I am grateful to Nicholas Rengger, Richard Little, Andrew Linklater, and anonymous reviewers for their comments on successive drafts of this article.

1. See, for instance, Gaddis, J. L., “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no.3 (Winter 1992/1993): 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoffmann, S., “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus 106, no.3 (Summer 1977): 44Google Scholar.

2. For instance, in one recent overview of international ethics, Morgenthau was represented as denying the relevance of morality to statecraft altogether (see Donnelly, J., “Twentieth Century Realism,” in Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Nardin, T. and Mapel, D. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], pp.85, 93–7Google Scholar).

3. Griffith, M., Realism, Idealism, and International Politics (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.ix-x, 36, 39-41, 71, 75–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Smith, Michael, Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp.15, 139-40,145-46, 234–37Google Scholar.

5. Rosenthal, Joel, Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press, 1991), pp.42 and 45–61Google Scholar.

6. Russell, Greg, Hans. J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press, 1990), pp.86, 156-57, 169-70 and 231Google Scholar.

7. In taking this approach I draw heavily upon the contextualist approach developed by Quentin Skinner. See Skinner, Q., “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8 (1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skinner, Q., “Social Meaning and the Explanation of Social Action,” in Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Series 4, ed. Laslett, Peter, Runciman, W. G., and Skinner, Q., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), pp. 136–57Google Scholar; and Skinner, Q., “Hermeneutics and the Role of History,” New Literary History 7 (1975–1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These arguments are discussed and debated in Tully's, James Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

8. I use “positivism” here to mean, very specifically, the type of theory aimed at creating a social science akin to the natural sciences.

9. Morgenthau, , “The Commitments of Political Science,” in Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 38Google Scholar.

10. Michael Smith makes this point in relation to the realists in general in Realist Thought, p. 233.

11. This Hobbesian-Machiavellian identification was established early on by critics such as Tucker and Lichteim. That it continues to influence readings of Morgenthau, and realism in general, can be seen in Michael Smith's decision to begin Realist Thought with an overview of the thought of Hobbes and Machiavelli. (See Tucker, R., “Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political Realism,” American Political Science Review 46 [1953]Google Scholar; Lichteim, G., “The Politics of Conservative Realism,” in The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays [New York: Vintage Books, 1967]Google Scholar; Smith, , Realist Thought, p.4Google Scholar).

12. Hobbes, , The Elements of Law, ed. Gaskin, J. C. A. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. XXIX. 8, pp.180–81Google Scholar; I rely on this passage because of constraints of space. However, as both Gaskin (n.l, p. 279), and Tuck, Richard (Hobbes [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], pp. 57–58)Google Scholar point out, it represents the best summary of Hobbes's political theory.

13. I rely primarily on the 15 and 18 chapters of the Prince due to the constraints of space. However, the extent to which this passage has been taken as representative of Machiavelli's thought by those who would criticize Morgenthau would seem to justify this liberty.

14. Machiavelli, , The Prince, trans. Adams, R., 2nd ed. (London: Norton, 1992), chaps. 15 and 18, pp.42 and 47–48Google Scholar; Strauss, L., Thoughts on Machiavelli (London: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 9–12Google Scholar; it should be noted, however, that Strauss does add caveats to this argument later in the book.

15. Machiavelli, , The Prince, chaps. 15 and 18, pp.43, 49Google Scholar; Skinner, Q., Machiavelli, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 36-38, 46–47Google Scholar; Berlin, I., “The Originality of Machiavelli,” in Against The Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, (London: Hogarth, 1979), passim, esp. pp.44-47, 49-50, 52–66Google Scholar.

16. Machiavelli, , The Prince, chap. 15, p. 42Google Scholar; Olschki, L., Machiavelli—The Scientist (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), passim, esp. pp. 22–33Google Scholar.

17. See, for instance, Morgenthau, , “The Primacy of the National Interest,” American Scholar 18 (1949): 210Google Scholar; Morgenthau, , American Foreign Policy (published in the United States as In Defense of the National Interest) (London: Methuen, 1952), pp. 38–39Google Scholar. On criticism see Tucker, , “Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political Realism,” esp. pp. 221–22Google Scholar; and Lichteim, , “The Politics of Conservative Realism,” esp. p. 146Google Scholar.

18. Russell makes this point forcefully in Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 159-60 and 166.

19. Morgenthau, , “The Political Science of E. H. Carr,” World Politics 1 (1948): 134CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. Morgenthau, , “The Problem of the National Interest,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics, vol.1 of Politics in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 106Google Scholar.

