¹ Mare Liberum was first published in 1609 and De Jure belli ac Pads in 1625. The latter work includes 61 Prologomena. For a comprehensive list, see Rogge, H. C., Bibliotheca Grotiana (The Hague, 1883).Google Scholar

² Sir Lauterpacht, Hirsch, The Grotian Tradition in International Law', British Yearbook of International Law, 23 (1946), pp. 1–53Google Scholar; Murphy, C. F., “The Grotian Vision of World Order”, American Journal of International Law, 76 (1982), pp. 477–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Edwards, C. E., Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland (Chicago, 1981)Google Scholar; Higgins, R., ‘Grotius and the United Nations’, International Social Sciences Journal 1,(1985), pp. 119–27Google Scholar.

³ Bull, H., ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Butterfield, H. and Wight, M. (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 51–73Google Scholar; Holsti, K. J., The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London, 1985Google Scholar); Lijphart, A., The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations', International Studies Quarterly, 18 (1974), pp. 41-74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bull, H., ‘Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations’, British Journal of International Studies, 2 (1976), pp. 101–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977), pp. 24, 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Jackson, R. H., ‘Civil Science: Comparative Jurisprudence and Third World Governance’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 1 (1988), p. 380CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the nature of a civil science approach to international theory, see Jackson, R. H., ‘Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World’, International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 519–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Wight, M., ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 92Google Scholar.

⁷ Wight, ‘Western Values’, p. 93.

⁸ Wight, M., ‘An Anatomy of International Thought”, Review of International Studies, 13 (1987), pp. 223–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Wight, , ‘Western Values’, p. 95. (notes omitted).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Bull, ‘Martin Wight’, p. 107 notes that, if forced to pigeon-hole Wight into one of his categories, ‘we should have to consider him a Grotian’, though Bull argues that this would be a mistake, for it overlooks the influence of the other categories on Wight's thought.

¹¹ Holsti, K. J. in ‘Along the Road to International Theory’, International Journal, 39 (1984), p. 345Google Scholar notes that ‘Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society is the most notable exposition on the Grotian concept that a society of states contains many bonds that brings stability and order that would not be found in a mere collection of sovereignties1 (original emphasis). See also Hoffmann, S., ‘Hedley Bull and His Contribution to International Relations’, International Affairs, 62 (1986), pp. 179–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Krasner, S. D., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, in Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983), p. 8.Google Scholar

¹³ Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, p. 3.

¹⁴ Bull, H., ‘International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach’, in Knorr, K. and Rosenau, J. N. (eds.), Contending Approaches To International Politics (Princeton, 1969), p. 20.Google Scholar

¹⁵ ‘Inverted Rationalism: Martin Wight, International Theory and The Good Life’, presented at the joint meeting of the International Studies Association and the British International Studies Association, London, 1989.

¹⁶ The Dividing Discipline, pp. 7–8.

¹⁷ The Dividing Discipline, pp. 7–8.

¹⁸ In The Dividing Discipline Holsti acknowledges that Grotians differ with respect to their image of the world, in that they impart a great deal more order to international relations than do classicists. However, he argues that differences in ‘a single feature of the states system are not sufficient in my opinion to signify the existence of different paradigms, so long as the units of analysis, actors, and the problematic remain essentially the same (p. 33, original emphasis).

¹⁹ Theoretical Revolution', p. 43.

²⁰ Lijphart, Theoretical Revolution', p. 43.

²¹ A caveat is in order. Vincent, R. J. in The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (1981), p. 96Google Scholar, has cautioned that one may question ‘the whole enterprise of treating great thinkers like parcels at the post office'. The attempt to reduce the ideas of these thinkers to three essential elements to enable their categorization intends no disservice to the complexity or richness of their thought.

²² All references to this text are taken from Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. F. W. Kelsey (New York, 1925).

²³ War and Peace, Prolegomena 1, p. 9.

²⁴ War and Peace, Prolegomena 28, p. 20.

²⁵ Falk, R. A., Introduction to Edwards, Grotius, p. xv.Google Scholar

²⁶ Grotius, p. xv.

²⁷ Lauterpacht, ‘Grotian Tradition’, pp . 16–17.

²⁸ Lauterpacht, ‘Grotian Tradition’, pp. 16-17. For a review of the debate over Grotius' status as the ‘father of international law’ see Edwards, Grotius, ch. 2.

²⁹ Grotius, War and Peace, Book I, ch. 2, p. 52. Further references for this paragraph are found in Prolegomena 8; Book I, ch. 2; Book II and Book III.

³⁰ War and Peace, p. 53.

³¹ Lauterpacht, ‘Grotian Tradition’, pp. 28-9.

