Some time before the middle of this century Europe ceased to be a self-regulating political system. This is much the most upsetting event in European history for centuries. It means that Europeans now look beyond their continental confines, not if and when and where they wish, but because they must. During the past 500 years or so—from the emergence of strong centralized French and English monarchies to the disruption of the polyglot empires of eastern Europe by self-determination—Europe has been increasingly articulated into secular sovereign states constructed and fuelled by national languages and national passions. These states have existed in a condition of conflict with one another. But their conflicts, however intense, were never perpetual, so that conflict itself became systematized and found its most characteristic expression in two things: in changes of alliance for the purpose of preserving the multinational system and in war. Europe was a political system which operated through alliances, reversals of alliances and war; and whenever one state threatened to become powerful enough to destroy or atrophy the system, there was always at hand an alliance of other states capable of checking its advance and ensuring the system's essential fluidity. There was, in consequence, no need to go outside the system in order to preserve it.

David Mltrany's functionalism has provided an inspired, if widely criticized approach to the study of international organization,1 Although originally conceived without regional restrictions in its application, it has been interpreted as a prescription for European integration hence the development of the formerly pervasive but now largely discredited neo-functionalist school.2 The contention that will be advanced here is that Mitrany's work may still usefully guide our analysis of international organization. This is especially so with regard to understanding the stubbornness of sovereignty, and the complexity of decision making in a new generation of multilateral conference diplomacy, as typified by UNCLOS and UNCTAD. These forums are likely to feature more prominently in coming attempts to develop codes and rules of conduct in fields of global conflict and co-operation such as technology transfer, economic development, basic health and other ‘common heritage’ resource management issues. The grounds for promoting Mitrany's approach are that a close reading of his principal works reveals a more subtle, conservative and realistic appreciation of sovereignty than many critics have permitted, and furthermore, within this more cautious appraisal there lie a number of procedural pointers to the constructive, if undemonstrative circumvention of the restriction of sovereignty.

Two consequences of the internationalization of economic activities that has taken place since the early 1960s have been that, within the international trading system, participant states have become more vulnerable and sensitized to the economic conditions obtaining in other countries; and economic actors have, in general, become more transnational and universal in their orientation and more aware of worldwide business possibilities. Consequently, visible trade flows have been progressively transformed through global raw material sourcing, production location and marketing; and invisible trade has been restructured by global deposit sourcing and lender servicing. Both types of international exchange required extensive external production networks which had to be newly created by international capital transfers and institutional migration. Despite the outward manifestation of these infrastructures, international exchange tensions nevertheless remained because of ‘the continued existence of still mainly nationally based political systems’ and the conflicts of interest and uncertainties created by the asserted extra-territorial orientation of national tax and legal system's, These problems were largely untouched by the harmonization and liberalization processes attempted by industrial nations under the aegis of GATT and other international institutions. As a result, the transnational operations of multinational companies have often had to be channelled to parts of the world where their activities are least frustrated by obstructive interventionist policy in order to secure particular objectives.

Of the family of war conferences the Atlantic meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, has been a neglected relation. It has been covered in general histories but only one substantial account of the conference has appeared to date. This state of affairs is regrettable given the intrinsic importance of some of the issues which were raised at Argentia and the fact that T. A. Wilson's account, The First Summit, was written before some of the official records were released. However, though there is a need for an overall review of the conference, this paper has the modest goal of reconsidering the economic questions which resulted in point four of the Atlantic Charter. The reasons for a new account of the genesis and formulation of the main economic provisions of the joint declaration are three-fold. First, the context of economic discussions in which the conference took place has never been adequately described; consequently the reasoning behind certain decisions, as well as some of the nuances of the talks, have been misunderstood. Secondly, the injudicious character of Welles' proposals for point four and the nature of America's diplomatic defeat at the hands of the British have never been properly explained. Finally, it has not previously been detected that Churchill evaded full consultation with his Cabinet and ignored some of their advice which, ironically, resulted in a less serious set-back for American economic goals than would otherwise have been the case.

Anglo-American relations have always been complicated by mythology. On the American side are the legends spawned by the revolt of the thirteen colonies against the tyranny of George III and Lord North and the resulting legacy of anti-imperialism and an enduring suspicion of the British. On the British side, the myth of the 'special relationship' has often led British statesmen to expect more co-operation and gratitude from the Americans than from mere foreigners such as the French or the Germans. It has been the British, on the whole, who have failed to remember that a core of common interests does not necessarily produce a core of common approach.

In his recent Review article, ‘Do general rules of international law exist?’, Lowe states that there are at least two interpretations of the nature of customary international law.1 In the following, I shall attempt to clarify what these two interpretations are, examine the implications which Lowe attaches to the interpretation which he favours, and discuss his assertions about truly general rules of international law.

Hidemi Suganami's thoughtful criticisms of my recent article in the Review1 throw valuable light on some of the key elements of the argument which I tried to outline there. None the less, those criticisms do not seem to undermine my central argument, which is that there is a difference between the conception of customary international law as a set of laws which in principle bind all states and the conception of customary international law as a set of obligations which in principle bind only those states which have consented to be bound by them. By ‘law’ here, I mean a rule which purports to apply to all entities which fall within the open-ended set (i.e., ‘states’) which constitutes its sphere of application rationae personae. An ‘obligation’, on the other hand, claims no such general applicability, but—in the case of consensual obligations, with which we are here concerned—is only binding upon the closed set of states which have consented to be bound by it. There is, in my view, no good reason why the orthodox conception of customary international law as a set of laws should be preferred to the conception of customary international law as a set of obligations.