* An earlier version of this paper was read to the working conference of the European Association of American Studies, Bellagio, Lago di Como, Italy, in September, 1960.

¹ Two excellent illustrations of this are Heindel, R. H., The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898–1914 (London, 1940)Google Scholar, and Rappaport, Armin, The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Stanford, 1951)Google Scholar.

² Pelling, Henry, America and the British Left, from Bright to Bevan (London, 1956)Google Scholar; Winkler, Henry R., “The Emergence of a Labour Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 1919–1929,” Journal of Modern History, XXVIII (1956)Google Scholar; and The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914–1919 (Rutgers, 1952)Google Scholar; Martin, L. W., Peace without Victory, Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals (New Haven, 1958)Google Scholar; Windrich, Elaine, British Labour's Foreign Policy (Stanford, 1952)Google Scholar; Fitzsimons, M. A., The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945–1951 (Notre Dame, 1953)Google Scholar.

³ The works of Professor Denis Brogan and Professor H. C. Allen exemplify this. The former was for a considerable time connected with the British Labour Party. As a radical Glaswegian Scot, his outlook and background are far from conforming to the orthodox pattern of the British political elite. Professor H. C. Allen is an avowed and doctrinaire supporter of Anglo-American union. Nevertheless, his Great Britain and the United States: a History of Anglo-American Relations, 1785–1952 (New York, 1954)Google Scholar is the indispensable introduction to any serious study of Anglo-American relations.

⁴ Two recent examples of the limitations experienced by some American scholars in attempting to penetrate or understand the mentality of the British political Right are the otherwise excellent works, Epstein, Leon D., Britain—Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954)Google Scholar; and Bremner, Marjorie, “An Analysis of British Parliamentary Thought Concerning the United States in the Post-War Period” (Ph. D. thesis, London, unpublished, 1950)Google Scholar, both of whom swallow and repeat unquestioningly the myths about British Conservative “experience” in foreign affairs and unity of opinion and social origin, neither of which will stand up to a moment's examination even in the periods they are dealing with.

⁵ Taylor, A. J. P., The Trouble-Makers. Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939 (London, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁶ For a recent discussion of theories of elites in relation to recent British society see Guttsmann, W. L., “Social Stratification and Political Elites,” British Journal of Sociology, XI (1960)Google Scholar.

⁷ By contrast with American historians who have preferred 1898, the year of the Spanish-American War. It is noticeable that the main work on Anglo-American relations in this period has been done by Americans. R. H. Heindel, op. cit.; Gelber, L. M., The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, 1898–1906 (London, 1938)Google Scholar; Campbell, Charles S., Anglo-American Understanding, 1898–1903 (Baltimore, 1957)Google Scholar. The year is selected because it marks the opening of active American imperialism in the Spanish American War.

⁸ The recent opening of the British Foreign Office, Admiralty and War Office Archives has still to result in any published work on Anglo-American relations. Recent and current graduate research at London University, mainly at the London School of Economics and Political Science, covers a number of topics in the field, notably Anglo-American relations in the Far East and the embassy of Sir Mortimer Durand; other London studies in recent years, based principally on published diplomatic documents have covered Anglo-American-Canadian relations, 1918–1922, and Anglo-American relations during Hoover's Presidency. Mention will be made later of a number of American works in this more recent field.

⁹ SirSykes, Percy, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand (London, 1926)Google Scholar. Durand would not fit into Theodore Roosevelt's “court.” Roosevelt was desperately anxious that Durand be replaced by his personal friend, Cecil Spring-Rice.

¹⁰ On Bryce see Fisher, H. A. L., James Bryce (New York, 1927)Google Scholar; Percy, Lord of Newcastle, , Some Memories (1958)Google Scholar; and Willson, Beckles, Friendly Relations; a Narrative of Britain's Ministers and Ambassadors to America, 1791–1930 (Boston, 1934)Google Scholar. “He had the quality of liking to make long and rather dull speeches on commonplace subjects which I know to be a trait that would make him popular with the American masses” wrote Sir Charles Hardinge who originally proposed him. Hardinge, Lord of Penhurst, , The Old Diplomacy (London, 1947), p. 132Google Scholar.

¹¹ A subject of first-class importance as yet unstudied.

