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TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2008

BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER
BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER*
Affiliation:
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*
*HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN, INSTITUT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, UNTER DEN LINDEN 6, D-10099 BERLIN. E-mail: b.schnieder@gmx.de
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Abstract

It is shown that the standard definitions of truth-functionality, though useful for their purposes, ignore some aspects of the usual informal characterisations of truth-functionality. An alternative definition is given that results in a stronger notion that pays attention to those aspects.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , June 2008 , pp. 64 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

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References

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