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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
Janet Martin Soskice's book Metaphor and Religious Language may reasonably be described as ‘state of the art’ in respect of studies on metaphor and theology. Dr Soskice recognises the need for metaphor to retain its traditional designation as a figure of speech, but at the same time wants to establish its use as credible in a Christian realist perspective. To this end, she undertakes a rigorous examination of the nature and function of metaphor in order to build a solid base from which to establish its pertinence to theology. It is metaphor's ability to achieve an increment of meaning in language in general (and science in particular) which is able to provide the springboard for its role in religious language. Dr Soskice thus sees language as the framework within which to conduct her argument. The first part of this paper analyses her argument.
1 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985.
2 Ibid. p. 15.
3 However I do not see that it is possible to make a clear distinction between semantic and syntactic: if the meaning of an utterance depends on a certain grammatical structure such as predication, how is it possible to distinguish the syntactical form of the utterance from the semantical content? Both are brought together and interact (see Wittgenstein's dictum of meaning as use in his Philosophical Investigations, tr. Anscombe, G. E. M., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1958)Google Scholar. It is our use of words in our everyday lives which connects our language with the physical world. This connection relies on our social conventions regarding language use. These implicit sets of conventions (which tell us what things, events etc. are, are nothing if not predications (e.g. ‘This colour is red’) —hence Wittgenstein's term for them is ‘grammar.’ For an application of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy to metaphor, see my paper ‘Word, Words and World’ (Colloquium, May 1991); also my unpublished doctoral thesis: “The Theological Implications of the Relationship between a Wittgensteinian Understanding of the Relation of Language to World and the Role of Metaphor as an Agent of Revelation” (University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 25 October 1991.
4 Jüngel, Eberhard ‘Metaphorical Truth’, Theological Essays, tr. & intr. Webster, J. B., T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1989: p. 24.Google Scholar
5 Ibid. pp. 25–6.
6 What Metaphors Mean. ed. Sacks, Sheldon, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 30–44; Soskice op. cit. pp. 27–31.Google Scholar
7 Ibid. pp. 32–38.
8 Ibid. pp. 39–43.
9 Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, Cornell University Press. Ithaca, New York, 1962Google Scholar; Soskice op. cit. pp. 39–43.
10 Ibid. pp. 44–45.
11 Dr Soskice'sexamples are adjective-noun combinationssuch as ‘giddy brink’ and ‘metaphysical streets’.
12 See my comment above on predication and syntax, footnote 2.
13 Soskice op. cit. p. 43f.
14 Ibid. p. 101.
15 Ibid. p. 101.
16 Ibid. p. 102.
17 The scope of this paper does not permit a comparison of mechanical and theoretical models. For Dr Soskice it appears that all paramorphic models, whether mechanical or theoretical, whether in science or theology, are what T. F. Torrance terms ‘disclosure’ models; that is, they are open at both ends: open to revision of their content from both the existing categories of our knowledge and the reality beyond which it seeks to represent (see T. F. Torrance Theological Science, Oxford University Press, London, 1969: pp. 240f., 318f.). But it is only when mechanical models are ‘read’ off into metaphorical terms (and are ‘annotated’ in effect into theoretical models) that they become capable of referring beyond themselves: only models which involve words are able to reach beyond the limits of their vehicle, that is, discover a wider deeper ‘actuality’ beyond the ‘actuality’ of the vehicle (seejüngel op. cit.).
18 But to say on this basis (as some do) that there is no essential difference between models and metaphors is to take the exception for the rule.
19 Soskice op. cit. p. 62.
20 Ibid, p. 103.
21 Dr Soskice's term ‘reality depiction’ is an unfortunate one. Models and metaphors cannot simply ‘depict’ reality as this would require that our minds were merely blank slates awaiting the imprint of sense data. As it is, all sensory input is subject to organisation in terms of our existing conception of reality — we cannot help but ‘add the pages of our recipe to the stew’. On this topic see also ‘, Word words and World’ op. cit.
22 Soskice op. cit. p. 106.
23 It will be seen later, however, that in starting from a literary perspective Dr Soskice herself falls into this trap.
24 Soskice op. cit. p. 117.
25 See above, footnote 21.
26 Hence one tends ultimately to become the other, as Dr Soskice notes — see also Kerr's, FergusTheology after Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; p. 128f.Google Scholar
27 Soskice op. cit. p. 122.
28 Ibid. p. 127.
29 For a critique of Dr Soskice's application of critical realism to reference, see Michael Durrant's paper ‘Reference and Critical Realism’ Modern Theology, January 1989: pp. 135–144.
