¹ For an examination of the Munich syndrome, see Newman, William J., The Balance of Power in the Interwar Years, 1919–1939 (New York, 1968), pp. 34–38Google Scholar.

² These notions have approached the status of official dogma since 1961 when a committee of French and German history teachers agreed to interpret the Locarno era as a period of relaxation and hope. Bodensieck, Heinrich, “Weimarer Republik und deutsche-französische Beziehungen,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XIII (1962), 368–70.Google Scholar

³ For a study of the diplomacy of the era, Locarno see my Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925–1929, to be published by Princeton University PressGoogle Scholar.

⁴ One historian of the League has written that while the most important issues of the day were considered at the Geneva “tea parties,” the League Council dealt with matter of “third-rate importance.” Walters, Francis P., A History of the League of Nations (New York, 1960), pp. 341–47;Google Scholar; Jordan, W. N., Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, 1918–1938 (London, 1943), p. 98Google Scholar.

⁵ Watt, D. C., “Summits and Summitry Reconsidered,” International Relations, II (1963), 493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Stresemann, Gustav, Vermächtnis; der Nachlass in drei Bänden, III (Berlin, 1932–1933), 34–35Google Scholar; Petrie, Charles, The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, II (London, 1939–1940), 312–13Google Scholar.

⁷ Stresemann was first elected to the Reichstag in 1907. He led the National Liberal party during 1917–18 and the German Peoples' party from 1918 to 1929. He was Chancellor from August to November, 1923, and Foreign Minister from August, 1923, to October, 1929. Briand entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1902, and between 1906 and 1932 he held numerous offices and headed 11 governments. He served as Foreign Minister from April, 1925, to January, 1932. Chamberlain entered the House of Commons in 1892. During his career he held nine offices in five different governments and was leader of the Conservative party in the House of Commons in 1921–22. He was Foreign Secretary from November, 1924, to June, 1929.

⁸ This model of personal-political interaction is inspired in part by Mayer, Arno J., Politics and Diplomacy of Peace Making: Containment and Counter Revolution at Versailles, 1918–1919 (New York, 1967), p. 358Google Scholar and Nicolson, Harold, Diplomacy (Oxford, 1939, 1964), p. 86Google Scholar.

⁹ Bishop, Donald G., The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Syracuse, 1961), pp. 293–95;Google Scholar; Craig, Gordon A., “The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain,” in Craig, Gordon and Gilbert, Felix (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919–1939 (Princeton, 1953), p. 29Google Scholar; Jordan, , op. cit., pp. 101–102Google Scholar; Mayer, Arno J., Wilson versus Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (Cleveland, 1959, 1964), pp. 53–58Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Anon. [Baker, Philip Noel], “Back to Publicity,” Headway, VIII (06, 1926)Google Scholar. On authorship of the article: Noel Baker to Murray, May 19, 1926, Gilbert Murray papers; memorandum by Cecil, March 30, 1926, Cecil papers, 51080; Cecil, Lord, The Great Experiment: An Autobiography (New York, 1941), pp. 177–78Google Scholar and All the Way (London, 1949), p. 190Google Scholar; Dalton, Hugh, Towards the Peace of Nations: A Study in International Relations (London, 1928), p. 288Google Scholar; Survey of International Affairs, 1926, pp. 52–55. The Murray papers are located in the Bodleian Library. The Cecil papers are in the British Museum.

¹¹ Stresemann to Sthamer, June 22, 1929, 2546/5138/298737-40; Hoesch to AA, July 1, 1929, 2546/5138/289604-08; Hoesch to Stresemann, July 3, 1929, 2546/5138/289618-27. A microfilm copy of the Records of the German Foreign Ministry is located in the National Archives.

¹² To Stresemann's recollection, Chamberlain stated that he had received reports from the British Military Attaché in Berlin asserting that the Reichswehr had made vast advances since the war. Although these reports provided evidence and cause for calling Germany before the League of Nations as a violator of the Treaty of Versailles, he (Chamberlain) intended to take no formal action: Memorandum by Schubert, December 28, 1928, 2258/4502/120268-69; Rumbold to Lindsay, January 3, 1929, AC 55/434; Rumbold to Chamberlain, January 18, 1929, AC 55/437. The Austen Chamberlain papers are located at the Library of the University of Birmingham.