21. This should be apparent from even the most cursory examination of his two central works. See Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations—The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 251Google Scholar; Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics (London: Phoenix books, 1965Google Scholar; first published Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 187. Against state centric ethics, see Morgenthau, , The Purpose of American Politics, 2nd ed. (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1982), p.228Google Scholar. Against raison d'état, see Morgenthau, , “The Escape from Power,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 314Google Scholar; see also Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 175-80 and 187-88.

22. See the letters concerning the Van Doren debate contained in Morgenthau, , The Purpose of American Politics, pp. 354–58Google Scholar; also see Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 15.

23. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 196Google Scholar. This notion obviously parallels Kant's “categorical imperative.” Morgenthau's employment of such terminology might seem peculiar, but, in that Kant essentially sought to reformulate traditional Christian morality into more acceptable terms, it is perfectly consistent. The “categorical imperative” is basically an updated version of the “golden rule,” and Morgenthau is simply employing the most advanced formulation of this principle available.

24. This transcendentalism has received an inchoate recognition in the revisionist literature. However, it is generally ignored as inconsequential. See Smith, , Realist Thought, pp. 146 and 161–63Google Scholar; Russell, , Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 4, 156-57 and 164Google Scholar.

25. William Bluhm has perhaps done most to point out this Augustinian connection. It would seem to be primarily the result of Morgenthau's affinity to Niebuhr. While Niebuhr was eventually to move away from such close proximity to Augustine, this did not occur until the later stages of his life. It his was earlier work which most influenced Morgenthau, especially Moral Man and Immoral Society, which laid much of the groundwork for Scientific Man Vs Power Politics. Morgenthau draws upon Niebuhr's arguments throughout the book, but especially so in chapter 7, that concerned to discuss moral issues. However, as Bluhm noted, certain of Morgenthau's passages bear a striking resemblance to parts of The City of God, and this suggests that there may have been some direct influence. See Bluhm, , Theories of the Political System, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 193–205Google Scholar, esp. pp.194-95; Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, esp. p. 236Google Scholar; Stone, R., Reinhold Niebuhr—Prophet to Politicians (New York: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 104, 165Google Scholar.

26. Bluhm, William, Theories of the Political System, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 193–203Google Scholar, esp. pp. 194-96. See also Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 2Google Scholar and chap. 8, esp. pp. 204-207. As Bluhm points out, despite the influence of Burke upon him, Morgenthau clearly views prerationalist thought through an Augustinian, rather than the more usual Thomistic, prism.

27. On Augustine's morality, see Confessions, trans. Pine-Coffin, R.S. (London: Penguin, 1961), pp. 47, 63–64Google Scholar; City of God, trans. Bettenson, Henry (London: Penguin, 1984), pp.376, 556, 873Google Scholar.

28. Augustine, , City of God, pp. 305, 374, 430, 502, 523, 625Google Scholar; Augustine, , Confessions, p. 175Google Scholar.

29. City of God, pp. 599-601, 743, 858-61.

30. Ibid., pp. 204-206, 213, 471, 553, 593.

31. Ibid., p. 761.

32. Ibid., pp. 138, 213-14, 599-600, 860, 892.

33. Ibid., pp. 860, 220.

34. Ibid., pp. 860-61, 892-93, 1069.

35. Niebuhr, R., Moral Man and Immoral Society (London: Charles Scribner, 1932), p. 4Google Scholar.

36. Niebuhr, R., The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol 2 Human Destiny (London: Nisbet, 1943), p. 182Google Scholar.

37. Niebuhr, R., Faith and History (London: Charles Scribner, 1949), pp. 198–200Google Scholar.

38. Niebuhr, R., Human Destiny, pp. 202–3Google Scholar; An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (London: Harper and Bros., 1935), pp. 19, 76-78, 202Google ScholarPubMed.

39. This is not to say that Morgenthau accepted all of the content of Augustine's morality, only he adopted the framework which Augustine used to represent the interaction of morality with a recalcitrant reality. In short, rather than Augustine converting Morgenthau, Morgenthau co-opted Augustine.

40. Of course, this notion of an Augustinian heritage is not uncontroversial. Michael Loriaux, for instance, has rejected it, arguing that realists such as Morgenthau not only lacked any conception of a good beyond national advantage, but also any conception of the freedom necessary for moral choice. Realism first destroys the criteria by which action might be morally evaluated, and then destroys the possibility of moral action itself. However, such accounts fundamentally misunderstand the nature of Morgenthau's realism, as the remainder of this article will demonstrate. (See “The Realists and St. Augustine: Scepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought,” International Studies Quarterly 36 [1992]: 410–17Google Scholar).

