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China, India, and the social construction of technology in international society: The English School meets Science and Technology Studies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2020

Dimitrios Stroikos Open the ORCID record for Dimitrios Stroikos [Opens in a new window]
Dimitrios Stroikos*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of York, York, United Kingdom
*
*Corresponding author. Email: dimitrios.stroikos@york.ac.uk
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Abstract

In recent years, there has been a growing scholarly interest in how International Relations theory can contribute to our understanding of the impact of technology on global politics, underpinned mainly by an engagement with Science and Technology Studies (STS). However, less attention has been paid to the ways in which international society shapes technology. Building on sociological and historical studies of science and technology, this article outlines one way through which international society has constituted technology by developing a synthetic account of the emergence of technological advancement as a ‘standard of civilisation’ in the nineteenth century that differentiated the ‘society of civilised states’ from non-European societies, with a particular focus on China and India. In doing so, this article also highlights how this process has had a powerful and enduring influence on Chinese and Indian conceptions about science and technology. Thus, by shifting the focus from how technology shapes global politics to how international society shapes technology, this article provides new insights into the relationship between technology, power, and modernity in an interdisciplinary context. It also offers a new way of thinking about the complex dynamics of today's global politics of technology.

Keywords

Technology‘Standard of Civilisation’ChinaIndiaInternational Society
Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 46 , Issue 5 , December 2020 , pp. 713 - 731
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British International Studies Association

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