Chamberlain maintained that he had not mentioned the Military Attaché as the source of his information, nor had he accused Germany of violating the disarmament provisions of the Treaty: Chamberlain to Rumbold, January 14, 1929, AC 55/436. Chamberlain's version is substantiated by the notes of the conversation made by Paul Schmidt, Stresemann's own interpreter, which do not mention the British Military Attaché but refer only to “military reports of English experts.” Memorandum by Schmidt, December 14, 1928, 2365/4587/-184581. Stresemann's version was based on the notes taken by Karl von Schubert, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry. Memorandum by Schubert, December 13, 1928, 2365/4587/184549. Neither the Schmidt nor the Schubert memorandum refers specifically to a charge of violating the Treaty of Versailles, although Schmidt's notes do indicate that Chamberlain mentioned bringing the matter before the League.

What Chamberlain apparently had in mind were not reports from the embassy in Berlin but a letter, published in the London Times on November 14, 1928, written by General J. H. Morgan, a Germanophobe who had served on a subcommittee of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission until 1923 and subsequently recorded his impressions in Assize of Arms: Being the Story of the Disarmament of Germany and Her Rearmament, 1919–1939 (London, 1945)Google Scholar. In his letter Morgan alleged that Germany could mobilize an army of nine million men and that the Reichswehr was making large secret expenditures on training and weapons. These allegations, which Maurice Hankey, who was by no means soft on the Germans, viewed as exaggerated and alarmist, were brought to the attention of the War Office by Lord Salisbury and were evaluated by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. They were then discussed and dismissed by the Committee of Imperial Defense on December 13 and by the entire cabinet on May 1, 1929. Hankey to Salisbury, November 15, 1928, Salisbury papers; Secretary of State for War to CID, December 6, 1928, “The Military Situation in Germany,” FO. 371/12889/110-14; Cab. 2/5 239; Hankey to Balfour, December 18, 1928, Balfour papers; Cab. 23/60/19. The Salisbury papers are located at Hatfield House. The Balfour papers are in the British Museum. The Records of the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defense are in the Public Record Office.

¹³ Journal Officiel de la Republique Française. Sénat, Débats Parlementaires (Paris, 1919-), pp. 64Google Scholar, 67–68 (February 2, 1928). Hereinafter referred to as Sénat.

¹⁴ Memorandum by Stresemann, March 6, 1928, 1336/2406/505986; , Stresemann, Vermähtnis, III, 341Google Scholar. Briand confused the initialing of the Locarno Treaties in October, 1925, with the signature of the Treaties at London the following December. In fact, the initialing of the Treaties was unconditional and the agreements themselves did not legally alter any of the provisions regarding occupation made in 1919. At Locarno, however, Briand and Chamberlain listened to German demands regarding the Rhineland, and in November, after the Treaties were initialed, the Allies met some of them. Stresemann, thereby, succeeded in making formal signature of Locarno dependent on the evacuation of the Cologne zone, alleviations in the regime of occupation, and a reduction of the number of troops in the remaining two zones (Coblenz and Mainz). But the British and French made no formal promise, either before, during or immediately following the Locarno Conference to evacuate the Rhineland completely prior to 1935. Consequently, Stresemann was not correct in implying, as he did in 1928, that the Allies had broken their word to Germany regarding this matter. Reichstag, , Verhändlungen, v. 394Google Scholar, S. 371, p. 12558 (January 30, 1928).

¹⁵ Recent studies of the various issues discussed at Thoiry are Gottwald, Robert, Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in der Ᾰra Stresemann (Berlin, 1965), pp. 75–88Google Scholar; Pabst, Klaus, Eupen-Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs und Parteienpolitik, 1914–1940 (Aachen, 1964), pp. 453–81Google Scholar; Salewski, Michael, Entwaffnung und Militärkontrolle in Deutschland, 1919–1927 (Munich, 1966), pp. 332–43Google Scholar; Zenner, Maria, Parteien und Politik im Saargebiet unter dem Völkerbundsregime, 1920–1935 (Saarbrucken, 1966), pp. 231–33Google Scholar.

