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Hume's Political Methodology: A Reconsideration of “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

James Conniff
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Extract

In his analysis of Plato's Republic, Aristotle objects to his teacher's abstract and psychological method by suggesting that “there is another matter which must not be ignored—the teaching of actual experience. We are bound to pay some regard to the long past and the passage of the years, in which these things…would not have gone unnoticed if they had been really good.” Ever since that time, political theorists have been divided on the question of the appropriate approach to the study of politics, and often, as in the case of Plato and Aristotle, the focal point of the disagreement has been whether politics is best seen through the lens of history or the study of human nature and the development of a consequent psychology. This, for example, is the crux of the argument between James Mill and T. B. Macaulay. Mill is the proponent of a psychological approach; he maintains “it is immediately obvious that a wide and difficult field is presented, and that the whole science of human nature must be explored to lay a foundation for the science of government.” Macaulay disagrees, for he believes that “the style which the Utilitarians admire, suits only those subjects on which it is possible to reason a priori.” Indeed, in Macaulay's view, Mill belongs in the Middle Ages: “of those schoolmen Mr. Mill has inherited both the spirit and the style. He is an Aristotelian of the fifteenth century, born out of due season.” Far better, continues Macaulay, is the inductive historical method which observes the world, examines facts, devotes itself to the careful study of the past, and checks itself “by perpetually bringing the theory which we have constructed to the test of new facts….”

Type
Articles
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , January 1976 , pp. 88 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1976

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References

1 Aristotle, , Politics, trans., Barker, Ernest (New York, 1962), p. 52 (1264A)Google Scholar.

2 Mill, James, An Essay on Government, Liberal Arts Press (New York, 1955), p. 48Google Scholar.

3 Macaulay, T. B., “Mill on Government,” in Macaulay, Prose and Poetry, ed. Young, G. M. (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 581Google Scholar.

4 Ibid., p. 581.

5 Ibid., p. 586.

6 Clive, John, Macaulay (New York, 1973)Google Scholar.

7 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Biggs, L. A. (Oxford, 1888)Google Scholar. Hume, David, Political Essays, Liberal Arts Press (New York, 1953). pp. 12–23Google Scholar.

8 Dahl, Robert A. and Neubauer, Deane E., eds., Readings in Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968), p. 2Google Scholar.

9 Hume, David, The History of England, 5 vols. (1761; Boston, 1854)Google Scholar.

10 For example, see Letwin, Shirley Robin, The Pursuit of Certainty (Cambridge, 1965)Google Scholar and Noxon, James, Hume's Philosophical Development (Oxford, 1973)Google Scholar. The origins of this line of criticism are quite old. It is perhaps most fully developed in Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1963)Google Scholar; Green, T. H., “General Introduction,” Hume's “Treatise” Works, vol. 1 (London, 1898)Google Scholar, and Stephen, Leslie, The History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1962)Google Scholar. On the other hand, some writers assert the overall unity of Hume's thought. The most important of these is Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London, 1949)Google Scholar. See also, Passmore, J. A., Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1952)Google Scholar and Stewart, John B., The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1963)Google Scholar. The latter view has two versions. Smith argues that Hume is consistent and that the consistency is provided by his concern with morality, while others, like Laing, B. M., David Hume (New York, 1968)Google Scholar, agree to the consistency but ground it in adherence to scientific methodology.

11 Hume, , “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,” Political Essays, p. 13Google Scholar.

12 Ibid., p. 13.

13 Neville, Henry, “Plato Redivivus,” in Twer English Republican Tracts, ed. Robbins, C. (Cambridge, 1969), p. 102Google Scholar.

14 Harrington, James, “Oceana,” in Ideal Commonwealths, ed. Morley, H. (Port Washington, New York, 1968), p. 201Google Scholar.

15 Ibid., p. 209. See also Moyle, Walter, “An Essay Upon the Constitution of the Romans,” in Two English Republican Tracts, p. 245Google Scholar.

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17 Ibid., p. 304.

18 Neville, , “Plato Redivivus,” p. 144Google Scholar.

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20 Ibid., p. 47.

21 Quoted in ibid., p. 152.

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25 Ibid., p. 373 ff. It seems to me that in our anxiety to excuse Harrington from the charge that he is responsible for 19th-century British Imperialism we have failed to give due recognition to the strain of moral fanaticism in his works.

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27 Ibid., p. 16.

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34 Ibid., p. 12.

