^{page 127 note 1} The Semantics of Biblical Language (1961), p. 271.Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 2} Systematic and Philosophical Theology, Nicholls, W.. (1969), p. 95.Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 3} The Bible in the Age of Science, Richardson, A.. (1961), p. 139.Google Scholar

^{page 127 note 4} Artide ‘Revelation’, A Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Richardson, A. (1969), p. 295.Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 1} ‘Sentences, Statements and Proposition’, in British Analytical Philosophy, ed. Williams, and Montefiore, .Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 1} op. Cit. p. 97–8.

^{page 129 note 2} Word and Object, (1961), pp. 193–4.Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 3} Geach's view is expounded in ‘Assertion’ Philosophical Review (October 1965), and more briefly in Reference and Generality (Emended edition, 1968), pp. 24–5.Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 1} For an account of this see Kenny, Anthony ‘Necessary Being’ in Sophia, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October 1962).CrossRefGoogle Scholar A similar view is defended by Williamson, Colwyn in ‘Propositions and Abstract Propositions’, Studies in Logical Theory, ed. Rescher, Nicholas (1968).Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 2} Prior, A. N., Time and Morality (1957), p. 8Google Scholar; Past, Present and Future (1967), pp. 15 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 131 note 1} Searle, J. R., Speech Acts (1969), p. 29.Google Scholar

^{page 131 note 2} The extent to which the meaning of a statement is to be equated with its illocutionary force is a matter of active philosophical controversy. See e.g. Geach ‘Assertion’, Searle, J. R., Speech Acts (1969)Google Scholar; Hare, R. M. ‘Meaning and Speech Acts’, Philosophical Review (January 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 132 note 1} Nature, Man and God (1934), P. 317.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 1} Faith and Understanding (1969), p. 241.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 2} op. cit., p. 148.

^{page 134 note 1} op. cit. p. 189.

^{page 134 note 2} Kneale, M., ‘Eternity and Sempiternity’ (PAS 1968–1969).Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 1} On this point see Mackay, Donald M., ‘What Makes a Question?’ in Information, Mechanism and Meaning (1969), p. 32.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 1} Philosophy of Logic (1970), p. II.Google Scholar Quire's remarks on ‘Truth and semantic assent’ illuminate the falsity of the dichotomy between believing truths and believing persons very nicely.