¹² Admiral Sir John Fisher saw Roosevelt and Lodge as “bitter foes” of an English-speaking federation, “England's two greatest enemies.” Marder, A. J., Fear God and Dread Nought, II, (London, 1961), 456Google Scholar. Even in 1901, Valentine Chirol of The Times could describe America as “the most serious opponent of England” in conversation with the German diplomatist, Holstein.

¹³ Campbell, A. E., Great Britain and the United States, 1895–1903 (London, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Epstein, op. cit.; Bremner, op. cit.

¹⁵ For example Robert Osgood, E., Ideals and Self-interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ All British diplomatic memoirs and biographies, and all relevant political ones have been consulted. Military and naval memoirs have not been so thoroughly covered.

¹⁷ One extremely important theme which has only been touched on here is the channels of information and experience of America available to and used by the political elites in Britain.

¹⁸ Some went on, retracing Mr. Phileas Fogg's steps, to the Grand Canyon, the Yosemite Valley, San Francisco, and on to Asia on a round the world trip.

¹⁹ Pope-Hennessey, James, Lord Crewe, 1858–1945, Portrait of a Liberal (London, 1955)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Benckendorff to Sazonov, July 1, 1915. Mezhdunarodanye Otnosheniya, Series III, VIII, No. 223. As Lord President of the Council, Crewe was temporarily in charge of the Foreign Office in Sir Edward Grey's absence.

²¹ The figure is from H. G. Allen, op. cit.The marriages did not always serve to strengthen Anglo-American relations. American readers did not well receive remarks in the vein of Oscar Wilde in The Canterville Ghost: “For Virginia received the Coronet, which is the reward of all good little American girls, and married her boy-love…” On one future American President, Hoover, the knowledge of such marriages had a contrary effect. “The cynical remarks upon American ladies who bought titles would be hard for those ladies to bear. It added wormwood to American listeners to learn the justification of such titled gentlemen which was that sacrifice must be made to repair their family fortunes,” The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (New York, 1952), I, 126–127Google Scholar and also Chapter 10 passim. See also the very astute comments of Lord Percy of Newcastle, op. cit., a member of the British Embassy in Washington under Bryce, later Minister in various of the Conservative cabinets, and a close friend of Baldwin.

²² Gollin, A. M., The Observer and J. L. Garvin (New York, 1960), pp. 301–303Google Scholar.

²³ The History of the Times, IV, part II.

²⁴ See on Cliveden, , Jones, T. H., A Diary with Letters (London, 1954)Google Scholar; SirButler, James, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882–1940 (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Collis, Maurice, Nancy Astor (London, 1960)Google Scholar.

²⁵ Cited in Charles S. Campbell, op. cit.

²⁶ I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. Bourne, for providing me with this quotation from War Office files recently deposited in the Public Records Office.

²⁷ An extraordinarily large proportion of the most successful figures in the British Foreign Service in this period served terms of duty in Cairo, where the nature of the British occupation made their jobs quite unlike those of the normal diplomatic post.

²⁸ See SirWrench, Evelyn, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times (London, 1955)Google Scholar; the History of the Times, IV, Part II. See also my article “Der Einfluss der Dominions auf die britische Aussenpolitik vor Muenchen, 1938,” Vierteljahresheft fuer Zeitgeschichte(January, 1960).

²⁹ On some grounds, George Lloyd, High Commissioner in Egypt, 1922–1930, and first head of the British Council, may be counted in this group, although he kept aloof from most of its activities. Forbes-Adams, Colin, Life of Lord Lloyd (London, 1948)Google Scholar.

³⁰ The influence of Bryce is of considerable importance here. F. S. Oliver wrote a biography of Alexander Hamilton that was not without its influence.

³¹ Although both supported the Conservative party before 1914, Northcliffe and Rothermere, the press lords, are in other respects characteristic of this type.

³² See his letters to Grey of May 30, and July 14, 1916, and to Maurice de Bunsen of March, 1916. “I thought the Bird [Sir Eyre Crowe, then head of Blockade Division in F. O., subsequently Permanent Under-Secretary] would raise an angry beak at my pro-American tendencies.” The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, II (Boston, 1929)Google Scholar.

³³ May, Ernest R., The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959)Google Scholar is an indispensable introduction to this period and the first book on this subject to come out of America in which intelligent comment is not deafened by the noise of grinding axes.

