1 Krasner, Stephen, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 3Google Scholar .

2 See, for example, Amin, Samir, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1996)Google Scholar ; and Bond, Patrick, Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004)Google Scholar .

3 Cox, Robert W., ‘The Way Ahead: Towards a New Ontology of World Order’, in Jones, Richard Wyn (ed.), Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 55Google Scholar . Both Cox and I would of course recognise that there is a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, but given the privileging of structure in much of neo-realism and some critical theory, it is an important corrective to reaffirm the importance of agency, specifically in the context of considering change in world politics. States and state leaders are by no means the only relevant agents of change, though.

4 Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 30–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

5 One important exception is the volume edited by Weber, Heloise and Berger, Mark T, Recognition and Redistribution: Beyond International Development (Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar . The reader would soon notice, though, that the contributors to this volume use these two terms for a different purpose than they are used here. On a more general level, Shapcott's, Richard Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar is also relevant, although failing to deal with the insights of Axel Honneth, it treats recognition in a rather undifferentiated manner.

6 The phrase ‘revolt against the West’ was coined by Hedley Bull. See, ‘The Revolt against the West’, in Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 217–228Google Scholar . Bull was one of the first IR theorists to have some understanding of the importance of communicative interaction and intersubjective recognition in North-South relations, although his own theoretical approach provided him with few tools to analyse it in any great detail.

7 For a very useful discussion of the analytical challenges in this type of empirical research, see the German article by Wolf, Reinhardt, ‘Respekt: Ein unterschaetzter Faktor in den Internationale Beziehungen’ (‘Respect: An Underestimated Factor in IR’), Zeitschrift fuer International Beziehungen, 15:1 (2008), pp. 5–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

8 See Finnemore, Martha, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1–33Google Scholar ; Crawford, Neta, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 49–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Lynch, Marc, ‘Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement’, European Journal of International Relations, 8:2 (2002) and pp. 187–230CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Kappen, Thomas Risse, ‘“Let's Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54:1 (2000), pp. 1–39Google Scholar .

9 Gilpin, , War and Change, p. 31Google Scholar .

10 See Daniel Flemes, ‘“Emerging Middle Powers” Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum’, German Institute of Global and International Studies Working Papers No. 57 (2007).

11 Brendan Vickers summarises well the resentment that South Africa, is evoking in Africa. See his ‘South Africa: Global Reformism, Global Apartheid, and the Heiligendamm Proces’, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Antkiewicz, Agata (eds), Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), p. 168Google Scholar .

12 On the Heiligendamm Process, see Cooper, Andrew F., ‘The Heiligendamm Process: Structural Reordering and Diplomatic Agency’, in Cooper, Andrew F. and Antkiewicz, Agata (eds), Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), pp. 1–18Google Scholar .

13 For a discussion of the programmatic vision of NAM, see Strydom, Hennie, ‘The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations’, in Bogdandy, A. von and Wolfrum, R. (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of UN Law, 11 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2007), pp. 1–46Google Scholar .

14 Nel, Philip and Stephen, Matthew, ‘The Foreign Economic Policies of the IBSA States’, in Flemes, Daniel (ed.), Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (Aldershot: Ashgate 2010), pp. 71–90Google Scholar .

15 Destradi, Sandra, ‘Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership’, this special section, Review of International Studies, 36:4 (October 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar . Note, however, that this generalisation hides considerable variation and fluidity, especially in the behaviour of India. India follows a more hard hegemonic approach as far as Bangladesh and particularly Pakistan are concerned. There are signs, however, of a moderation of India's approach to Pakistan. In the wake of the Mumbai terror attack of November 2008, India did suspend its Composite Dialogue with Pakistan, but was careful not to exacerbate tensions by avoiding any threat of military action. The dialogue with Pakistan was resumed in February 2010. See Hardley, Jim, ‘Balancing Act for India as Talks With Pakistan Resume’, New York Times Online Edition (24 February 2010)Google Scholar .

16 If realised, the schedule for climate-related aid as proposed by the leading developing countries would amount to an annual figure that could equal the amount of official development assistance provided by the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee annually. The developing countries are insisting that climate-related aid should be an add-on and not a replacement of existing aid. Potentially, thus, assistance to help developing countries to mitigate climate change and to adapt to its effects could constitute one of the largest transfers ever of funds and technology from North to South. The Copenhagen Accord agreed to at the December 2009 Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC, commits developed countries to supplying such assistance. Of course, this Accord is non-binding. For a discussion of the Copenhagen Accord, see Khor, Martin, ‘After Copenhagen, the Way Forward’, South Bulletin, 43 (8 February 2010), pp. 1–3Google Scholar .

