page 107 note 1 See Why Tou Should Vote No by the National Referendum Campaign, 1975. This leaflet represents anti-marketeer views. Its printing was arranged and financed by Her Majesty's Government, and distributed by the General Post Office.

page 107 note 2 See Euro-Barometer No. 3 (May 1975)Google Scholar, Commission of the European Communities (Brussels, July 1975)Google Scholar; Rabier, J. R., L'Europe vue par les Européens (Brussels, 1974)Google Scholar; and Hedges, Barry and Spence, James, Britain and the European Community: Attitudes of the British Public in 1971, Social and Community Planning Research (London, 1974).Google Scholar

page 107 note 3 Feld and Wildgen found that the EEC's unfavourable image was not restricted to publics but also existed among young bureaucrats who were dismayed at the technocratic, cartel image of the EEC. They were less enthusiastic proponents of integration as a group than might have been expected given Inglehart's findings of greater pro-Europeanness among the young “post-bourgeois” generation. Feld, W. and Wildgen, K., ‘National Administrative Elites and European Integration: Saboteurs at Work?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, xiii (1975) p. 254.Google Scholar R. Inglehart, ‘Changing Value Priorities and European Integration’, ibid. x (1971), pp. 1–3.

page 107 note 4 Euro-Barometer No. 3, op. cit. p. 8Google Scholar.

page 107 note 5 Ibid. p. 9.

page 108 note 6 See, for example Inglehart, R., ‘The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergeneration Change in Post-Industrial Societies’, American Political Service Review, 65 (1971), pp. 991–1017CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his ‘The New Europeans: Inward or Outward Looking?’ International Organization, 24, (1970), pp. 129–139CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Puchala, D.‘Patterns in West European Integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, ix (1970), pp. 117–142.CrossRefGoogle ScholarRabier, J. R., L'Europe vue par les Européens, Commission des Communautés Européennes (Bruxelles, 1974).Google Scholar

page 108 note 2 Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity (New Jersey, 1970) pp. 249–252Google Scholar term this “permissive consensus”.

page 108 note 3 Pentland, Charles, International Theory and European Integration (London, 1973), p. 73.Google Scholar For fuller discussion of functionalism see Mitrany, D., The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975).Google Scholar

page 108 note 4 It works on the principle of isolating the common index of need and having technocrats administer functionally specific tasks independently of national governments. See Pentland, Charles, ‘Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration’, in Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, Paul (eds.), Functionalism (London, 1975), p. 16.Google Scholar

page 109 note 1 Mitrany, David, ‘International Cooperation in Action’, International Associations (September, 1959), p. 647.Google Scholar

page 109 note 2 Mitrany, David, ‘The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?’ in Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, Paul (eds.), op. cit. pp. 53–78Google Scholar; Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966).Google Scholar

page 109 note 3 Paul Taylor, writing on Functionalism, maintains that ”The experience: of successful integration – and the perception of the rewards in terms of welfare which that brings – is seen to shift loyalties away from national governments.” See his ‘Functionalism and Strategies for International Integration’ in Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, Paul (eds.), op. cit. p. 82.Google Scholar

page 109 note 4 It is implicit that payoffs derived from supranational cooperation will exceed those obtainable at the national level, and that bureaucratic elites will develop their own stake in self-perpetuation and extend their spheres of competence. That, however, this need not be so has been argued by Feld and Wildgen who found two distinct and opposed bureaucratic groups in the EEC and that divergent bureaucratic attitudes are nation, generations and organisationally based. The lesser favourability of younger bureaucrats towards political integration may be due to a number of factors including perceptions as to how integration may affect their personal advancement. Feld and Wildgen found significant discrepancies between those favouring political union but opposed to EMU, and vice versa. However, the small size of their “pro political union” respondents in a number of ministries (N≪ = 14) gives rise to the suspicion that perhaps small changes of personnel would produce different results. See op. cit. pp. 249–250.

page 110 note 1 Haas, E. B., ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, in Lindberg, L. N. and Scheingold, S. A. (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 23.Google Scholar

page 110 note 2 Given Feld and Wildgen's findings that older bureaucrats and bureaucrats from the Six tend to be more favourably disposed to “political union” than younger ones, and those from the “new” Three, this may be so. However, the personal payoffs careerwise are also important, as is their finding that while participation in expert working committees may increase favourability towards functional ‘economic’ integration, it may decrease favourability towards political integration.

page 110 note 3 Haas, op. cit. p. 29.

page 110 note 4 Ibid. p. 31.

