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The Special Relationship and the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis, 1950–4

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Abstract

The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis of 1950–4 provides an ideal case-study for those interested in the postwar Anglo-American Special Relationship. This article investigates the oil crisis with two purposes in mind: first, to demonstrate how Britain and the United States struggled to adjust their bilateral relations in response to their changing postwar world positions; second, to show just how crucial both countries perceived the Special Relationship to be in the early 1950s. This is done by examining the American decision not to pursue a policy in the Iranian oil crisis that would undermine Britain's position, despite at times severe Anglo-American tension. It is concluded that the problems created by the changing balance of forces within the Special Relationship were mitigated in Iran by a combination of consanguinity and, more important, the US need for British help in its policy of global containment. In short, Anglo-American policy-makers perceived sufficient mutual need to persuade them to actively preserve and develop the Special Relationship.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

My thanks go to Dr Alan Dobson for all his constructive advice and to the Harry S. Truman Library for their generous research scholarship, without which this article would not have been possible.