^{page 101 note 1} Rachels, James, ‘God and Human Attitudes’, Religious Studies, VII (1971), 325–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The article is reprinted in Helm, Paul, ed., Divine Commands and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 34–48.Google Scholar References to this article will be taken from Helm's anthology and cited following the name of the author.

^{page 101 note 2} Rachels, , p. 117.Google Scholar

^{page 101 note 3} Quinn, Philip L., Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. I–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar An earlier version of some of the material in this chapter appeared as ‘Religious Obedience and Moral Autonomy’, Religious Studies, XI (1975), 265–81.Google Scholar References will be taken from Quinn's book and cited following his name. Oakes, Robert A., ‘Reply to Professor Rachels’, Religious Studies, VIII (1972), 165–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Reference to this article will also be cited after the author's name.

^{page 102 note 1} Rachels, , p. 177.Google Scholar

^{page 102 note 2} Rachels, , p. 177.Google Scholar

^{page 102 note 3} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 102 note 4} As will be explained below, there is reason to think that Quinn fails to distinguish these two notions. The expression ‘moral agent’ is misleading. In some contexts, it can refer to someone who is capable of acting in accordance with morality. In others, it can mean someone who actually acts that way.

^{page 103 note 1} Rachels, , p. 175.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 2} Rachels, , p. 176.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 3} Rachels, , p. 174.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 4} Rachels, , p. 175.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 5} Quinn, , p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 103 note 6} The assumption is that the two conflicting obligations are not merely prima facie but ‘actual’ obligations.

^{page 103 note 7} Quinn, , p. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 104 note 1} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 104 note 2} Rachels, , p. 173.Google Scholar

^{page 104 note 3} Cf. Konyndyk, Kenneth, Introductory Modal Logic (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 31–41 and 51–55.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 1} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 2} In his critique of Rachels, Quinn, seems to treat all the obligations in question as moral (p. 5).Google Scholar But in a recent discussion of some of these same issues, Quinn speaks of the obligation to obey God as a special kind of ‘religious obligation’. This possibility introduces a complication which will be discussed below.

^{page 106 note 3} Quinn, , p. 12.Google Scholar

^{page 106 note 4} Quinn, , pp. I–7.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 1} Quinn, , p. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 1} Quinn, , p. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 2} Quinn, , p. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 3} Quinn, , p. 7.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 4} Quinn, , p. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 5} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 1} Neither Oakes nor Quinn explicitly states which premiss of Rachels' argument is falsified by the truth of the claim that a divine command could never conflict with moral autonomy.

^{page 109 note 2} Quinn refers to Oakes' article in a footnote (Quinn, , p. 10).Google Scholar These two critics are here understood to be urging different, though related, arguments for why obedience to God cannot conflict with moral agency. Oakes focuses on the claim that a perfectly good being cannot command what is morally wrong. Quinn focuses on the claim that a perfectly good being cannot command something which the recipient has good reason to believe is morally wrong.

^{page 109 note 3} Oakes, , p. 167.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 4} Oakes, , p. 166.Google Scholar

^{page 109 note 5} Oakes, , p. 166.Google Scholar The quotations attributed to Oakes are part of his paraphrase of the second of the five objections which Rachels raises against his own view. Since Oakes claims that this objection is ‘fatal’ to Rachels' argument (Oakes, , p. 167)Google Scholar, there is nothing inappropriate in putting some of the words of Rachels' presentation of it in Oakes' mouth.

^{page 110 note 1} Rachels, , p. 177.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 2} Quinn, , p. 8.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 3} Quinn, , p. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 110 note 4} Quinn, , p. 12.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 1} Quinn, , p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 2} Quinn, , p. 11.Google Scholar Here, again, there may be some ambiguity. If we take ‘relinquish’ to mean ‘abandon’, the case Quinn is referring to is the rather special one in which God supposedly commands a person to abandon his role as moral agent. On the other hand, the issue might be whether or not God could command a person to act in violation of his role as autonomous moral agent, i.e. to do something inconsistent with moral autonomy.

^{page 112 note 1} ‘Autonomy and Theological Ethics’ in Robert Merrihew Adams, The Virtue of Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 123.Google Scholar This appeared previously in Religious Studies, XV (1999), 191–194.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 1} Quinn, , p. 12.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 2} There is some ambiguity about the situation so described. Does it follow from the fact that someone has good reason for believing that something is the case that he believes that it is the case? If so, Quinn is describing a situation in which someone is simultaneously entertaining contradictory beliefs. This may be thought impossible, at least in cases in which the contradiction is as close to the surface as it is here. Inasmuch as the person believed that he had received a divine command, he would also believe what is obviously implied by this, viz. that the command was right. But he also has good reason to think that the action commanded is wrong. Perhaps it is best to understand the concept of ‘good reasons for believing’ in a way that does not entail that the person believes what he has good reason for believing. In ordinary language, there seems to be a slight difference between saying that a person has good reason to believe something and saying that he has good reason for believing something. The latter suggests more strongly than the former that the agent actually believes the thing in question. But this is far from a strict distinction in common parliance.

^{page 113 note 3} Quinn, , pp. 12–16.Google Scholar

^{page 113 note 4} It should be obvious that, on the view being espoused here, a person can have good reasons to believe something that is false and that his reasons to believe something false can be better than his reasons to believe something true.

^{page 114 note 1} Quinn appears to place no limits on the possibilities in which the belief in a divine command might dislodge a moral belief. But he might allow some moral views to be such that no evidence for a contrary divine command could possibly dislodge them. This might be the case when paradigmatic moral beliefs are in question, e.g. that gratuitous cruelty is wrong. Perhaps these are the ‘hard core’ moral beliefs that Quinn refers to (Quinn, , p. 6).Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 2} Quinn, , p. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 114 note 3} Quinn, , p. 14.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 1} Rachels, , p. 175.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 2} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 3} Rachels, , p. 177.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 1} Rachels, , p. 177.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 2} Theists might not, in fact, accept even this narrowed limitation on God's right to command morally required actions. Perhaps God's goodness demands that he command what is morally required even when he foresees that the command will not be heeded.

^{page 117 note 1} Racheis, , p. 174 n. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 2} ‘Moral Obligation, Religious Demand, and Practical Conflict’, in Audi, Robert and Wainwright, William J. (eds), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 195–212.Google Scholar References to this article will be cited after the name of the first of the editors.

^{page 118 note 1} Audi, , p. 205.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 2} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 3} Rachels, , p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 4} Audi, , p. 204 n. 11.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 1} Audi, , p. 205.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 2} Kripke, Saul A., Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), Pp. 3–15.Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 3} I John, 4: 16.Google Scholar