41. Smith, , Realist Thought, p. 226Google Scholar.

42. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 4Google Scholar.

43. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 46 and 191–97Google Scholar.

44. This criticism was first made by Good, Robert in “The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's ‘Debate’ with Morgenthau and Kennan,” Journal of Politics 22 (1960): 613CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It has remained a staple of criticism of Morgenthau, and has been repeated in recent years by both Smith, , Realist Thought, p. 130Google Scholar, and Russell, , Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 169-70, 220–21Google Scholar.

45. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 194Google Scholar; for comparison to Niebuhr, see Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 101, 196; An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 76 and 84; The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1 Human Nature (London: Nisbet, 1941), pp. 42-43, 130Google Scholar; The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (London: Nisbet, 1945), pp. 20-21, 45–47Google ScholarPubMed; Faith and History, p. 103; The Irony of American History (New York: Charles Scribner, 1962), p. 84Google Scholar.

46. This would seem to refute criticisms made by Good and Smith that Morgenthau's conception of human nature equates to some doctrine of original sin which excludes the possibility of moral action. If the corruption of action by the will to power is generated by our freedom of choice, this does not imply that it is inevitable, even if it is statistically almost invariable. Furthermore, even if all action were inevitably corrupted, this would not negate the possibility of conforming to the moral law in some degree. See Good, , “The National Interest,” pp. 608–18Google Scholar; Smith, , Realist Thought, p. 136Google Scholar.

47. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 5Google Scholar.

48. Morgenthau, , The Purpose of American Politics, p. 357Google Scholar; again, this clearly parallels Niebuhr, see especially, Human Nature, p. 50 and The Children of Light, p. 20.

49. Morgenthau, , The Purpose of American Politics, p. 229Google Scholar; Niebuhr's, Moral Man, pp. 21–22Google Scholar, anticipates this notion.

50. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 168, 177Google Scholar; “The Commitments of Political Science,” p.48, and “Cynicism, Perfectionism and Realism in International Affairs,” p. 130 in The Decline of Democratic Politics.

51. For instance, because both Justin Rosenberg and Martin Griffith work from the assumption that Morgenthau constructs a positivist theory, they are forced to interpret the presentation of rules of politics as erecting a necessity which excludes the possibility of freedom. Consequently, they cannot but conclude that the application of moral principles is rendered impossible. The national interest becomes the only possible strategy, and hence a morally justified one. See Rosenberg, , “What's the Matter with Realism,” pp. 289–92Google Scholar; Griffith, , Realism, Idealism, and International Politics, pp. ix-x, 36, 39-41, 71, 75–6Google Scholar].

52. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 2, 10, 95,126-30, 136–38Google Scholar. These themes were to characterize Morgenthau's work throughout his life. Twenty years later, he was still on the offensive. See “International Relations” in Truth and Power—Essays of a Decade (London: Pall Mall, 1970)Google Scholar.

53. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 3-5, 6-8, 14Google Scholar.

54. Ibid., p. 21; Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 149–51Google Scholar.

55. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 4 and 8–10Google Scholar.

56. Indeed, as Morgenthau pointed out in “The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations” (in The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 68), the very process of developing a theory presupposes the recognition that political relations are not given, but subject to manipulation.

57. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, chap. 3, esp. pp. 31–33Google Scholar; “Cynicism, Perfectionism, and Realism in International Affairs,” p. 130.

58. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 196Google Scholar; Morgenthau reemphasized this theme in “The Demands of Prudence” in The Restoration of American Politics vol. 3 of Politics in the Twentieth Century, pp. 15-16.

59. Thompson's, Kenneth introduction to The Purpose of American Politics, p. iiiGoogle Scholar.

60. Rosenthal, , Righteous Realists, pp. 43–45Google Scholar.

61. Robert Good pointed to this but argued that Morgenthau broke the dialectical tension by assuming a conception of human nature which was too pessimistic, condemning the individual to inevitable sin and thus destroying any possibility of acting morally. However, as I argued in the previous section, Morgenthau's conception would seem to retain the necessary freedom to sustain the dialectic adequately. See Good, , “The National Interest and Political Realism,” pp. 608–18Google Scholar.

62. Morgenthau, , “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil,” Ethics 56 (1945): 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 10Google Scholar; Russell seems to point towards this in passing, but later specifically distinguishes Morgenthau's approach to political ethics from that of Niebuhr on the grounds that he conceived of no such interaction (Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 146-47, 151-53, 227, 232).