³² See Edwards, Grotius, pp. 146-7. Lauterpacht, ‘Grotian Tradition’, p. 29 interprets the Grotian conception of sovereignty in terms of a proprietary notion of ‘dominion held under law' and argues that the disappearance of patrimonial theory and practice had more relevance for the evolution of laws governing territorial property than for those relating to international personality. J. L. Brierly in The Basis of Obligation in International Law (Oxford, 1958), pp. 20-23 notes that Grotius's theory of sovereignty was unclear, reflecting a notion of'superiority’, ‘with no pretensions to independence in the modern sense’, but also tending against absolutist formulations, in the belief that the sovereign is subject to the rule of law. Brierly also identifies the Grotian view of sovereignty as consistent with the feudal notion of the patrimony or property of the ruler.

³³ Wight in ‘Western Values’, p. 102, notes that the ‘fruitful imprecision’ as to the membership of the Grotian international society is consistent with the tendency before the eighteenth century and the formulation of the juridical concept of exclusive state personality to regard kings, peoples, individuals and even certain institutions as possessing international personality.

³⁴ Lauterpacht, ‘Grotian Tradition’, pp. 27, 29 (original emphasis).

³⁵ Grotius identifies three categories of law: natural, divine and voluntary or positive law. Voluntary law comprises both municipal law and the law of nations, both of which derive from the consent of their subjects. However, Grotius roots the obligatory nature of consent in natural law and thus gives positive law a naturalist base. See Grotius, War and Peace, Prolegomena 1, p. 16; Brierly, Basis of Obligation, p. 10 and Lauterpacht, ‘Grotian Tradition’, pp. 21-2.

³⁶ ‘Natural Law and International Relations’, British Journal of International Studies, 5 (1979), p. 171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Vincent, R. J., ‘Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order’, British Journal of International Studies, 4 (1978), pp. 21–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also D. M. Mackinnon, ‘Natural Law’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds.) Diplomatic Investigations, p. 79 for a discussion of the recourse to natural law for establishing the source of'a human norm1 or a ‘metaphysical basis for the good life’.

³⁸ This conception is commonly associated with the thought of Hobbes. However, Holsti in The Dividing Discipline, pp. 24—5 notes that commentators often overlook that Hobbes ‘in fact acknowledged a number of conflict-reducing mechanisms whose operations imply some form of international order. These include the laws of nature, prudence (the recognition that constant warfare would derogate from the subjects1 loyalties), and the possibility that a more highly developed international law might lead to a ‘troubled peace1 rather than to recurring war1 (notes omitted). See also Vincent, ‘The Hobbesian Tradition’.

³⁹ Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, p. 25 suggests that Rousseau ‘represents more of the opposite to Grbtius's viewpoint1 than does Hobbes, for Rousseau believed that the ‘areas of common agreement’ amongst states are insignificant and that interstate relations, rather than breeding societal interests, breed conflict.

⁴⁰ Grotius, War and Peace, Prolegomena 6, p. 11 (notes omitted).

⁴¹ Grotius, War and Peace, Prolegomena 18, p. 16 (notes omitted).

⁴² Grotius, War and Peace, Prolegomena 21, p. 17.

⁴³ Donelan, Michael in ‘Grotius and the Image of War’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12 (1983), p. 241Google Scholar, argues that the Grotian “community of mankind” is not premised upon notions of the common good, but derives from the ‘self-regarding’ interests of states. According to this view ‘states are not radically ordered to the common good. They may attain it if the Liberal doctrine of the harmony of interests is correct. But there is not the power of a basic obligation to each other behind their search’. Professor Donelan cites Midgley, E. B. F., The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations (London, 1975), pp. 154–67Google Scholar, in support of the individualism' and self-regarding nature of the Grotian society. However, both authors overlook the fact that for Grotius perceptions of self-interest are infused with concerns for the common good. Grotius refuses to concede that ‘every animal is impelled by nature to seek only its own good’ (Prolegomena 6, p. 11) and argues that the law of nations has in view the advantage, not of particular states, but of the great society of states' (Prolegomena 17, p. 15). Furthermore, the right to wage war to inflict punishment upon a wrongdoer, which is regarded by both authors as illustrating the individualistic and self-regarding bias in that it sanctions the right of individual states to sit in judgment on their own causes, is limited by Grotius to action that ‘has some good end in view’ and wrongdoings that directly or indirectly affect ‘human society or fellow man’ (Book II, ch. 20, pp. 468, 489).

⁴⁴ The State of War (New York, 1965), p. 68.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Hoffman, State of War, p. 67.

⁴⁶ The Dividing Discipline, p. 25.

⁴⁷ Grotius, War and Peace, Prolegomena 16, 17 and 22, pp. 15-17.