³⁴ Admiral Beatty was the only exception. Neither Jellicoe nor Wemyss, his successor as First Sea Lord, had any time for America, Wemyss finding Americans “tiresome and sententious” despite his school friendship with Sir Esmé Howard, Baron Howard of Penrith, one of the few Foreign Office men who understood America at this period; (Ambassador, 1924–1930; Councillor in Washington, 1907–1908). See Howard's, Theatre of Life, 1863–1936 (Boston, 1935-1936)Google Scholar and Victoria, , Wemyss, Baroness Wester, The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss (London, 1935)Google Scholar. On Beatty see ansittart, Lord, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), p. 319Google Scholar. Lord Robert Cecil was the Minister of Blockade. See Cecil, Viscount of Chelwood, , All the Way (London, 1949), pp. 129–140Google Scholar. Hoover pays tribute to him in his memoirs.

³⁵ Willert, Arthur, Times correspondent in Washington, 1910–19, to Dawson, 01 22, 1915Google Scholar. “I feel it incumbent to be more pro-American in print than in private. I do resent rather the sordidness of the American attitude.” The same to the same, March 5, 1915. “We must never forget that in the United States we have perhaps the weakest government she has ever suffered under, fighting unscrupulously, stupidly and incessantly to save itself in the next Presidential election.” Dawson, beginning 1917: “Personally, I believe that nothing would be so popular here as a real anti-American outburst and the sacking let us say, of poor old Page's house.” See The History of the Times, IV, part I. British informants in America, a legacy from the 1900's, tended to be Republicans, who assured them that Wilson could not last in power.

³⁶ “Of course Anglo-American relations were ‘paramount’ and all that, but Macdonald was exceptional in meaning it.” Vansittart, , op. cit., p. 318Google Scholar. Vansittart was head of the American department from 1924–27 in the F. O., deputy Under-Secretary and principal private secretary to Baldwin and Macdonald, 1927–1930, Permanent Under-Secretary, 1930–1938, married an American as his first wife. Grey was adamant on doing nothing to disturb Anglo-American relations. “We wish in all our conduct in the war to do nothing which will be a cause of complaint or dispute as regards the United States Government; such a dispute would indeed be a crowning calamity… and probably fatal to our chances of success.” Grey to Spring-Rice, Sept. 3, 1914, cited in Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon (Boston, 1937), p. 356Google Scholar.

³⁷ Ably described in May, op. cit.

³⁸ “A great piece of impertinence”; The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914–1918 (London, 1924)Google Scholar, entry of December 21, 1916. Bertie was Ambassador in Paris, 1905–1918. “Frankly a piece of impertinence.” Hardinge, of Penhurst, , op. cit., p. 207Google Scholar. Hardinge was Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office. An “outrage,” unless the American Ambassador in Berlin had told Wilson that Germany could fight another five years. Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1938), IVGoogle Scholar, entry of December 24, 1916. A professional “eminence grise,” Esher was close to the court, a friend of General Haig and in regular correspondence with Captain Hankey, secretary to the Cabinet.

³⁹ “We shall be obliged to reply with civility and suppressed anger.” Bertie, , op. cit., entry of 12 20, 1916Google Scholar. Pressure was in fact put on the British press to restrain hostile comment. Dugdale, Blanche, Arthur James Balfour (New York, 1936), III, 188–189Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See the remarks of the American Ambassador in Turkey, , Morgenthau, , to Esher, , op. cit., entry of 08 11, 1917Google Scholar, and more significantly Wilson's attempt to force Britain publicly to accept the principle of the freedom of the seas, by threatening a separate peace with Germany, in early November, 1918.

⁴¹ It is significant that the main formal embodiment of Anglo-American amity in the 1900–1912 period was t he oligarchic Pilgrim Trust. In 1917–1918 it was the middle class English-Speaking Union founded by the Irish journalist and protégé of Northcliffe, Sir Evelyn Wrench. See his Struggle, 1914–1919 (London, 1935)Google Scholar.

⁴² Rufus Isaacs, First Marquis of Reading, by his son (London, 1945)Google Scholar. of a Jewish fruit-importing family, Isaacs rose by his brilliance at the bar to be Liberal Lord Chief Justice, Ambassador in Washington 1917–1919; Viceroy of India, and Foreign Secretary, 1931.