17 See paragraphs 11–13 of the 2008 New Delhi IBSA Summit Declaration, available at: {http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org}.

18 The notion of such a balancing act is suggested by de Freitas Barbosa, Alexandre and Narciso, Thais, and Biancalana, Marina, ‘Brazil in Africa: Another Emerging Power in the Continent?’, Politikon, 36:1 (2009), pp. 59–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

19 A distributionist negotiation strategy consists of making ‘very high opening demands, refusing to make any concessions, and holding the other's issues hostage’. See Narlikar, Amrita, ‘Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiation Strategy of a Rising India’, International Affairs, 82 (2006), p. 62CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

20 Stewart, Heather, ‘Doha: India accuses US of sacrificing world's poor at trade talks’, The Guardian (31 July 2008)Google Scholar , available online at: {http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/31/wto.india}.

21 Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita, ‘A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations’. Global Society, 20:4 (2006), p. 422CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

22 Farasat, Shadan, ‘India's Quest for Regional Trade Agreements: Challenges Ahead’, Journal of World Trade, 42 (2008) pp. 433–460Google Scholar .

23 These four became known as the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). See Martin Khor, ‘After Copenhagen’, p. 2.

24 See Nattrass, Nicoli, ‘Gambling on investment: competing economic strategies in South Africa’, Transformation: Critical perspectives on Southern Africa, 31 (1996), pp. 25–42Google Scholar .

25 See Nel, Philip, Taylor, Ian, and van der Westhuizen, Janis, ‘Reformist Initiatives and South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy: A Framework for Understanding’, in Nel, , Taylor, , and van der Westhuizen, (eds), South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limits of Reformism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 1–30Google Scholar .

26 The G10 arranged itself in opposition to US proposals to extend GATT liberalisation negotiations to areas such as intellectual property, services and investments, representing ‘traditional Third Worldism’. Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar, ‘A New Politics of Confrontation?’, p. 421.

27 Soares de Lima, Maria Regina and Hirst, Monica, ‘Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities’, International Affairs, 82 (2006) pp. 26–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

28 Veiga, Pedro da Motta, ‘Brazil and the G20 Group of Developing Countries’, in Gallagher, Paul and Low, Patrick, and Stoler, Andrew L. (eds)Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 115Google Scholar .

29 Matias Spektor discusses the ambivalence of Brazil's attitude towards its region and the thinness of the regional architecture that Brazil has helped to create in the region. See his ‘Brazil as a Regional and Emerging Global Power’, Policy Briefing 9 of the Emerging Power Programme (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, November 2009), p. 3.

30 Alden, Chris and Vieira, Marco Antonio, ‘The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly, 26 (2005), p. 1084CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

31 Spektor, ‘Brazil as a Regional and Emerging Global Power’, p. 3.

32 For a broad discussion of ‘tri-continentalism’ as a manifestation of South-South solidarity, see Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne, Institutions of the Global South (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 13–54Google Scholar .

33 Fabricius, Peter, ‘IBSA defends its apparent exclusivity’, The Star (Johannesburg) (19 October 2007)Google Scholar .

34 See Lechini, Gladys, ‘Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 40 (Sep-Oct 2007), p. 29CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

35 See Alden and Vieira, ‘The New Diplomacy of the South’, pp. 1077–95.

36 Fabiana Frayssinet, ‘Brazil, India, South Africa to broaden “Voice of the South”’. Inter Press Service News Agency, (1 September 2009), available at: {http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=48291}, accessed on 2 September 2009.

37 The one issue area in which this is not yet true is international security, but there the IBSA states often rely on China, and sometimes Russia, to augment its institutional power.

38 Other regional powers of the Global South, notably Egypt, Libya, and Venezuela, to name but three, also aspire to play roles on the stage beyond their regions, and these roles include some element of opposition to the hegemony of the Global North. However, exactly because these states lack the credibility among their interlocutors that flows from the robust democratic institutions that India, Brazil, and South Africa have, they do not deserve to be categorised together with the IBSA states.

39 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1–32Google Scholar .

40 On the contrast, see Forst, Rainer, ‘Radical Justice: On Iris Marion Young's Critique of the “Distributive Paradigm”’, Constellations, 14 (2007) pp. 260–265CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

41 The contributions of these theorists are discussed below.

42 Fanon summarises the connection between recognition and self-identity well: ‘Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask the question constantly: In reality, who am I?’ Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 200Google Scholar .