page 110 note 5 Puchala argues that a shift to mutual relevance attentiveness and responsiveness is a necessary part of integration, and that European integration began “with the shift in intra-European communications behaviour between the inter-war and post-war periods arid then continuing in the 1950s in the diplomatic channels, in institutional channels and in the minds of West Europeans”, op. cit. p. 140–141. But he does not clearly differentiate between mass and elite responsiveness.

page 110 note 6 See on relevance of personal rewards to business elites, Mennis, B. and Sauvant, K. P., ‘Describing and Explaining Support for Regional Integration: An Investigation of German Business Elite attitudes toward the European Community’, International Organization, 29 (1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar That a reward structure can be an effective way of promoting the acquisition of a desired set of socio-political beliefs among citizens, and that it can be more effective than deliberate inculcation has been shown by Court, D. and Prewitt, K., ‘Nation versus Region in Kenya: A Note on Political Learning’, British Journal of Political Science, 4 (1974), p. 109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar That the type of reward structure, education, and. values of recipients are important has been shown by Inglehart, (1971), Feld, and Wildgen, , and Rabier, J. and Handley, D., ‘Summary: Inter-Regional Differences and Differentiations in the Public Attitudes and Behaviours’, ECPR (Brussels, March 1975).Google Scholar

page 111 note 1 Money allocated under the Social Fund for retraining schemes is distributed by governments in the member states, or via private schemes. In the latter case, the Commission pays 33% of the total cost; the governments and private concerns themselves each 33%. For public schemes the Commission and national governments split the cost equally. European Report, 12 May, 1976, No. 324.Google Scholar Because monies are distributed via national offices, and insufficient attention is drawn to the sources of such monies, individuals benefiting may remain ignorant of them.

page 111 note 2 European Report, No. 158. 20 July 1974.Google Scholar It was found that while respondents to an inquiry in the EEC attributed their low level of knowledge about the Community to attributes of media coverage in given member states (some arguing for instance that available information was biased, or insufficient), 25%–33% of respondents could not say why they felt poorly informed about the Community. Low public interest in the EEC was detectable.

page 111 note 3 European Report, No. 160, 26 July, 1974.Google Scholar

page 112 note 1 The July 1975 summit (also referred to as European Council) endorsed this view in favouring the creation of a tripartite conference of the EEC's “social partners” and Ministers of Labour and Economics. This idea originated with the Brussels-based European Trade Union Confederation. The Commission was charged with preparations for the conference.

page 112 note 2 Significantly some identitive groups have reoriented their activities. The European Metal-Workers Federation organized a European day of action on 3 October, 1974 to alert national and EEC authorities to workers’ claims in the metal working sector. It urged the Commission to: (i) expedite enquiries into the role played by MNCs in the oil crisis; (ii) implement a genuine European energy policy; (iii) take adequate measures to contain inflation and safeguard purchasing power; (iv) take action on the employment question. See European Report, No. 181, 5 October, 1974.Google Scholar The unions have also sought solutions to the codetermination and merger controls issues at the EEC level of government. Their efforts have met with varying degrees of success.

page 112 note 3 The Commission, in its 1974 Annual Report on the Economic Situation in the Community, stressed the need for Community solidarity to withstand recession. See this report and Trade Union News from the European Community, No. 15, Commission of the European Communities (London, 1974), pp. 1–6.Google Scholar

page 112 note 4 Rabier and Handley note that “Dissatisfaction with national authorities seems to be related to regional socio-economic situation, whereas confidence increases in regional authorities (who are “closer to home”) as regional socio-economic conditions get worse”. op. cit. p. 2. See too Handley, D., ‘Regional Variations, and Supportive Attitudes toward European Integration’, Études et Recherches (Dép. de Science Politique of the University of Geneva), no. 4, 1974.Google Scholar

page 113 note 1 See Averyt, W., ‘Eurogroups, clientela, and the European Community’, International Organization, 29 (1975) pp. 949–972.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 113 note 2 Hirschman, A. O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).Google Scholar

page 113 note 3 See Binder, Leonardet al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, 1971).Google Scholar

page 114 note 1 Feld and Wildgen note that “a substantial number of national civil servants has a variety of motivations to hinder progress toward political integration”, op. cit., p. 265.

