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A Theory of disembodied survival and re-embodied existence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Paul Helm
Paul Helm
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, the University of Liverpool
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Extract

In his Survival and Disembodied Existences Terence Penelhum presents two arguments against the possibility of disembodied survival. The first is that the memory criterion of personal identity is parasitic upon bodily identity and the second is the more fundamental contention that the notion of a disembodied person is unintelligible. Penelhum's claim is not that it is impossible as such to speak of disembodied intelligence, or perception, or even agency, but that the problem of construing the identity of disembodied individuals is overwhelmingly difficult. With regard to the idea of resurrection Penelhum argues that it is intelligible but that the question of whether or not an individual is someone who has been resurrected, or not, is one which no evidence could conclusively settle. It calls for a decision rather than for the production of conclusive evidence. ‘When resurrection is predicted it is always open to a critic to deny that what is predicted has to be accorded that title.’

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 1978 , pp. 15 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

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page 15 note 3 Penelhum, op. cit. p. 104. At one point (p. 4) Penelhum briefly raises the possibility of combining the notions of disembodied survival and bodily resurrection. It is this possibility that the present paper discusses and defends.Google Scholar

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page 26 note 2 The Westminster Confession of Faith (1647), ch. XXXII.Google Scholar