43 Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam, ‘Introduction’, in Bull, and Watson, (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1Google Scholar .

44 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 215–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

45 See sources cited in fn. 8 above.

46 Linklater, Andrew, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 113Google Scholar and further.

47 Honneth, Axel, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)Google Scholar ; Honneth, Axel, ‘“Recognition or Redistribution?” Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society’, Theory, Culture & Society, 18:2–3 (2001), pp. 43–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Margalit, Avishai, The Decent Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996)Google Scholar ; Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992)Google Scholar . For a general discussion of the application of Honneth's approach to recognition to the field of International Relations, see Haacke, Juergen, ‘The Frankfurt School and International Relations: on the Centrality of Recognition’, Review of International Studies (2005), pp. 31, 181–194Google Scholar .

48 Axel Honneth, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?’, p. 54. The reference is to Fraser, Nancy, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age’, New Left Review, 212 (1995), pp. 68–93Google Scholar .

49 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 440–446Google Scholar .

50 For a discussion of the contrasting interpretations, see Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 57–67Google Scholar .

51 Bull, Hedley, ‘The Revolt against the West’, in Bull, and Watson, (eds), The Expansion of International Society, pp. 217–228Google Scholar .

52 Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as Another, pp. 169–171Google Scholar .

53 Honneth, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?’, p. 49.

54 Lyon, Peter, ‘The Emergence of the Third World’, in Bull, and Watson, (eds), The Expansion of International Society, pp. 229Google Scholar .

55 See Crawford, , Argument and Change in World Politics, pp. 317–319Google Scholar .

56 On the initiative of forty-four African and Asian states, the general Assembly in 1963 decided to enlarge the UN Security Council to fifteen members by adding another 4 non-permanent seats (and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members). See Bailey, Sydney D. and Daws, Sam, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 152–153CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

57 For a discussion of the instrumental value of multilateralism for the Global South, see Braveboy-Wagner, , Institutions of the Global South, pp. 1–9Google Scholar . My contention is that the commitment of the three IBSA states to multilateralism goes further than instrumental concerns, but that it is in fact constitutive of their very identities as states.

58 de Lima and Hirst, ‘Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power’, p. 25.

59 Mandela, Nelson, ‘South Africa's Future Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 72:5 (Nov-Dec, 1993), pp. 86–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar . This article is widely regarded as the founding document of the foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa. See Nel, Philip and Carlsnaes, Walter, ‘Introduction’, In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid (Midrand, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006), pp. 17–22Google Scholar . For collections of discussions on the importance of multilateralism in South Africa's foreign policy, see Nel, Philip and Taylor, Ian, and van der Westhuizen, Janis (eds), South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001)Google Scholar , and Lee, Donna and Taylor, Ian, and Williams, Paul (eds), The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

60 See Bhagavan, Manu, ‘A New Hope: India, the UN and the Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Modern Asian Studies, 44:2 (2010) pp. 311–347CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

61 Bhagavan, ‘A new hope’, p. 338.

62 The ‘Green Room’ refers to the practice at WTO ministerial meetings in which representatives of the developed world meet in closed sessions to coordinate their negotiating position, often circumventing the more inclusive plenary sessions of the WTO negotiating fora. The frustration and humiliation that this causes developing countries is well captured by this comment by an Al-Ahram journalist following the WTO meeting in Sydney in 2002: ‘At the Seattle WTO summit the hullabaloo started with the mysterious “green room”, a privileged and exclusive meeting ground for the rich countries’ delegations. Providing privacy behind closed doors, the green room was definitely where it was at. In the shared intimacy of the green room, Northern countries defined and fine-tuned their own version of the WTO agenda, while Southern delegations aimlessly roamed the hallways, accompanied by hordes of journalists waiting for their scoop. Humiliated, marginalised and literally locked out of any meaningful negotiating process, Southern delegations finally walked out in protest. At the end of the day, the ministerial broke down in chaos as Southern dignitaries began to echo the discourse of militant anti-capitalist street protesters.’ See Rady, Faiza, ‘The “green room” syndrome’, Al-Ahram Weekly Online (21–27 November 2002)Google Scholar , available at {http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/613/in4.htm}.

63 On the Danish unilateral initiative and opposition to it from the IBSA states, among others, see Martin Khor, ‘After Copenhagen, the Way Forward’, pp. 2–3.