page 114 note 2 The ECSC's housing scheme for workers in relevant industries still functions. Since 1952 Italians, for instance, working in coalmines and steel mills of other member states have been able to transfer their social security benefits home to their families, and to move into houses paid for by the High Authority's budget. See A Social Policy, European Community Information Service (Washington, April 1975), p. 12;Google ScholarFifteenth (ECSC) General Report, sections 471 through 474 (Brussels, 1967).Google Scholar

page 115 note 1 It was not until 1974–75 that real progress began to be made in these spheres. On equal pay see Trade Union Newsfrom the European Community, No. 16 (Winter 1975)Google Scholar; on migrant work ers see ibid. and Trade Union News No. 14 (Spring/Summer 1974), Trade Union Information, No. 1 (January 1975).Google Scholar On industrial democracy see European Community (May 1974), pp 10–11;Google ScholarTrade Union Information No. 1 (February 1975)Google Scholar, Trade Union News, No. 17 (Spring/Summer)Google Scholar all published by the European Communities.

page 115 note 2 Significantly this development led to recognition of the fact that EEC legislation affecting citizens can only be effective if citizens are aware of their rights and act to maintain them.

page 116 note 1 On associated difficulties see Collins, D., ‘Toward A European Social Policy’ Journal of Common Market Studies, v (1967), pp. 31–33;Google Scholar her The European Communities: The Social Policy of the First Phase, (London, 1975)Google Scholar and Lawson, R. and Reed, B.Social Security in the European-Community (Chatham House, PEP, London, 1975), pp. 54–61.Google Scholar

page 116 note 2 Ibid. p. 57.

page 116 note 3 Ibid.

page 116 note 4 Ibid.

page 116 note 5 Pinder, John, ‘Economic Growth and Social Justice’, in Mayne, Richard (ed.), Europe Tomorrow (London, 1972), p. 277.Google Scholar

page 117 note 1 The 6.5% allocated the social sector represented marginally less than the 10% reimbursement to member states of funds allocated to “own resources” which amounted to 6.64% of the EEC's total budget. European Report, No. 199, 15 January, 1975.Google Scholar

page 117 note 2 A Social Policy, op. cit. p. 7.

page 117 note 3 Of aid that went to retraining workers in 1967, 42% went to physically handicapped workers who represented but 12% of the total number of men retrained, and the size of the Social Fund was increased by 65% over the 1966 figure. This increase corresponded with increased benefits and a rise in the number of workers for whom retraining assistance was sought. See First General Report on the Activities of the Communities, 1967 (Brussels and Luxembourg, Febuary 1968), sections 281 through 285, pp. 240–242.Google Scholar

page 118 note 1 Report on the Development of the Social situation in the Community in 1971 (Brussels and Luxembourg February 1972), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

page 118 note 2 Information: Social Policy, 16/72, Commission of the European Communities, Press and Information Directorate-General (November 1971). p. 1.Google Scholar

page 118 note 3 Ibid.

page 118 note 4 Ibid.

page 119 note 1 Information: Social Policy, 16/72 (April 1972) pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

page 119 note 2 A Social Policy, op. cit. p. 7.

page 119 note 3 Economic and Social Committees of the European Communities, Annual Report, (Brussels, 1973), p. 13.Google Scholar

page 119 note 4 Increased attention to social policy also resulted from the imminent enlargement of the Community, and British obsession with socio-economic questions.

page 119 note 5 Information: Social Policy, 16/72, op. cit. p. 2.Google Scholar

page 119 note 6 Lawson and Reed, op. cit. p. 58.

page 120 note 1 Commission Third General Report on the Activities of the Communities (1969) (Brussels and Luxembourg, February 1970), pp. 295–296.Google Scholar

page 120 note 2 Fourth General Report on the Activities of the Communities (1970) (Brussels and Luxembourg, February 1971), p. 102.Google Scholar

page 120 note 3 See on this Lodge, J., ‘Toward the European Political Community: EEC Summits and European Integration’, Orhis, xix (1975), pp. 626–651.Google Scholar

page 120 note 4 Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community in 1972 (Brussels and Luxembourg, February 1973), p. 7.Google Scholar

page 120 note 5 Ibid. pp. 7–8.

page 121 note 1 Summit communiqué, point 6.

page 121 note 2 Significantly the communiqué preamble noted: “Economic expansion is not an end in itself. Its first aim should be to enable disparities in living conditions to be reduced. It must take place with the participation of all social partners. It should result in an improvement in the quality of life as well as standards of living.” This view was expressed in the Commission's Preliminary Guidelines for a Social Policy Programme. See Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community, op. cit. p. 9.

page 121 note 3 See ibid. section C on the ‘Democratization of Economic and Social Life’, pp. 13–14.