¹⁶ The major exception would have been reparation payments, of course. Even had the Thoiry scheme become effective, the Dawes plan would have remained in force, and the remainder of the debt would have had to be paid.

¹⁷ See note 38.

¹⁸ Stresemann to Hoesch, March 18, 1927, 1344/2466/516668-69; Stresemann to Hoesch, April 23, 1927, 1344/2466/516676; Stresemann to Hoesch, April 23, 1927, 1344/2466/516703-07; Stresemann, , Vermächtnis, III, 128–30, 132–33, 138–40Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The fullest statement of Briand's version: Sénat, p. 69 (February 2 1928). Some early but partial expressions; Chamberlain to Tyrrell, December 3, 1926, AC 53/565; Chambre, débats, 1928, p. 3914 (November 30, 1926); Le Matin, January 20, 1927.

²⁰ This interpretation is consistent with the memorandum of the meeting made by Professor Oswald Hesnard, Briand's interpreter and confidant. According to this memorandum, after some very general comments by Briand about French conditions for a general settlement, Stresemann spoke optimistically about the prospects for selling the bonds necessary to finance advance reparation payment. Suarez, Georges, Briand: sa vie—son oeuvre avec son journal et des nombreux documents indédits, VI (Paris, 1938–1952), 217–20Google Scholar.

²¹ According to the Hesnard memorandum, Briand stated clearly that a general settlement was possible only after the problem of French security was resolved. Suarez states that this memo makes no mention at all of the return of the Saar, the evacuation of the Rhineland or even a reduction on the size of the French Army of the Rhine. Suarez, , Briand, VI, 217–20Google Scholar, 226. Consequently, it cannot be considered a complete record of what was discussed at Thoiry, an indication of who took the initiative, or even an outline of the topics which were discussed. Briand himself told Chamberlain in early October that he, not Stresemann, had begun the conversation with a discussion of military control, occupation and the Saar. He had then expressed, he stated, a preference for a prompt, general settlement of these problems and stated that the period of occupation could be reduced in return for some modification of German payments under the Dawes plan. To all this, Stresemann replied in agreement. Memorandum by Chamberlain, October 6, 1926, AC 50/236.

²² Thoiry was, Briand told the Chamber of Deputies, a “tour of the principal problems interesting our two countries.” Journal Officiel de la Republique Française Chambre des Députés, Débats Parlementaires (Paris, 1919-), p. 3914Google Scholar (November 30, 1926). This inconclusiveness appears also in the Hesnard memorandum which is more general, vague and less precise than the one written by Stresemann. Suarez, , Briand, VI, 218Google Scholar.

²³ Briand's tenacity: Note 40.

²⁴ Stresemann's version of Thoiry is to be found in his memorandum written soon after the conversation: Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945 (Bonn, 1949-), B, I–2, 94Google Scholar (hereafter ADAP). His fullest public expressions of it were made in early 1928. Stresemann, , Vermächtnis, III, 68–72Google Scholar, 328–29.

²⁵ Stresemann, , Vermächtnis, III, 39Google Scholar. This account is consistent with Stresemann's own notes on Thoiry which depict Briand opening the conversation by proposing the evacuation of the Rhine and the return of the Saar and then asking if Germany, in return, would facilitate advance reparation payment. ADAP, B, I–2, 94.

²⁶ According to Stresemann's memorandum, both men spoke of the prompt end to occupation, and when Stresemann spoke of September 30, 1927, as the end date, Briand nodded in agreement. ADAP, B, I–2, 94.

²⁷ Just before his death Stresemann wrote of Thoiry as an occasion on which evacuation had already been decided upon when it was thwarted by the adverse reaction of the French public. Stresemann, , Vermächtnis, III, 567Google Scholar. His assertion that German diplomacy bore little responsibility for the failure of Thoiry is substantiated by a collection of documents assembled by Schubert in August, 1928, to be used, if necessary, to prove this point in conversations with the French. 2257/5402/119524-65.