64. It is worth noting that, although critical of Morgenthau's ethics generally, Robert Good concurs here. Good's criticism of Morgenthau is based on the inability of his ethic to guide action, not on its judgmental quality (“The National Interest,” pp. 612-63).

65. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 10Google Scholar.

66. See, for instance, Morgenthau, , “The Problem of the National Interest,” pp. 109–11Google Scholar; “Neutrality and Neutralism,” p. 280 in The Decline of Democratic Politics.

67. Russell, , Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 86Google Scholar; also Thompson, Kenneth, “Philosophy and Politics,” in Truth and Tragedy - a Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau, ed. Thompson, K. and Myers, R. (London: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 30Google Scholar.

68. Robert Good has maintained that Morgenthau ended up with little more than cynicism because in terms of practical guidance, his transcendental ethic is abandoned for a relative standard capable of approximation, a standard which is little more than the national interest. In recent times Michael Smith has echoed this sentiment (Good, , “The National Interest,” p. 615Google Scholar; Smith, , Realist Thought, pp. 146, 161Google Scholar). Yet, as was discussed previously, the interpretation of Morgenthau's conception of the human character and of his ability on the basis of this to posit a creative tension between real and ideal, on which this argument is based, is seriously flawed.

69. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 177Google Scholar.

70. Morgenthau, , “The Moral Dilemma of Political Action,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 325Google Scholar.

71. Morgenthau, , “The Problem of the National Interest,” p. 110Google Scholar.

72. On this point see Rosenthal, , Righteous Realists, p. 61Google Scholar; Russell, , Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 5Google Scholar.

73. Weber greatly impressed Morgenthau and had a significant impact upon his work, as Michael Smith has demonstrated (“Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography,” p. 7), and “Bernard Johnson's Interview with Hans J. Morgenthau,” p. 347, in Thompson and Myers, Truth and Tragedy; Smith, , Realist Thought, p. 15Google Scholar. Joel Rosenthal has argued that this consequentialism, in the shape of a concept of “responsible power,” was supported by values which were merely conventional in origin, the product of a consensus in American society. Michael Smith has gone even further, claiming that it has no criteria of evaluation at all, such that it represents merely a procedural standard, and renders Morgenthau's morality inadequate. However, it would not seem problematic for Morgenthau to use the Judeo-Christian principles contained within his approach to provide the standard of evaluation for this ethic of responsibility. Although Smith seems to think that the transcendental law and the political ethic of consequences are mutually irreconcilable, not even Weber supposed this. See Rosenthal, , Righteous Realists, pp. 42, 45–49Google Scholar; Smith, , Realist Thought, pp. 15, 139-40, 145-46, 234–37Google Scholar; Weber, , “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Gerth, H. and Mills, C. Wright (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 127Google Scholar.

74. Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,” pp. 119–26Google Scholar; see also, Weber, Marianne, Max Weber—a Biography, trans, and ed. Zohn, H. (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1988; reprint of New York: Wiley, 1975 edition), p. 682Google Scholar; Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Pouter Politics, p. 186Google Scholar.

75. Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,” pp. 119–26Google Scholar; see also, Weber, Marianne, Max Weber, p. 682Google Scholar; Morgenthau, , “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil,” p. 9Google Scholar; Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 185.

76. The significance of Burke for international relations is usefully discussed by Boucher, David in his “The Character of the History of the Philosophy of International Relations and the Case of Edmund Burke,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 10Google Scholar.

78. See for instance, Mapel, and Nardin, , “Convergence and Divergence in International Ethics,” in Nardin, and Mapel, , Traditions of International Ethics, pp. 298 and 320Google Scholar.

79. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 8Google Scholar; American Foreign Policy, p. 118; also Russell's discussion of this point, Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 161-63; also Good, , “The National Interest,” p. 607Google Scholar.

80. Rosenthal's notion of “responsible power” would seem to include this conception of prudence, although it stresses the union of pragmatism with nationalist values, rather than with a transcendental ethic (Righteous Realists, pp. 49, 61-62, and 173).

81. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 11Google Scholar.

82. Morgenthau, , “The Problem of the National Interest,” pp. 106–11Google Scholar; “Neutrality and Neutralism,” p. 280.

83. See, for instance, Morgenthau, , The Purpose of American Politics, pp. 250–51Google Scholar; Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 167; “The Crisis of Communism” in Truth and Power, pp. 356-57. This tendency in Morgenthau's thought perhaps indicates another source of the emphasis on self limitation which Peter Gellman identified as “political realism's most efficient practical lesson” (“Hans J. Morgenthau,” pp. 260, 263).

84. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 5, 10, and 7Google Scholar; Donnelly, , “Twentieth Century Realism,” p. 95Google Scholar.

85. Morgenthau, , American Foreign Policy, p. 34Google Scholar. This statement should not be interpreted to imply that Morgenthau adopted a Hobbesian position—he later sought to clarify his meaning, maintaining that “moral principles are universal and, hence, not created by the state … [but] moral principles, as applied to political issues, receive their concrete meaning from the political situation within which they are called upon to operate” (Morgenthau, quoted in Gellman, , “Hans. J. Morgenthau,” p. 259Google Scholar). This account is reinforced by the fact that this national relativism was clearly rooted in the peculiar ideological schism which characterized the Cold War. In his account of the states system in previous centuries he clearly perceived a moral community. See American Foreign Policy, pp. 210-16; Politics Among Nations, pp. 22, 511.

86. This does of course raise the problem of how the universal ethic is to have direct practical application—it inadvertently opens up the possibility that, despite Morgenthau's allegiance to a transcendental system of ethics in the abstract, by his definition of the conditions of its application, he effectively promoted a nationalist system in its place. However, his insistence that it is ultimately the individual who is the moral agent—negating the requirement for a consensus in terms of actions within the scope of one individual—and his constant application of the raw ethic to practice through the conscience of this individual, indicate that he regards the transcendental ethic as present to practice, and the locally specific variations as technical, rather than substantive matters.

87. Morgenthau, , American Foreign Policy, p. 38Google Scholar. Smith points to this, but regards it as supplemental to the state's broader value as the “source of concrete morality.” In fact, this interpretation of Morgenthau as adopting a Hegelian position is dubious: aside from the fact that, as Smith admits, he specifically rejected the association, the frailties of human understanding, epitomized by the collective prejudices manifested in the state, would hardly seem to provide any broader justification for the state in Morgenthau's thought. It is simply a fact of life one must use to best advantage (Realist Thought, pp. 155-56). See also footnote 86 above.

88. Morgenthau, , “The Problem of the National Interest” p. 110Google Scholar; Russell concurs here, see Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 100-101.

89. Niebuhr, , Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 267Google Scholar.

90. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 7Google Scholar.

91. Rosenthal suggests that this is a common trait of the realists (Righteous Realists, p. 48). Russell also points to this in Morgenthau's case (Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 166).

92. see Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 11 and 541Google Scholar; Morgenthau, , “The Problem of the National Interest,” p. 99Google Scholar; Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 120; “Traditional and United Nations Diplomacy” in The Decline of Democratic Politics, p. 356; “John Foster Dulles” in Truth and Power, p. 107.

93. This line of thought is suggested by Raskin, Marcus in his “Morgenthau: The Idealism of a Realist,” in Thompson, and Myers, , Truth and Tragedy, p. 86Google Scholar; see also Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 11Google Scholar.

94. Morgenthau, , American Foreign Policy, p. 38Google Scholar; also see the beginning of this section.

95. Morgenthau, , “The Twilight of International Morality,” Ethics 58 (1948): 79–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

96. Michael Smith points to this in Realist Thought, but, because he fails to situate Morgenthau's moral thought within its broader Judeo-Christian context, he seems to regard the ethic of responsibility as the be all and end all of Morgenthau's moral approach. I would argue that the Weberian ethic is merely one part of a much broader conception, the culmination of which is a Judeo-Christian nonperfectionism. (p.139). I use here the distinction pointed to by Wolfers, Arnold in “Statesmanship and Moral Choice,” World Politics 1 (1949): 188CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97. Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 4Google Scholar; Rosenthal makes this point in relation to the realists in general (see Righteous Realists, p. 62).

98. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, p. 202Google Scholar.

99. See, for instance, Russell, , Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 100Google Scholar.

100. Morgenthau, , Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, pp. 195 and 202–203Google Scholar; see also Morgenthau, , “The Demands of Prudence,” p. 16Google Scholar.

101. Andrew Linklater is the foremost critical theorist to have pointed to the value of Carr's work. See “The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: a Critical-Theoretical Point of View,” Millennium 21 (1992): 96Google Scholar. Indeed, one would suspect that Morgenthau's realism ultimately has more in common with critical theory, especially that rooted in the Frankfurt school and the work of Habermas, than with neo-realism. His approach would, of course, differ considerably in many respects—particularly in terms of the priority given to emancipation—yet both would appear to move in the same general direction. However, this is obviously a matter for another article. It is, though, the subject of ongoing research by the author.