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Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

A rough and tumble, we have had; though one quite lacking in impoliteness. I hope I do not go too far in supplying that deficiency.

Disagreement is endemic on political questions, both between and within ourselves. We do however come to conclusions, often strongly held. It may often be in doing so we are wholly irrational; but in so far as we are not, the philosopher should surely have something to contribute?

Our conclusions, so far as they are at all rational conclusions, will be based on some considerations or other: our premises. So, it may be thought, so far as we are rational we should be clear about what our premises are, how if at all they may be justified, and that our conclusions logically follow from them. Only if this is so are our conclusions justified.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1989

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References

1 Renford Bambrough discusses this and related issues in his ‘Fools and Heretics’, in Wittgenstein: Centenary Essays, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

2 Lin's letter to Queen Victoria asked her to consider how she would regard traders who were selling her subjects dangerous drugs: which is hardly an exotic moral appeal. There is no record of any reply.