35 Ibid., pp. 20–21.

36 Letwin, , Pursuit of Certainty, p. 87Google Scholar. Letwin sees the essay as a defense of moderation, but argues that Hume is sincere in his proposal of scientific laws. The argument is that the validity of such laws makes Bolingbroke's attacks on Walpole's person unwarranted. While the issue is complex, I believe Letwin's explanation to be inadequate. In addition to the argument in the text, I would cite the following considerations. (1) For Letwin's thesis to hold, Bolingbroke would have to believe that personalities are more important than institutions. He clearly does not believe so; in fact, the central theme of his later political career was his desire to restore the old institutional order. See Kramnick, Isaac, Bolingbroke and His Circle (Cambridge, Mass., 1968)Google Scholar. (2) When one compares the political opinions of Hume to those of Walpole and Bolingbroke, one finds that while Hume is closer to Walpole important differences remain and it is difficult to see why Hume should be anxious to support him (ibid., pp. 111–136). (3) Hume's essay does not cover the same ground as Bolingbroke's Dissertation. The Dissertation, like so much of Bolingbroke's work, is long and repetitive, but its argument is really rather simple. He maintains that the balance of the British mixed constitution, which was reasserted at the time of the Glorious Revolution, is threatened by the corruption of the independence of Parliament by ministers of the crown. The remedy is a return to unity in the public interest, the creation of a national party of virtue, and the consequent abolition of all parties in the name of patriotism. There is no doubt that Hume disagreed strongly with this position, but what is significant here is that his essay does not even touch on the issues raised by Bolingbroke's analysis. I cannot find anything in the Dissertation, which is cited by Hume and relied on by Letwin, that corresponds to the laws coined by Hume. See, “A Dissertation on Parties,” The Works of Lord Bolingbroke, Vol. II, Bohn, Henry G., London, 1967, pp. 5–172Google Scholar. The difficulty is that most writers of the period share a considerable area of agreement, for example, a belief in mixed government, and very careful study is required to avoid false comparisons. Hume's argument, in my view, extends well beyond Bolingbroke. The political situation around 1740 probably did influence Hume, but his interest is broader. His target is fanaticism of all kinds.

37 Harrington, , “Oceana,” pp. 183–184 and 193Google Scholar.

38 See the second volume of Essays, Moral and Political (Edinburgh, 1742)Google Scholar. Hume was not happy with the essay on Walpole and dropped it in the third edition, published in 1748.

39 Hume, , History, vol. 5, p. 23Google Scholar.

40 Hume to Abbe Le Blanc, 12 September 1754, The Letters of David Hume (Oxford, 1932), pp. 193–194Google Scholar. Hume's letters are full of references to the republicans. On the other hand, Bolingbroke is seldom mentioned.

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42 Aiken, Henry D., Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy (New York, 1964), pp. 373–385Google Scholar.

43 Ibid., p. 373.

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45 Ibid., p. 440.

46 Hume, , Political Essays, p. 93Google Scholar.

47 Hume, , History, vol. 5, p. 91Google Scholar.

48 Passmore, , Hume's Intentions, p. 7Google Scholar. Hume was himself quite aware of the problem. See his letter to Elliot, Gilbert, Letters, p. 150Google Scholar.

49 Smith, , Philosophy of David Hume, p. 11 ffGoogle Scholar. A point not often recognized by those who would turn Hume into a scientist.

50 Passmore, , Hume's Intentions, p. 7Google Scholar.

51 Hume, Treatise, bk. 3, sec 2.

52 Laing, , David Hume, p. 192Google Scholar.

53 Smith, , op. cit., p. 199Google Scholar. Hume does not inquire into the origin of this nature. He may have thought that such an inquiry would take one into those areas of metaphysics not amenable to proof.

54 Ibid., p. 174.

55 Hume, Treatise, bk. 2, sec. 7.

56 Grene, Marjorie, “Hume: Sceptic and Tory,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 4, no. 3 (06 1943), 334CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Grene's article is a reply to Mossner, Ernest Campbell, “Was Hume a Tory Historian?” Journal of the History of Ideas, 2, no. 2 (04 1941) 225–236CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I think that a close reading of the two articles shows that Mossner and Grene agree on the nature of Hume's thought but differ on how it is to be labeled. It seems that Hume is not a Tory in the partisan sense. Throughout his life, he steadfastly professed himself neutral between the Tory and Whig parties. On the other hand, he is a Tory in the sense that his political thought is conservative.

57 Hume, , “Of Parties in General,” Political Essays, p. 80Google Scholar.

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59 For representatives of the various positions, see note 10 above. Russell, Green, and Laing, among more recent scholars, maintain that Hume lacked the ability to overcome his own skepticism. Huxley, T. H., Hume (London, 1879)Google Scholar, is the classic statement of the view that Hume sought fame above all else, though it can be found elsewhere as well. Along with Smith, the best of the defenses of Hume's consistency is Mossner, E. C., “Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David Hume,” Philosophical Review, no. 59 (1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By and large, historians seem more willing to accept Hume's interest in history as the logical expression of his skepticism. See Norton, David Fate and Popkin, Richard H., David Hume: Philosophical Historian, Library of Liberal Arts (New York, 1965)Google Scholar; Braudy, Leo, Narrative Form in History and Fiction (Princeton, N. J., 1970)Google Scholar; and Bongie, Laurence L., David Hume, Prophet of the Counter-Reformation (Oxford, 1965)Google Scholar.

60 Hume, , Letters, pp. 30–31Google Scholar.

61 Laing, , David Hume, pp. 219–220Google Scholar.