⁴⁸ For an illuminating discussion of the concept of reciprocity and the distinction between reciprocity arising from self-interest (specific reciprocity) and reciprocity arising from a sense of obligation or ‘solidaristic social norms’ (diffuse reciprocity), see Keohane, R. O., ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization, 40 (1986), pp. 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁹ Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, p. 20.

⁵⁰ Grotius, War and Peace, Book II, ch. 22, sect, xiii, p. 552. References in the following paragraph to Grotius are found in Prolegomena 25; Book I, chs. 3, 4 and 22; Book II, ch. 5.

⁵¹ Falk, introduction to Edwards, Grotius, p. xiv.

⁵² For the distinction between natural law and natural rights, see Mackinnon, ‘Natural Law’, pp. 79 ff.

⁵³ Vincent, in ‘Western conceptions’, pp. 22, 26, notes that the element of universalization, necessary to the contemplation of a universal moral order, is present in both Christianity and natural law. In providing a secular basis for natural law, Grotius assisted in the transition from natural law to natural right, by providing the foundation for social contract theory and ‘placing the origin of society in an agreement among individuals who had natural rights and thence to the rights of man’ But, with the growth of legal positivism and its emphasis upon the state as the sole repository of rights and duties and the ultimate determinant of moral values, the status of the individual was reduced to that of being ‘a mere object of international law’, while the element of universality was replaced by moral relativism.

⁵⁴ It should be noted that while Grotius is generally regarded to have provided a secular and rationalist basis for natural law and the law of nations, there is a certain ambiguity in the place he assigns to divine law. Grotius states that natural law would retain its character even if one were to concede that there is no God. (Prolegomena 11). However, the fact that he identifies divine law as a source of law, albeit not the ultimate source, has led some to question his status as a secularist and a rationalist. See Edwards, Grotius, p. 47.

⁵⁵ (Leicester, 1978), p. 108. The original version first appeared in 1946 in the form of an essay and later appeared as a text, edited and enlarged by Hedley Bull and Carstan Holbraad.

⁵⁶ Wight, Power Politics, pp. 101-2.

⁵⁷ In particular, see ‘Western Values’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, where Wight discusses the rationalist or Grotian tradition.

⁵⁸ Bull, ‘Martin Wight’, p. 110.

⁵⁹ ‘Western Values’, p. 102.

⁶⁰ ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, in Butterfield and Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 17-8 and ‘An Anatomy’, p. 222.

⁶¹ In ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ Wight attributes what he refers to as ‘a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized about’ to the intellectual dominance of the state and to the belief in progress, which is inconsistent with the recurrent and necessitous nature of international politics.

⁶² ‘An Anatomy’, pp. 221-2. Wight does not develop the distinction between ‘patterns of thought’ and ‘traditions of thought’ in depth, save for the observation that the former partakes more of philosophy, thereby exhibiting greater logical coherence, while the latter partakes of history and practice and thus is subject to actions that are inconsistent with logic. Unfortunately, Wight does not specify which of the categories constitute traditions and which constitute patterns.

⁶³ Bull, in ‘Martin Wight’, and B. Porter in ‘Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's ‘International Theory’ in M. Donelan (ed.), The Reason of States (London, 1978), pp. 64-78. Both note that Wight did not limit these categories to the thought of any one individual alone.

⁶⁴ ‘Western Values’, p. 93 and ‘An Anatomy’, p. 222.

⁶⁵ ‘Western Values’, p. 93 (original emphasis). The following discussion relies primarily upon ‘Western Values’, and ‘An Anatomy’.

⁶⁶ ‘Western Values’, pp. 96-7.

⁶⁷ Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 29.

⁶⁸ Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, p. 30.

⁶⁹ ‘Western Values’, pp. 124, 128.

⁷⁰ ‘An Anatomy’, p. 227.

⁷¹ For further discussion of the influence of Wight's religious beliefs and for the view that Grotian rationalism is a compromise position which makes concessions to both alternate formulations see Bull, ‘Martin Wight’.

⁷² ‘An Anatomy’, pp. 130-1.

⁷³ See Jackson, ‘Inverted Rationalism’.

⁷⁴ ‘The Grotian Conception’, p. 51.

⁷⁵ Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 24.

⁷⁶ Bull Anarchical Society, p. 152.

⁷⁷ Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 153.

⁷⁸ Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 35.

⁷⁹ Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 6.

⁸⁰ ‘The Grotian Conception’, p. 52.

⁸¹ ‘The Grotian Conception’, p. 52.

⁸² ‘The Grotian Conception’, p. 70.

⁸³ Anarchical Society, p. 13.

⁸⁴ Anarchical Society, p. 67.

⁸⁵ Anarchical Society, pp. 67-70.

⁸⁶ ‘The Grotian Conception’, pp. 71-3. See also The Anarchical Society, pp. 238-40.

⁸⁷ ‘Natural Law and International Relations’, p. 180.

⁸⁸ Anarchical Society, ch. 1.