⁴³ SirWillert, Arthur, The Road to Safety (New York, 1953)Google Scholar, passim; Murray, Lord of Elibank, , At Close Quarters (London, 1946)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ On the League of Nations movement see Winkler, op. cit. On Wilson's connections with the British intellectual radicals see Martin, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Esher, , op. cit., entry of 01 27, 1917Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Esher, , op. cit., to O. S. B., 11 16, 1918Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914–1919 (London, 1952)Google Scholar. Entries of February 20–21, 1919.

⁴⁸ Wemyss, op. cit.

⁴⁹ “The Paris Conference has at any rate succeeded in this, that a future war upon a bigger scale becomes inevitable. It is something to have dispelled all doubt upon that point. It is not precisely what Wilson set out to do.” To L. B., June 16, 1919. Esher, op. cit. It is interesting to find him in agreement with the radical liberal aristocrat, Commander Kenworthy, R. N., M. P., who on June 6, 1919, said that the Versailles Treaty had turned the peace into “a just and durable war.” Cited in McCallum, R. B., Public Opinion and the Last Peace (London, 1944), p. 51Google Scholar. Kenworthy, later Lord Strabolgi, was a serving naval officer until 1919 when he entered Parliament as an Asquithian Liberal. In 1927 he joined the Labour Party. See his Sailors, Statesmen and Others (London, 1933)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Documents on British Foreign PolicySeries I, Vol. V, document No. 399. Viscount Grey was sent over on a despairing mission to try to secure a ditentein Anglo-American relations, but despite the strong recommendation of Colonel House, Wilson refused to see Grey, ostensibly on grounds of illhealth. It was at this period that the second Mrs. Wilson established her ascendancy over the ailing President, and succeeded in turning him against House himself. Grey insisted on employing a number of Lord Reading's staff whom gossip alleged to have spoken slightingly of Mrs. Wilson and of the President. See SirPeterson, Maurice, Both Sides of the Curtain (London, 1950)Google Scholar; Phillips, William, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), pp. 91–92Google Scholar. State Department Papers, Decimal File, 1919–1929, U.S. National Archives, File 704.41111/303, 304, 305, 314½.

⁵¹ Indeed, Republican leaders had warned Lord Reading that the charge that Wilson was a victim of British guile would be a consequence of very obvious British co-operation with Wilson at Versailles. Frank L. Polk Diary, entry of April 26, 1919, Sterling Library, Yale. Wilson, on his part, attempted to prevent the appointment of Sir Auckland Geddes, as British Ambassador in 1920, because he believed promotion of a trade war to be the reason for Sir Auckland's appointment. Wilson, to Polk, Frank L., 03 3, 1920, Polk Papers, Sterling Library, YaleGoogle Scholar.

⁵² For some illustration see deNovo, J., “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad,” American Historical Review, LXI (1956)Google Scholar; Shwadran, Benjamin, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

⁵³ See Brebner, J. Bartlet, “Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference,” Political Science Quarterly (1953)Google Scholar; Galbraith, J. S., “The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference,” Canadian Historical Review, XXIX (1948)Google Scholar. Whyte, W. Farmer, W. M. Hughes: His Life and Times (Canberra, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Arthur Lee, Lord Lee of Fareham. As military attaché in Washington under the Embassy of Sir Julian Pauncefote he had become very friendly with Theodore Roosevelt senior and was an honorary member of the latter's “Rough Riders.” His wife was American. He had attempted various unofficial approaches to members of the new administration early in 1921. See Lee of Fareham to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., March 11, 1921, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Letters, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division. Commander E. S. Land to the same, May 27, 1921, Admiral Emory Scott Land Papers, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division; Young, Eugene J., Powerful America (New York, 1936), pp. 49–56Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Shwadran, op. cit.On the principal British negotiator, see Rowland, John and Basil, , Second Baron Cadman, Ambassador for Oil, the Life of John, First Baron Cadman (London, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ “Gratuitious ill-will is an absorbing subject”; Vansittart, , op. cit., p. 319Google Scholar. “As to America taking part in promoting security in Europe, I think the public is still quite unready for anything of the sort. Overriding all this is the attitude of purely political and Congress circles, and as to this, my view is that no progress is to be registered, perhaps even retrogression, on the question both of debts and security, especially of the latter.” SirLindsay, Ronald to the Marquess of Reading, 10 23, 1931, D. B. F. P., Series II, Vol. II, No. 277Google Scholar. Vansittart served as Head of the American section of the Foreign Office up to 1927. His wife was American. Sir Ronald Lindsay served in Washington as Second Secretary to Bryce, 1906–1907, and as Ambassador in Washington 1931–1939. Lady Lindsay was American.