²⁸ Even though it has not yet been told fully, I have made no attempt here to tell the fascinating story of the origin and failure of Thoiry. The documentary sources available for a study of Thoiry now include the published and unpublished records of the German Foreign Ministry, the British Foreign Office, and the United States Department of State; the published records of the Belgian Foreign Ministry; the archives of the German Chancellery and the British Cabinet; and the private papers of Gustav Stresemann and Austen Chamberlain. The information gap lies in Paris.

²⁹ ADAP, B, I-1, 2, 8, 41, 61, 67. Berthelot was so open in his advocacy of the project that the Wilhelmstrasse soon came to refer to it as “Berthelot's plan”: unsigned, undated memorandum, 2273/4509/130708. Berthelot did not hide his favor for the scheme from diplomatic circles in Paris. Crewe to Chamberlain, February 7, 1926, AC 53/145.

³⁰ ADAP, B, I-1, 1, 80.

³¹ Le Temps, September 22, 1926; September 24, 1926; Cabinet Protocol, 1840/3543/770122.

³² British opposition: Treasury memorandum entitled “Note on the Commercialization of German Reparation Bonds …,” September 27, 1936, FO. 371/12877/92-95. American opposition: Documents diplomatiques belges, 1920–1940, II (Brussels, 1964–1966), 135 (hereafter DDB)Google Scholar; Crewe to Chamberlain, October 13, 1926, AC 53/186; ADAP, B, I–2, 156.

³³ Berthelot called the proposed payment “une compensation derisoire”: DDB, II, 137. As William Tyrrell, Permanent Under-secretary of the British Foreign Office, put it, advance payment would require “a mountain of work to give birth to a mouse”: DDB, II, 143.

³⁴ Cabinet Protocol, September 2, 1926, 1840/3543/769979-80; Eyck, Erich, A History of the Weimar Republic, II (Cambridge, Mass., 1962–1963), 76Google Scholar. Advance payment was to be made possible by a public sale of a portion of the bonds deposited by the German government as security for German payments under the Dawes plan. If private investors were to purchase these bonds, they would have to be certain of the income from their investment. Interest and amortization payments on the bonds would have to be paid unconditionally. Therefore, transfer could not be suspended in order to protect the mark during periods of financial difficulty as was the case with German payments under the Dawes plan.

³⁵ ADAP, B, I-2, 167, 188; Le Matin, January 20, 1927.

³⁶ The limitations and disadvantages, inherent in using memoranda authored by Stresemann, which attracted much attention as a consequence of Carr's, E. H. widely read What Is History? (New York, 1961)Google Scholar. In the case of the Thoiry conversation the disadvantages are far outweighed by the memoranda's comparative reliability.

³⁷ At present, definitive answers to these questions cannot be given because neither Briand's personal papers nor the records of the French Foreign Ministry are accessible. What we know regarding these questions, as is true for French policy during the Locarno era in general comes primarily from German, British and Belgian records.

³⁸ Le Matin, January 20, 1927. The opposition to Briand's policy and the threat to discontinue the Locarnite meetings: Hoesch to Stresemann, January 13, 1927, 1344/2466/516577-80; Grewe to FO., January 20, 1927, FO. 371/12116/169-70; ADAP, B, I-2, 275.

³⁹ See note 19.

⁴⁰ Stresemann reproved Briand during a private meeting held in March, 1928, but was unable to change the mind of the French Foreign Minister. Briand replied with statements which were, in Stresemann's opinion, evasive, irrelevant and factually incorrect. In so doing, Stresemann reported, Briand embarrassed himself and “sensed that with these statements he had made a complete mess of things.” Hesnard, the only other person present at Thoiry, was also present at this meeting; significantly, he did not support Briand's statements. Memorandum by Stresemann, March 6, 1928, 1336/2406/505987.

⁴¹ Hoesch to Stresemann, February 3, 1928, 2544/5138/297332-33; Hoesch to Stresemann, December 5, 1928, 2258/4502/120219-22; Stresemann, , Vermächtnis, III, 68Google Scholar. “Briand,” Hoesch once pointed out, “subsequently interprets conversations in a manner convenient to himself”: Hoesch to Stresemann, July 3, 1929, 2546/5138/289604-08.