¹ This is a core tenet of realism and neo-realism, despite concessions by many realists that the exclusion of internal factors is merely an analytic convenience. Waltz's argument is clearly spelt out in Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979)Google Scholar, chapter four. I have discussed this assumption and the shifts n i argument involved in ‘Theorizing the International’, Economy and Society, 18, 3 (August 1989). Examples of conventional IR suppression of the question of the international dimensions of revolution are legion. Jack Piano and Roy Olton's. The International Relations Dictionary (fourth edition, 1988), has no discussion of the general interrelationship of the two subjects: an (unindexed) item on revolution and war discusses only internal aspects. IR literature is replete with discussion of alliances. Rarely is it made clear that (a) many alliances have as their original purpose the suppression of revolution within member states and (b) that one of the main reasons for the collapse or ending of alliances is that revolutions occur within some of the constituents: the fates of SEATO, CENTO and the Warsaw Pact should make this latter point evident enough, victims, respectively, of the Vietnamese, Iranian and Eastern European upheavals. Indeed CENTO fell victim to revolution twice over: its initial form, the Baghdad Pact, had to be abandoned in favour of CENTO after the Iraqi revolution of 1958.

² See for example the overview of the sociological literature in Taylor, Stan, Social Science and Revolutions (London, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Northedge, Fred, The International Political System (London, 1976), pp. 28–30Google Scholar; Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, pp. 127–128.Google Scholar

⁴ I have developed this argument in my The Making of the Second Cold War (London, 1983)Google Scholar. Some writers on strategic studies, including Alexander George, Raymond Garthoff and Michael Mandelbaum have discussed this interrelationship, but it has in the main, failed to find sufficient place i n analyses of the postwar arms race and strategic competition. For example, Garthoff's, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, 1987)Google Scholar, makes mention of Soviet fears of a US invasion of Cuba but greatly understates the importance of this, eminently rational, concern in the Soviet decision to station missiles on the island. In conventional British academic studies of the nuclear arms race the impact of Third World revolutions rates hardly a mention.

⁵ The chronology of funding and publication of US works on internal wars and their international dimensions tells its own story: a rush of interest, motivated by concern in the wake of the Cuban revolution, in the early 1960s, followed by a taut silence once the difficulties of the Vietnam War became evident. The impact, explicit and tacit, of the Vietnam War on the academic study of International Relations has yet to be analysed.

⁶ Kissinger, Henry, A World Restored (New York, 1973)Google Scholar; Rosecrance, RichardAction and Reaction in International Politics (Boston, 1963)Google Scholar; Wight, Martin, Power Politics (London, 1966)Google Scholar, chapter 7; Rosenau, James (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kyong-won, Kim, Revolution and International System (New York, 1970)Google Scholar; and Calvert, Peter, Revolution and International Politics (London, 1984).Google Scholar

⁷ The hypostatization of terrorism in academic writing on IR has been one of the discipline's more sloppy chapters. Terrorism, in the sensational sense in which it has normally been used, is a subaltern feature of International Relations. See Laqueur, Walter, Terrorism (second edition, London, 1989)Google Scholar; Halliday, Fred, ‘Terrorism in Historical Perspective’, Arab Studies Quarterly 9, 2 (Spring 1987).Google Scholar

⁸ Palmer, R. R., ‘The World Revolution of the West’, Political Science Quarterly, 03 1954Google Scholar; Palmer, R. R., The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 1760–1800, 2 vols. (London, 1959 and 1964)Google Scholar; Rude, George, Revolutionary Europe 1783—1815 (London, 1964)Google Scholar; Godechot, Jacques, La Grande Nation (Paris, 1956)Google Scholar; Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848 (London, 1962)Google Scholar; Carr, E. H., The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 3 (London, 1973)Google Scholar; Liebman, Marcel, Leninism under Lenin (London, 1975)Google Scholar, part 4; Deutscher, Isaac, Marxism, Wars and Revolution (London, 1984)Google Scholar, and his biographies of Stalin and Trotsky; Harding, Neil, Lenin's Political Thought, vol. 2, (London, 1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ These points are well brought out in Goldstone, Jack, ‘Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation’, World Politics, 04 1980.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Skocpol, Theda, States and Special Revolution (Cambridge, 1979), p. 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ A classic article that covers some of the same ground as Griewank is Hatto, A. T., ‘ “Revolution”, An Enquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term’, Mind, 10 1949.Google Scholar

¹² Wight, , Power Politics, p. 92.Google Scholar

¹³ On the revolutions of the 1640s, see Parker, Geoffrey and Smith, Lesley (eds), The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London, 1978).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Palmer, , ‘World Revolution’, and Democratic Revolution.Google Scholar

¹⁵ I have gone further into the relation between East-West conflict and Third World revolution in my The Making of the Second Cold War and in Cold War, Third World, (Radius/Hutchinson, 1989)Google Scholar. An interesting, if belated, recognition of the linkage is to be found in the Pentagon report, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, 1989).Google Scholar

¹⁶ For example, Scott, Andrew, The Revolution in Statecraft, Informal Penetration (New York, 1982).Google Scholar

¹⁷ An example of such an argument with regard to the Iranian revolution is to be found in the conclusions to Bill, James, The Eagle and the Lion (New Haven and London, 1988)Google Scholar; Bill proposes twelve ways in which US policy in such revolutionary situations can be improved, to reduce conflict with the revolutionary state. These are, in the main, counsels of perfection.

¹⁸ Fred Halliday, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution’, in Cole, Juan and Keddie, Nikki (eds), Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven and London, 1986).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Aron, Raymond, Peace and War (London, 1966), pp. 373–381Google Scholar. This presumption of homogeneity in internal political and social arrangements is distinct from that found in the English school concept ‘international society’: the latter is concerned only with homogeneity of international values and practices. See Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (London, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chs. one and two.

²⁰ Rosenau's concept of ‘fused linkage’ captures this interrelationship well. On Waltz's refusal to accept this as a legitimate part of IR theory, see note 1 above.

²¹ I have discussed this point further in my ‘state and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’, Millennium, 16, 2 (Summer 1987)Google Scholar, reprinted in Dyer, Hugh and Mangasarian, Leon (eds), The Future of International Relations, The State of the Art (Macmillan, forthcoming).Google Scholar For a discussion within realism of the two-sided activity of states, see Mastanduno, Michael, Lake, David and Ikenberry, John, ‘Towards a Realist Theory of State Action’, International Studies Quarterly 33, 4 (12 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² On the contrasting powers of ‘dominant ideology’ and ‘common culture’, theses, see Abercrombie, Nicholas, Hill, Stephen, and Turner, Brian, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London, 1980)Google Scholar. These writers do not discuss how international factors, ideological and more material, can contribute to the formation, strengthening and weakening of specific ideologies, dominant or subordinate, within any one society: but it is not difficult to see how their argument can be extended to show how important such external factors, confirmatory and challenging, can act upon a specific society. The force of example alone plays an important part. One has only to chart the global spread of such phenomena as universal suffrage or respect for human rights, or of religious trends, be these in the Reformation or contemporary Islamic societies, to see how external forces can shape internal ideological systems.

²³ Recent contributions to the field include Hall, John, Powers and Liberties (London, 1986)Google Scholar and Mann, Michael, States, War and Capitalism (Oxford, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁴ For historical materialist analyses of international dimensions of revolution, see: Arrighi, Giovanni, Hopkins, Terence, and Wallerstein, Immanuel, Anti Systemic Movements (London, 1989)Google Scholar; Lowy, Michael, The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development: the Theory of Permanent Revolution (London, 1981).Google Scholar