These introductory remarks are unorthodox in many respects. The deviance from usual practice is justified by the extreme importance I attach to the subject matter of this special issue. I want to convey to the reader a sense of why I think controversies, particularly in science, are so crucial, and to propose a different way of thinking about them. This mandates, in the limited space available, a compact presentation, omitting supporting arguments and necessary elaboration — for which the reader is referred to the bibliography.

Controversies are pervasive in the history of science. History is thus here also at odds with science's images. According to both traditional and contemporary views of science, there are no scientific controversies sui generis. In traditional images of science controversies are external to science proper; in some contemporary views nothing about controversies in science specifically distinguishes them from controversies in other domains. According to one traditional image, science progresses from common ground to conclusions according to secure procedures such that there is no place for disagreement nor, therefore, for controversy. According to another traditional image of science, there are no such secure procedures. On the contrary: one does and even should jump to conclusions. Whereas here subsequent criticism is called for, it seems that controversy is not. This image is built on the assumption that refutations are clear cut, so that producing a valid refutation does not require a lengthy exchange of arguments.

Conflicts between scientists over credit for their discoveries are conflicts, not merely in, but of science because discovery is not a historical event, but a retrospective social judgment. There is no objective moment of discovery; rather, discovery is established by means of a hermeneutics, a way of reading scientific articles. The priority conflict between Roger Guillemin and Andrew Schally over the discovery of the brain hormone, TRF, serves as an example. The work of Robert Merton, Thomas Kuhn, Augustine Brannigan, and Grygory Markus shows that scientists read scientific articles by means of the application of a set of pragmatic rules that subtend the normative requirements of what counts as a scientific discovery. In other words, there is a hermeneutics of science, but it is internal to that form of life. Recategorization of priority conflicts has an impact on our view of scientific controversy generally. The impact is the revision of the boundary lines of scientific controversy and the further specification of its fine-structure.

The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, I propose to analyze controversies using a “dialectical” model, in the sense described in Aristotle's Topics. This approach presupposes that we temporarily disregard, for the sake of clarity, the concreteness of real life controversies in order to focus on their argumentative structure. From this point of view, the main advantage of controversies is that they allow the interlocutors to test each other's claims and therefore to arrive at relatively corroborated conclusions. This testing function in a dialectical context is implemented through the assent to commonly accepted premises, and the necessity which characterizes each step of the reasoning.

Secondly, I shall apply this dialectical framework to the study of the controversy concerning the motion of the Earth, or rather a small episode of it. I shall examine an exchange of letters, written in 1616 and in 1624 respectively, between Galileo Galilei and Francesco Ingoli, one of his Aristotelian opponents. I shall then compare this exchange with the first day of Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Systems of the World (1632), a fictional debate, where Galileo discusses some of the same arguments. While the first exemplifies what I call “negative” testing, and yields a refutation of the opponent's theses, the second exemplifies “positive” testing and yields a dialectical demonstration of the motion of the Earth.

The main subject examined in this paper is Immanuel Kant's controversy with Philosophisches Magazin regarding Kant's new theory of judgments. J. A. Eberhard, editor of Philosophisches Magazin, and his colleagues wanted to vindicate the Wollfian traditional concept of judgments by undermining Kant's claims. As will be demonstrated, their arguments were effective mainly in exposing the ambiguity that was inherent in Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori; an ambiguity that resulted from Kant's desire—central to his critique of metaphysics—to present judgments pertaining to mathematics, (dogmatic) metaphysics, and pure natural science as judgments which shared a common form. Exposing this ambiguity was not the intended result, and it was insufficient for the purpose of vindicating the Wollfian tradition. The contributors to Philosophisches Magazin ignored the important properties shared by the class of judgments falling under Kant's concept of synthetic a priori judgments. They also ignored the fact that their position was unable to account for the logical phenomena that motivated Kant to present a new theory of judgments. On the other hand, Kant's theory of judgments was insensitive to the important differences that exist among the distinct types of judgments falling under his concept of a synthetic a priori judgment. This latter point is clearly shown in the controversy regarding the novelty of Kant's concept of a synthetic a priori judgment, and in the controversy regarding the function of intuitions within synthetic judgments.