⁸⁹ Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, 1983).

⁹⁰ ‘The Grotian Conception’, pp. 70, 53.

⁹¹ ‘Medley Bull’, pp. 186-7.

⁹² ‘The Grotian Vision’.

⁹³ ‘The Grotian Vision’, pp. 34-35 (original emphasis).

⁹⁴ Anarchical Society, p. 86.

⁹⁵ Anarchical Society, p. 96.

⁹⁶ Anarchical Society, p. 97.

⁹⁷ It is important here to distinguish between the claim to universality in theory and in fact. Bull notes in ‘The Emergence Of A Universal International Society’, in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984), p. 120, that, in fact, there really was no universal international society prior to the nineteenth century. Though natural law posited the existence of such a society, ‘the universal international society of mankind contained in the doctrine of natural law was a merely conceptual or theoretical one. It had no foundation in the will or consent of political communities throughout the world’. Bull emphasizes that the absence of commonly perceived interests and accepted rules, practices and institutions militate against the finding of a universal international society in the relations between European and non-European states. Similarly, Martin Wight in System of States, p. 128 argues that the Grotian society was dualistic in nature, comprised of an universal ‘outer circle’, uniting all men under natural law, and an European ‘inner circle’, uniting men under divine law, thus differentiating between Christians and infidels.

⁹⁸ Note, however, that not all positivists ascribe to the command theory of law. See Hart, H. L. A., ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), pp. 593–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹⁹ Vincent in ‘Western Conceptions’, p. 31 notes that an ‘intractable difficulty’ with notions of ‘world society as constituting a moral framework’ is that ‘in being western conceptions, they are inescapably a partial view of the world society as a whole’. See also Bull, ‘Martin Wight’, p. 115, for a discussion of the Eurocentric and Western character of Wight's international society.

¹⁰⁰ Kratochwil, F. and Ruggie, J. G., ‘international Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State’. International Organization, 40 (1986), p. 759.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a useful review of the regimes literature, see Haggard, S. and Simmons, B. A., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 491–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰¹ Krasner, ‘Structural Causes’, p. 10. This volume adopts the following definition of international regimes: ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.

¹⁰² Young, O. R., ‘Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes’, in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, pp. 93–114Google Scholar; Puchala, D. J. and Hopkins, R. F., ‘International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis’, in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, pp. 61–90.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ ‘International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions’, World Politics, 39 (1986), p. 111.

¹⁰⁴ Holsti would likely disagree for in ‘The Necrologists of International Relations’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 18 (1985), p. 692, he argues that the ‘normative core’ of regime analysis is ‘welfare broadly conceived’ and not the causes of war and conditions of peace.

¹⁰⁵ ‘Regime Dynamics’, p. 93.

¹⁰⁶ ‘International Regimes’, p. 63.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Regime Dynamics’, p. 63.

¹⁰⁸ ‘International Regimes’, p. 86.

¹⁰⁹ ‘International Regimes’, p. 63.

¹¹⁰ ‘International Regimes’, p. 90.

¹¹¹ For a good discussion of formal and informal compliance mechanisms, see Young, O. R., Compliance and Public Authority (Baltimore and London, 1979).Google Scholar

¹¹² ‘Regime Dynamics’, p. 95.

¹¹³ Puchala and Hopkins, ‘International Regimes’, p. 66.

¹¹⁴ Compliance and Public Authority, p. 23.

¹¹³ Compliance and Public Authority, p. 23.

¹¹⁶ Anarchical Society, pp. 39-0.

¹¹⁷ See the various selections in T.M.C. Asser Institute (ed.), International Law and the Grotian Heritage (The Hague: 1985) for the contemporary relevance of the Grotian tradition to international law.

¹¹⁸ ‘Quasi-states’, pp. 541-42.

¹¹⁹ Haggard and Simmons, ‘Theories of International Regimes’, p. 493, criticize this formulation of regimes for overstating the normative consensus in international politics by assuming that all regularities in behaviour are rule governed, thus ‘conflating’ such patterns with rules.

¹²⁰ Young, ‘International Regimes’, p. 105.

¹²¹ ‘The Necrologists’, p. 692.

¹²² ‘Towards a Theory of International Obligation’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 8 (1968), pp. 301-2Google Scholar. Schachter identifies ‘at least a baker's dozen of ‘candidates’ that have been suggested as the basis of obligation in international law.

¹²³ Young, ‘International Regimes’, p. 121.

¹²⁴ ‘Cave! hie dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, pp. 337–54.

¹²⁵ ‘A Critique of Regime Analysis’.

¹²⁶ Grotius, War and Peace, Book III, ch. 24, p. 573.

¹²⁷ ‘Grotian Tradition’, p. 14.

¹²⁸ Holsti, The Dividing Discipline.