page 121 note 4 The Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community in 1972 devoted a special chapter to a “first tentative comparison between the situation in the Community of the Six and in the three acceding states”. This revealed important differences in procedure, but concluded that the main trends in social policy were sufficiently convergent to ensure that EEC enlargement would “in no way impede the achievement of the objectives of the Paris summit in the social sector”, op. cit. p. 14.

page 121 note 5 Commission Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community in 1973 (Brussels and Luxembourg, February 1974), pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

page 121 note 6 Total EEC unemployment by the end of 1974 was 4 million, and consumer prices rose by 20% in some member states.

page 122 note 1 ESC Information Bulletin, No. 3 (Brussels, 1973) p. 51.Google Scholar

page 122 note 2 Robert Marjolin, former Commission Vice-President and chairman of an expert group invited by the Commission in early 1974 to analyse problems raised by the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union by 1980 (a goal now postponed) called for the Creation of an EEC unemployment benefit scheme on 22 April 1974 whose activities would be directed by the social partners, and financed partly by management and partly by labour. Under it, each unemployed person would receive as a first part of his payment a Community allowance which would be clearly visible as such.

page 122 note 3 On the Community education programme see European Community (July/August 1974).Google Scholar

page 122 note 4 Ibid.

page 122 note 5 European Report, No. 313, 7 April 1976.Google Scholar

page 123 note 1 European Report, No. 313, 7 April 1976.Google Scholar

page 123 note 2 That is, a gain in loyalty for the EEC need not imply an equal loss in loyalty for the member states.

page 123 note 3 Indicators of lessening loyalty among citizens to national governments and of a diminishing belief among citizens of the efficacy of national level action may be: low turnouts in elections; high abstention rates; high proportion of spoiled ballot papers; high incidence ofindustrial unrest plus demands for better pay, working conditions, longer vacations, shorter hours; rise in support for ethnocultural secessionist movements seeking independence and financial autonomy from national government following perception of inequitous allocation of scarce resources; growing representation of grass-roots identitive groups at the supranational level indicating awareness of a new authoritative decision source. Under a combination of the above conditions, the grass-roots may prove more susceptible to reorienting their activities under guidance from supranational agencies. On the growth of supranational interest groups see Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit. p. 79.

page 124 note 1 The Commission organizes information exchanges under the social policy to enable member states to benefit from the experience of their partners.

page 124 note 2 Britain spends less per head, and a lesser proportion of its national income, on social security and social services than any other member state except Ireland. On present trends Britain is increasing its social expenditure in relation to its national income at a rate which will mean that within three years Britain may have the lowest relative social expenditure of all member states. For details on this and the Social Budget see Trade Union News, No. 16 (Winter 1975), p. 13 ff.Google Scholar

page 124 note 3 The Social Budget is intended to be a reliable indicator of progress towards a common social policy. Increased member state interest in the Social Fund playing a more extensive role in employment policy must be channelled along EEC lines to ensure that coordinated and optimal use is made of available resources. Otherwise, member states may only seek its aid when their own social policy provisions cannot adequately cope in times of recession or crisis.

page 124 note 4 The British government in August 1975 drew attention to the possibility of reallocating funds received under a Community policy in a manner acceptable to the national government. Cabinet endorsed a proposal to reduce Whitehall spending by using funds allocated to Britain by the Community from the Regional Development Fund. Treasury advocated a national policy of offsetting British receipts from Community funds by corresponding cuts in national government spending: a policy which contradicted the rationale behind the Commission's policy of allocating regional development funds to areas of greatest need in order to supplement, not substitute for, national spending programmes. Such action by member governments hampers both the fulfilment of Community goals, rudimentary harmonization schemes, and the promotion of balanced development throughout the Community. Sunday Times, 10 August 1975.Google Scholar

page 125 note 1 The Community made aid available to victims of the nyprocaprolactum plant explosion at Flixborough (UK) on 1 June, 1974. Cash compensation to individuals was proposed of the order of 30,000 Belgian francs to the next of kin of bachelors; 50,000 to widows; 20,000 to orphans. See European Report, No. 155, 12 June, 1974.Google Scholar But this did little to improve the image of the Community even in Britain. In a speech to the French Chamber of Commerce on 7 March 1975, Mr Len Murray, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, argued that the Community needed to reverse its thinking having “started off with too much competitive purpose and too little Community purpose, too much of economics and too little of social welfare, too much about fair business practices and too little about fair social practices”. Trade Union Mews, No. 16 (Winter 1975).Google Scholar