⁵⁷ See MissShepherd, P. M., “Anglo-American Relations during the Administration of Herbert Hoover, with Special Relation to Europe,” (Unpublished M. A. thesis, London, 1955)Google Scholar; Fagan, George M., “Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1927–1937” (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1954)Google Scholar; O'Connor, Raymond G., Perilous Equilibrium: the United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1961)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ He later published a highly partisan defense of Wilson in 1918–1919, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1958)Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ The only attempt to classify this kind of group of which the writer is aware is made in DrSemmel, Bernard, Imperialism and Social Reform (Cambridge, 1960)Google Scholar. In writing of essentially the same group in the pre-1914 era, Semmel distinguishes between financial imperialists and industrial imperialists, according to the main source of the individual's wealth. The classification, a little neo-Marxist in inspiration, is suggestive rather than entirely satisfactory.

⁶⁰ Strang, Lord, The Foreign Office (London, 1959), p. 73Google Scholar. This allegation is, I know, flatly contradictory to the normally accepted view. But if one concentrates on parental occupation rather than educational background one can pick out Sir Robert Craigie, Ambassador in Tokyo, 1937–1941, whose father was a naval officer, and who entered the Foreign Affairs Office in 1907; Sir Maurice Peterson, whose father was Principal of MacGill University, Canada, entered the Foreign Office in 1912; Duff Cooper entered in 1912 and his father was a successful surgeon; Sir David Kelly, son of a Professor of Classics at Adelaide University, entered in 1913; Lord Strang himself, the son of a market gardener, entered in 1919. More detailed statistical investigation is necessary to substantiate this picture.

⁶¹ No attempt has been made to extend the investigation to the Service ministries or the other sections of the foreign policy-making elite.

⁶² “It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words,” Chamberlain, Neville quoted in Feiling, K., The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), p. 325Google Scholar. “Rightly or wrongly, we were deeply suspicious, not indeed of American good intentions, but of American readiness to follow up inspiring words with any practical action,” Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare, Air Minister 1922–1924, Foreign Secretary, 1935, 1st Lord of the Admiralty, 1936–1938), Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), p. 263Google Scholar. “The apparent contradiction… that those who had sought the easier and more secure position… of putting themselves out of the range of European turmoil and disturbance… should nonetheless claim to exercise full right of criticism and judgment in regard to matters for which they were unwilling to accept any measure of direct responsibility,” Halifax, Lord (Lord Privy Seal, 1935–1938, Foreign Secretary, 1938–1940, Ambassador to the United States, 1941–1946), Fullness of Days (New York, 1957), p. 242Google Scholar. Hoare, to do him justice, tried very hard to obtain American support, by in-voking the Kellogg Pact at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, but with no success. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, I, passim;and ibid, 1936, I and III; also Feis, Herbert, Seen from E. A. (New York, 1947)Google Scholar, Part III, passim; Wilson, Hugh Jr, For Want of a Nail (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

⁶³ A phrase which Hoover quite unjustly suspected British diplomats of propagating. Memoirs, II, 179.

