 note 5} Ibid. p. 84.

^{page 88 note 1} Ibid. p. 85.

^{page 88 note 2} Pieper, J., The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1966), p. 54.Google Scholar

^{page 88 note 3} The Cloud, p. 100.Google Scholar

^{page 89 note 1} See Plato's Phaedo, trans. Hackforth, R. (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 50–1Google Scholar; Plato's Phaedo, trans. Bluck, R. S. (London, 1955), pp. 144–5.Google Scholar

^{page 91 note 1} Gorgias 470D ff.Google Scholar

^{page 91 note 2} Phillips, and Mounce, , pp. 28–31.Google Scholar

^{page 92 note 1} Arendt, H., The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958), Doubleday Anchor edition, p. 15.Google Scholar

^{page 93 note 1} Phillips, and Mounce, , p. 29n.Google Scholar

^{page 93 note 2} Phillips, and Mounce, , pp. 28–31.Google Scholar

^{page 93 note 3} It is true that the rhetorician and sophist occasionally fall into popular disrepute, a point which Gorgias himself makes when he complains to Socrates that teachers of rhetoric are punished for the misuse of their art by their pupils (456C ff.). But this tendency for the rhetorician or sophist to suffer popular disfavour only impels him to mirror more closely popular moral opinion.

^{page 93 note 4} Cf. 461 B–C and 482C ff.

^{page 93 note 5} 474C.

^{page 94 note 1} What Phillips and Mounce say of their own version of moral practices might be said of the version of popular morality found in Plato: ‘…there are a multiplicity of moral practices, some of them opposed to each other’ (p. 44Google Scholar). That popular morality is also concerned with personal advantage is irrelevant; philosophic virtue, as we have seen, serves the interest of the contemplative philosopher.

^{page 94 note 2} See Gorgias 485B ff.Google Scholar; Phaedo 64Google Scholar A–B; Republic 335E, 375C.Google Scholar