Large historical problems are stimulating to debate but difficult to specify and answer in ways that might carry forward our long-standing discourses in global economic history. The papers which form the basis of our essay deal with a meta question and are focused upon the economic consequences (the costs and benefits) for those European societies most actively involved in territorial expansion, colonization, world trade, capital exports and emigration to other continents over the past five centuries. Our symbolic dates mark (rather than demarcate) the beginning and ending of European imperialism. Colonisation occurred in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages but between 1415 and 1789 European powers, particularly Britain but also Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and Italy, founded hundreds of colonies. Individual articles have concentrated upon periods of significance for particular countries and are, moreover, analysed within the context of an international economy, evolving through four eras (or orders) of mercantilism (1415–1846), liberalism (1846–1914), neo-mercantilism (1914–48), and decolonisation (1948–74). Our Introduction draws heavily upon six national case studies as well as discussions that took place at a conference in Madrid in 1997. We do not intend to cite particular contributions to the inferences and conclusions in this essay. Our views represent an elaboration upon and an interpretation of the articles that follow.

The assessment of the economic consequences of empires from the fifteenth century to the present raises a set of problems which should not be concealed, if we are to provide any meaningful answers to the questions implied in such a survey. First, it is useful to remember that these questions, as so many addressed by social scientists, are immersed in the interminable ideological debate about the development of nations. For example, it is not easy to avoid the judgement of empires as inherendy good or bad, and to evade the prevailing notion that they are evil structures resting on some kind of violence, on which consequently it is not decent for any nation to have built its wealth. Anyway, even if we could easily do away with ideological controversies, and we cannot, we would still lack the appropriate statistical data, at least for most of the period under examination, which could support an accurate evaluation of the true economic consequences of empire. In fact, since we may never construct a plausible cost-benefit matrix or an acceptable estimate of the relative significance of imperial ventures1, controversy will always continue, not only about the interpretation of the effects of imperialism, but about the facts and figures themselves.

The Spanish Empire in America —so envied by other countries— has never been regarded by economic historians as an unmixed blessing. For Hamilton, the precious metals from the Americas caused a parallel rise in prices and wages, reducing industrial investment and thus aborting the development of capitalism. For Vilar, a critic of that view, the Empire, as «the supreme phase of feudalism», led to a primitive accumulation of capital responsible for freezing structures inhibiting to capitalism. Wallerstein recognised that America was essential for the conversion of Spain into a semi-periphery of the world market1. To that can be added other less general but equally negative approaches concerning the effects of emigration or of American treasure, seen by many as contributing to an absolutism powerful enough to impose a foreign policy alien to the interests of the country and highly damaging to the Spanish economy, and to that of Castile in particular.

How much did the Dutch economy benefit from its expansion beyond the borders of Europe? The simple answer is provided by the Dutch spectators at international soccer games, when they start to encourage their team by singing about the great achievements of Piet Heyn, who as an admiral of the Dutch fleet captured the Spanish flota off the Cuban coast in 1628. This song implies that the Dutch economy was gready stimulated by a one-time injection of «Spanish coins» and oranges. No doubt, both were very welcome indeed, but they did not seem to have constituted die economic impetus that made a difference to the Dutch economy at the time.

Among the colonial powers of the early modern period, France was the last to emerge. Although, the French had not abstained from the exploration of fhe New World in the 16th century: G. de Verrazano discovered the site of New York (1524), during a voyage sponsored by King Francis I; Jacques Cartier sailed up the St. Lawrence to Quebec and Montreal (1535). From the early 16th century, many ships from ports such as Dieppe, St. Malo, La Rochelle, went on privateering and or trading expeditions to the Guinea coast, to Brazil, to the Caribbean, to the Spanish Main. Many French boats did fish off Newfoundland. Some traded in furs on the near-by Continent. Moreover, during the 16th century, sporadic attempts were made to establish French settlements in «Equinoctial France» (Brazil), in Florida, in modern Canada, but they failed utterly. Undoubtedly, foreign wars against the Habsburgs, during the first half of the 16th and of the 17th centuries, civil «wars of religion» during the second half of the 16th century, political disorders like the blockade of La Rochelle or the Fronde during the first part of the 17th century, absorbed the attention and resources of French rulers, despite some ambitious projects, like those of Richelieu, for overseas trade. As for the port cities they tried to trade overseas but they were isolated and not strong enough (specially during die wars of religion) to create «colonies». Some small companies, which had been started in 1601 and 1604, to trade with the East Indies, were very short-lived, and the French did not engage seriously in Asian trade before 1664.