A result of the controversy was that Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori, which he believed to be an exact concept, was revealed to be a metaphor: no more than an invitation to view certain intellectual fields in the light of others. On the other hand, Eberhard and his colleagues failed to come up with satisfactory answers to Kant's questions within their traditional concept of judgment. Both parties refused to acknowledge this result. Consequently, the search for a new logic, a new architectonic order, and a new unity within reason became a general problem for the new generation of philosophers.

We examine the most famous controversy between economists — the one between Thomas Robert Malthus and David Ricardo — as a means of shedding fresh light on the current debate about economic methodology. By focusing on this controversy as the primary unit of analysis, we show how methodological considerations are but one of a whole set of stratagems employed by each opponent. We argue that each opponent's preference for a particular kind of stratagem expresses his own specific scientific style (within the general scientific and cultural style of an age). We also describe a dynamic dimension of the controversy, independent of the participants' intentions. Such a dimension is analyzed in one of the “cycles” of the controversy, which begins with a well-defined issue and expands to additional topics, without reaching a “solution” of the initial issue. The Controversy, thus, does not yield a solution of a given problem nor persuasion of the adversary — its presumable aims. Rather, its “benefit” seems to lie in an unintended result — the clarification and deepening of contrasting approaches to the discipline. Insofar as the history of a discipline requires a reconstruction of such contrasts, it is indispensable that it take into account the controversies where they emerge, and view both the positive doctrines and the methodological postures of the contenders as parts of a wider framework, within which the notion of a scientific style — which this paper attempts to clarify — looms large.

Like many controversies in science, the one between Freud and Jung is overloaded with ad hominem arguments despite the incompatibility of such arguments with the pretensions of both sides to attain scientific ad rem validity. Unlike natural scientists, Freud and Jung regarded their own ad hominem arguments as relevant to general and impersonal truths. They practically legitimized such a use claiming to have a clinical basis for the rejection of the opponent's objections by a de-validating analysis of the opponent's personality as a whole. The argument of this paper is that the de-validating strategy was neither an inevitable psychological outcome of the intricate interpersonal relationships in analytic situations nor the logical consequence of any clinical or scientific psycho-analytical discovery. It followed from the epistemological invalid pretension to have a general theory of mind which could explain by mental analysis the existence of “unreasonable opinions,” and the application of the same principles to the opinion that the theory itself is unreasonable. Such a pretension, apparently specific to mystical traditions in theology and metaphysics, was deeply rooted in the modern epistemological tradition. The paper examines the impact of the different branches of that tradition on Freud and Jung's respective ideologies, theories, and practice, including the ad hominem malpractice.

L. E. J. Brouwer and David Hubert, two titans of twentieth-century mathematics, clashed dramatically in the 1920s. Though they were both Kantian constructivists, their notorious Grundlagenstreit centered on sharp differences about the foundations of mathematics: Brouwer was prepared to revise the content and methods of mathematics (his “Intuitionism” did just that radically), while Hilbert's Program was designed to preserve and constructively secure all of classical mathematics.

Hilbert's interests and polemics at the time led to at least three misconstruals of intuitionism, misconstruals which last to our own time: Current literature often portrays popular views of intuitionism as the product of Brouwer's idiosyncratic subjectivism; modern logicians view intuitionism as simply applying a non-standard formal logic to mathematics; and contemporary philosophers see that logic as based upon a pure assertabilist theory of meaning. These pictures stem from the way Hilbert structured the controversy.

Even though Brouwer's own work and behavior occasionally reinforce these pictures, they are nevertheless inaccurate accounts of his approach to mathematics. However, the framework provided by the Brouwer-Hilbert debate itself does not supply an adequate correction of these inaccuracies. For, even if we eliminate these mistakes within that framework, Brouwer's position would still appear fragmented and internally inconsistent. I propose a Kantian framework — not from Kant's philosophy of mathematics but from his general metaphysics — which does show the coherence and consistency of Brouwer's views. I also suggest that expanding the context of the controversy in this way will illuminate Hilbert's views as well and will even shed light upon Kant's philosophy.