⁶⁴ The theme of SirBryant's, Arthur study of Field Marshall Alanbrooke's papers, The Turn of the Tide (Garden City, 1956)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ John Biggs-Davidson, M. P., The Uncertain Ally (London, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Indications may be found in the diary of the young Foreign Office clerk (son of the very realist-minded Lord Carnock, Ambassador in Russia, 1906–1910, Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office 1910–1916); Nicolson, Harold, Peace-Making 1919 (New York, 1933)Google Scholar; in Vansittart's discussion of Anglo-American relations, op. cit., for the contrast between the Foreign Office's overestimate and Chamberlain's dismissal of President Roosevelt's letter to Chamberlain in January, 1938; see Churchill, Winston S., The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948)Google Scholar; and very noticeably in Strang, Lord, At Home and Abroad (London, 1956)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ “I can form some opinion as to what France or Germany or Italy are likely to do in this or that contingency. Except in a narrow field, the course which will be taken by the United States is a riddle to which no-one – not even themselves – can give an answer in advance. But perhaps this is only saying that the United States has no foreign policy. The ship drifts at the mercy of every gust of public opinion.” Sir Austen Chamberlain (Foreign Secretary, 1924–1929), cited in SirPetrie, Charles, The Life and Letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain (London, 1939), II, 321–324Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Speech at Glasgow, November 25, 1934, cited in Baldwin, A. W., My Father: the True Story (London, 1955), p. 207Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Feis, Seen from E.A.

⁷⁰ Most of them became isolationist Republicans in the 1940 election; while the latter group joined the “All Aid to Britain Short of War” movement.

⁷¹ Especially in their belief in the revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Only the perspicacity and intelligence of Norman H. Davis, a Democratic hold-over from Hoover's disarmament delegation, saved matters.

⁷² Bullitt, Berle, Christian Herter, Joseph Grew, the Dulles brothers, Norman H. Davis, Walter Lippmann among the most prominent. The point is acutely, if dramatically made, in Schlesinger, Arthur M., The Age of Roosevelt (Boston, 1957), I, pp. 11–14Google Scholar. See also Percy, of Newcastle, , op. cit., pp. 70, 72Google Scholar.

⁷³ Percy, of Newcastle, , op. cit., pp. 31, 174Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See the excellent and critical study by Mooney, Neville Kingsley, “American attitudes towards the British Empire, 1919–1922” (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University, 1959)Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ Percy, Lord, op. cit., p. 27Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Harrod, R. F., Life of John Maynard Keynes (London, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ SirTilley, John, London to Tokyo (London, 1942), pp. 94–95Google Scholar. Chief Clerk in Foreign Office 1913–19; Co-ordinating Under-Secretary over American Department, 1919–21; Ambassador in Brazil (1921–1926), Tokyo (1926–31).

⁷⁸ The theme of SirWellesley, Victor, Diplomacy in Fetters (London, 1943). Deputy Under-Secretary in Foreign Office 1925–1940Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ See Gardner, R. N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford, 1956)Google Scholar. SirClay, Henry, Lord Norman (London, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Two more senior illustrations of this. “Keynes… was not predisposed to admire the American way of life. Later influences, strongly and typically British, coming from his circle of Bloomsbury friends made him still less predisposed to take a kindly view of American civilization… and yet… amid the grim and terrible circumstances of the Second World War… he found something he had long missed in Britain… men who had retained their intellectual poise, men of strong conviction… men who believed that by rational discussion one could plan and achieve reform and carry forward the progress of mankind.” Harrod, Roy, op. cit., (1951), pp. 4–5Google Scholar. … “It took me some time and several visits to America to get this notion… (that the United States had a different social philosophy and a different political system)… firmly into my head. It took me rather longer to perceive that inspite of all the sharp contrasts between the American and t h e British ways of thought and action they were rooted in the same subsoil of ideas and ideals.” SirButler, Harold, Confident Morning (London, 1950), p. 162Google Scholar. This, of course, cannot be said of t h e older political leaders like Churchill, Eden, and the Conservative Right who still thought in terms of the “English-speaking peoples.”

⁸¹ This fragmentation was raised to the level of a dogma by John Foster Dulles in his famous speech on “colonialism” at the height of the Suez crisis.

⁸² Whether he originated it or not, this was General Eisenhower's major contribution to Anglo-American amity.

⁸³ See Bryant, op. cit., passim.

⁸⁴ See Admiral of the Cunningham, Fleet Viscount of Hyndhope, , A Sailor's Odyssey (New York, 1951), pp. 598, 612Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Eden, Anthony, Full Circle (Boston, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ 05 13, 1948. Cited in Epstein, , op. cit.Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ In each case a slightly, though decreasingly, alien element was first added to and then withdrawn from the political membership of the group mainly by the electoral process; the “irresponsibles” and some Labour leaders in the years 1916–1918, 1918–1922, and Labour itself on the three other occasions.