New cross-cultural approaches to philosophy of religion seek to move it beyond the preoccupations of Christian theology and the abstractions of ‘classical theism’, towards an appreciation of a broader range of religious phenomena. But if the concept of religion is itself the product of extrapolation from modern, Western, Christian understandings, disseminated through colonial encounter, does the new philosophy of religion simply reproduce the deficiencies of the old, under the guise of a universalizing, albeit culturally and historically particular, category? This article argues that it is necessary to interrogate the secular episteme within which religion is thematized as a discrete topos.

Drawing on the work of Mark Siderits, Jay Garfield, and others, I introduce a global approach to the philosophy of religion that is inspired by ‘fusion’, ‘engagement’, or ‘confluence’ philosophy. To globalize the philosophy of religion requires more than expanding its traditional disciplinary scope or broadening its range of questions; it requires philosophers who are conversant in more than one philosophical tradition. I argue that this approach offers a viable way to develop the discipline by providing a platform for deep and authentic engagement in philosophical inquiry that crosses traditional religious and philosophical boundaries.

What if doing philosophy across cultures is always implicitly a matter of metaphilosophy – of articulating more clearly the nature of philosophy itself? What if it forces us to ‘stand back’ hermeneutically and map out a ‘view from above’ of the underlying fabric of ideas – in their constitutive concepts, their relations to other ways of thinking, and their potential to be configured in alternative fascinating and fruitful ways?

This article incorporates existing approaches to comparative philosophy within a single scheme of complementary philosophical activities, and a single overarching metaphilosophical project. These approaches are (1) ‘archival’ (exploring parallel but separate philosophical traditions), (2) ‘equivalentist’ (comparing traditions in terms of analogies and contrasts), and (3) ‘problem-solving’ (using multiple traditions to provide philosophical solutions). I situate these within (4) the overarching hermeneutic project of ‘mapping’ concepts and their possibilities. This entails the theory that philosophies drawing on multiple perspectives are always implicitly engaged in mapping out the underlying eidetic structure upon which philosophy does its work, and charting the conceptual possibilities surrounding any idea.

This article explores some critical issues pertinent to the practice of ‘global-critical’ philosophy of religion. Here, I focus on two general issues, especially as they have arisen in the production of a textbook and other pedagogical materials for an undergraduate course in philosophy of religion that is globally diverse and critically engaged: (1) how to restructure philosophy of religion with topics and questions suitable for ‘global’ enquiry; (2) how to philosophize about (global) religion in a manner that is ‘critically’ aware of theoretical and methodological issues in the academic study of religion, yet also pursues philosophical questions of meaning, value, and truth.

As the discipline of philosophy of religion stretches to become a global, cross-cultural discipline, it takes on ethical questions about how one should treat those who participate in religious forms of life one does not share. This article offers a typology of possible ethical positions in a context of religious diversity and argues that the strongest position is one of conditional hospitality. That is, the moral ideal proposed here is one of welcome to the religious other that is conditional on an accurate moral judgement of their practices, beliefs, and institutions.

Is the analysis of religion best conducted in terms of the beliefs of its practitioners? I describe a Wittgenstein-inspired approach to belief on which it is dubious that religious practices satisfy the criteria for the attribution of belief. I defend this more moderate and plausible version of Needham's thesis against two natural reasons to think religious belief widespread.

In a tribute to the work of Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff characterizes a form of the analytic tradition in philosophy of religion, which neither he nor Plantinga endorses, as a brand of Kant-rationality. What such rationality aims to achieve is, above all, a universality of rational agreement, or rather ‘a foundation that is acceptable to all rational reflective human-beings’, something that could be acknowledged by ‘all cognitively competent adult human beings’ who had access to the same relevant information or facts.

This article argues for a cross-culturally pluralistic conception of spiritual exemplarity. Three main modes of exemplarity are identified, distinguished by their underlying aspirations, which I label ‘allegiance’, ‘enlightened insight’, and ‘emulation’. After challenging some attempts to privilege the modes of exemplarity characteristic of theistic religions, I argue that perhaps the fullest example of the aspiration to emulation is the form of Daoism presented in The Book of Zhuāngzǐ. I conclude that what one finds across different cultures and traditions is a plurality of modes of spiritual exemplarity that should be acknowledge and explored, rather than given more reductive analyses that narrow our sense of the variety of ways of living a spiritual life.