64 Wines, Michael, >‘South Africa isn't bringing its moral weight to diplomatic deliberations’, New York Times (23 March 2007)‘South+Africa+isn't+bringing+its+moral+weight+to+diplomatic+deliberations’,+New+York+Times+(23+March+2007)>Google Scholar .

65 Paragraph 6 of the Delhi Summit Declaration by the IBSA Heads of Government states: ‘The leaders reiterated the need to make the structures of global governance more democratic, representative and legitimate by increasing the participation of developing countries in the decision-making bodies of multilateral institutions.’ New Delhi Summit Declaration (15 October 2008).

66 Ibid., para. 15.

67 In para. 5 of the Ministerial Communiqué following the sixth trilateral commission meeting of IBSA (Brasilia, 1 September 2009), the Parties ‘Reaffirm their commitment to multilateralism and to increase participation of developing countries in the decision-making bodies of multilateral institutions. Also reiterate the need for the UN to be reformed so as to become more democratic and coherent with the priorities of developing countries. Support a reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) that includes the creation of new permanent and nonpermanent seats, with increased participation of developing countries in both categories. Such reform is of the utmost importance for the UNSC to have the representativeness and legitimacy it needs to face contemporary challenges.’ Available at: {http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=53&Itemid=27}. See also para. 10 of the Declaration following the First Summit of Heads of State and Government of the IBSA states (Brasilia, 13 September 2006), available at: {http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=60&Itemid=27} and para. 3 of the Somerset West IBSA Ministerial Communiqué (11 May 2008): ‘The Ministers reaffirmed their call to make the structures of global governance more democratic, representative and legitimate by increasing the participation of the South in their decision-making. In this regard, the Ministers reiterated that the international system cannot be reordered meaningfully without a comprehensive reform of the UN, and the Security Council, in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. Ministers reiterated that inter-governmental negotiations on the issue of Security Council reform must commence forthwith.’ Available at: {http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=27}.

68 Honneth, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?’, p. 50.

69 In Ricoeur's own words: ‘(T)o the ethical aim will correspond what we shall henceforth call, self-esteem, and to the deontological moment, self-respect. According to the thesis proposed here, it will be made apparent: (1) that self-esteem is more fundamental than self-respect; (2) that self-respect is the aspect under which self-esteem appears in the domain of norms and, (3) that the aporias of duty create situations ‘in which self-esteem appears not only as the source but as the recourse for respect […]’ Ricoeur, , Oneself as Another, p. 171Google Scholar .

70 Honneth, ‘Recognition or Redistribution?’, p. 50.

71 Margalit, , The Decent Society, p. 10Google Scholar .

72 Ibid., pp. 2–3.

73 Bessis, Sophie, Western Supremacy: The Triumph of An Idea? (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 180Google Scholar .

74 Bair, Jennifer, ‘From the Politics of Development to the Challenges of Globalization’, Globalizations, 4 (December 2004), p. 489Google Scholar . See also, Dell, Sidney, ‘The Origins of UNCTAD’, in Cutajar, Michael Zammit (ed.), UNCTAD and the South-North Dialogue: The First Twenty Years (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985), pp. 10–32Google Scholar .

75 Speech by the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Amorim, at the 14th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement – Havana (16 September 2006). Available at: {http://www.brazil.org.uk/press/speeches_files/20060916.html}.

76 See Mbeki, Thabo, ‘The African Renaissance: Africans Defining Themselves’, in Mbeki, Thabo, Africa: Define Yourself (Cape Town: Tafelberg and Mafube, 2002), pp. 72–81Google Scholar . It is an open question whether the term ‘African renaissance’ will survive the political demise of ex-President Mbeki. NEPAD is firmly institutionalised in South Africa's foreign policy, though, and Mbeki's successors have been careful to echo its main ideals. See the budget vote address by the South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, to the National Assembly (18 June 2009). Available at:{http://www.dirco.gov.za/}.

77 Speech of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, on the occasion of the consideration of the budget vote of the Presidency, National Assembly (13 June 2000). Cited in Nel, Taylor, and van der Westhuizen, ‘Reformist initiatives’, p. 6.

78 Available at: {http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/primeministersaddress_alignedmovement_summitEgypt.htm}.

79 See Philip Nel and Matthew Stephen, ‘The Foreign Economic Policies’; Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, ‘The New Diplomacy of the South’, pp. 1077–95; and Taylor, Ian, ‘“The South Will Rise Again”? New Alliances and Global Governance: The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum’, Politikon, 36:1 (April 2009), pp. 45–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

80 See Taylor, “The South Will Rise Again?”, p. 47.