30 E.g. those of Kripke and Putnam: see Soskice op. cit. chapter VII.
31 However, it is problematic whether reference is able to be flexible in the way Dr Soskice advocates. Again, see Durrant's paper (op. cit.) for a critique of this theory.
32 Soskice op. cit. p. 134.
33 Ibid. p. 136.
34 Ibid. p. 117.
35 Ibid. p. 136.
36 Dr Soskice utilises Kripke's ‘baptism’ or ‘dubbing’ theory of reference — see pp. 127–9, 131–2.
37 See again Durrant op. cit.
38 Soskice op. cit. p. 140 — the scope of this paper does not permit a critique of Thomism.
39 Ibid, p. 152.
40 Hardy, Daniel ‘Christ and Creation’ in The Incarnation (ed.) Torrance, T. F., Handsel, Edinburgh, 1981: pp. 93–96.Google Scholar
41 Soskice op. cit. p. 161.
42 Dr Soskice takes Hume to task for the deleterious effect of British Empiricism on theology (p. 143).
43 See discussion below under Rebuilding the argument.
44 Soskice op. cit. p. 136. Dr Soskice attributes this assertion to Dummett, Michael (‘Common Sense and Physics’ in MacDonald, J. F. ed. Perception and Identity, The Macmillan Press, London, 1979: pp. 1–40)Google Scholar. It is my opinion that only an anti-realist could say this.
45 Personal Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958: p. 249f.Google Scholar
46 See by contrast Jüngel's approach which grounds metaphor in epistemology (Jüngel op. cit.).
47 For a fuller discussion on reference and the language-world relation, see ‘Word, Words and World’ op. cit.
48 See T. F. Torrance's Theological Science op. cit.; also Heron's, Alasdair summary of Torrance's work on this topic (A Century of Protestant Theology Lutterworth Press, Cambridge, 1980).Google Scholar
49 Personal Knowledge op. cit. and The Tacit Dimension, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966.Google Scholar
* This is also a Wittgensteinian perspective (see ‘word, words & world’, and doctoral thesis op cit.)
50 Tacit Dimension op. cit. p. 8.
51 Jüngel op. cit. p. 53.
* Again, this is also a Wittgensteinian perspective on the language –world relation.
52 I am indebted to T. F. Torrance for this concept (Theological Science, op. cit. p. 308) and also for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
53 I. A. Richards' term — see above.
54 Of course this is also given to us, firstly in our human capacity to be social and understand our local particularity; secondly in the training in our milieu which each of us receives as individuals growing up in a culture and locality.
55 Structure du Langage Poetique Paris, Flammarion 1966; English summary in Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor tr. Czerny, Robert et al. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978: p. 150f.Google Scholar
56 See Tacit Dimension op. cit. chapter 2.
57 Dr Hardy utilises Polanyi's concept of a higher organising principle (Tacit Dimension op. cit. chapter 2); Hardy op. cit. p. 106.
58 Hence Michael Dummett's conclusion that realism must ultimately end in theism (see Kerr, FergusTheology after Wittgmstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986: p. 128Google Scholar; Dummett, MichaelTruth and Other Enigmas, Duckworth, London, 1978: pp. 166–185).Google Scholar
59 As Jüngel has it, metaphor is the taking-place of truth: ‘we need to recognise [metaphor] itself as the event of truth.’ ‘Metaphorical Truth’ op. cit. p. 53.
60 Hardy op. cit. p. 106 — David Tracy's reduction of the transcendent to ‘limit experiences’ is a case in point.
61 Ibid. p. 106.
62 Ibid. p. 108.
63 This comprehensiveness must be our ground, indwelt by us, if we are to interiorise it in our lives (Hardy op. cit. p. 108).
64 As jüngel observes, the coming to speech of that reality which is outside of speech is itself metaphorical process and as the meaning of person is beyond concept, necessarily takes the form of metaphor. The ‘transfer of being into language’ is ‘the event of truth in which that which lets itself be discovered, and, as that which is discovered, enters into connection with that which has already been discovered, standing over against the (human) discoverer, and corresponding to the discovery (of the discoverer). As this transfer of being into language, the event of truth is an absolute metaphor’ Jüngel op. cit. p. 56.
* For a fuller exposition of this theology, see my doctoral thesis (op. cit.).
65 However, we have seen that to opt at this point for an undifferentiated theism is yet another path to incoherence. Bare transcendence and bare immanence quickly reduce God to redundant hypothesis: God becomes either unknowable (and hence beside the point) or, once the principle of parsimony is applied to the ‘immanent’ option, simply beside the point.