page 125 note 2 Trade Union Information, No. 3 (1975), p. 1.Google Scholar

page 125 note 3 A Social Policy, op. cit. p. 9.Google Scholar

page 125 note 4 ESC Information Bulletin, No. 3 (1973), p. 50.Google Scholar

page 126 note 1 The idea for the Foundation originated in the Commission's proposals for a European Institute for the Environment in two communications on the environment in July 1971 and March 1972. It was reinforced by a French government suggestion for a European Foundation to study living and working conditions at the 1972 Paris Summit. Hillery sees it as important for the social policy's evolution, and completion of SAP. European Report, No. 321 8 May 1976.Google Scholar

page 126 note 2 These include constant improvement of living and working conditions by raising living standards; developing poor regions; promoting employment and welfare, vocational and general education schemes; protecting consumers; and improving the environment.

page 126 note 3 There are 10 million handicapped in the EEC. See too ESC Annual Report (Brussels, 1974) p. 16.Google Scholar

page 127 note 1 Ibid.

page 127 note 2 The ESC set up a Section for Protection of the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Affairs in recognition of growing public and governmental concern with “the quality of life” which in previous decades had been sacrificed to economic expansio., ESC Bulletin, No. 1 (Brussels, January 1975), p. 1.Google Scholar

page 127 note 3 Ibid. p. 18.

page 127 note 4 Visiting the ESC on 17 June 1975 the President of Ireland, Gearball O'Dalaigh explained that the social policy had a “unique potential for securing the involvement of our citizens in Community work” but that it was not “just a public relations exercise … It operates in an effective and tangible way so that it becomes a daily reality to all the citizens… in particular to the disadvantaged groups within the Community …“ ESC Bulletin, 6 (1975), p. 2.Google Scholar

page 128 note 1 See Mennis and Sauvant, op. cit..

page 128 note 2 See Feld and Wildgen; and Inglehart, op. cit..

page 128 note 3 Puchala, op. cit. p. 119 and 140.

page 128 note 4 J. R. Rabier, 1973, op. cit. p. 7. Hedges and Spence, op. cit. p. 15.

page 128 note 5 Inglehart, op. cit. 1971.

page 128 note 6 Rabier, J. R. (1973), op. cit. pp. 13 ff.Google Scholar

page 129 note 1 The language barrier obviously creates problems for communications between the groups themselves. See Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge., Mass., 1967).Google Scholar

page 129 note 2 ESC Information Bulletin, No. 3 (1973), p. 50.Google Scholar

page 129 note 3 ESC Bulletin, No. 3–4 (1975), p. 9.Google Scholar

page 129 note 4 For details on this see European Report, No. 240, 21 June, 1975.Google Scholar On British arguments in favour of more cooperation on unemployment see ibid. No. 315, 7 April, 1976.

page 130 note 1 ESC Bulletin, 6, (1975), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

page 130 note 2 European Report, No. 253, 2 August, 1975.Google Scholar

page 130 note 3 Ibid.

page 131 note 1 European Report Feature, 7 April, 1976, p. 3.Google Scholar

page 131 note 2 This reluctance may be partly due to a feeling among national governments that they owe their office to those electors who voted them in on the expectation that they could better satisfy their socio-economic welfare needs than the opposition, and to a feeling that their support base would be eroded were they to relinquish control over their socio-economic welfare policies to other agencies. Another problem stems from Inglehart's findings that it is those respondents most satisfied with their situation who are most pro-integration. Exploring the reasons for this lies outside the scope of this essay, but it remains an important observation since these respondents support integration for reasons other than those born of strictly utilitarian considerations. We support Inglehart's “venture-capital” explanation for this.

page 132 note 1 The Community has yet to experience industrial action taken by transnational unions. Unions have yet to demonstrate like farmers against EEC policies. However, union trans-national awareness is growing since more attention is now being given to the possibility of unions in one member state supporting industrial action by another in other member states.

page 132 note 2 The British referendum campaign may have stimulated awareness of the EEC among both British and EEC publics.

page 132 note 3 Puchala, , op. cit. p. 142.Google Scholar

page 132 note 4 Rabier, op. cit..

page 133 note 1 Inglehart, , op. cit. pp. 11–13.Google Scholar

page 133 note 2 Mennis, and Sauvant, , op. cit. pp. 973 ff.Google Scholar Their findings are derived from responses of members of one national business elite and it may be that as suggested by neofunctionalists pay-offs are particularly important for the maintenance of elite support for integration.

page 134 note 1 Averyt, , op. cit. p. 972.Google Scholar