^{156 1} All references to Theological Science (Oxford University Press, London, 1969) will be given in the text.Google Scholar

^{156 2} I basically disagree with Professor Paul L. Lehmann's caustic comment, ‘In Scotland a virulent “Barthian scholasticism” obstructs the freedom of God in his revelation to be God for man in the world, and enervates the faith and life of the church’ (‘Karl Barth and the Future of Theology’, Religious Studies (June 1970), vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 105–106)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I am more in agreement with the assessment of Professor D. M. MacKinnon, who claims that the book is ‘expressive of the resolution of a most faithful theologian to discipline his understanding to the proper treatment of his central theme. Moreover, the very intensity of this resolve enables him to show again and again how our self-knowledge concerning the limitations of that same understanding is deepened and enlarged by the attempt to meet the demands which faith lays upon it’ (The Tablet, 20th December 1969, pp. 1262–3).

^{157 1} Theology is always in danger of being contemporary in a popular and not in a serious sense. Torrance is completely serious. His understanding of the scientific task is congenial to many interpreters of scientific methodology. Where he differs from many other theologians is in his move beyond what it is presumed other sciences would demand, and insists upon the uniqueness of the object of Christian knowledge. More, he emphasises the mystery which breaks through the objective Christ. This is, for some commentators, a retreat into obfuscation or as Frederick Ferré says, ‘… the theologian … must have the courage to abjure “judging” appeals to paradox and mystery, as though they were somehow cognitive virtues in disguise’ (in Ian Barbour, ed. Science and Religion, Harper and Row, New York, 1968, p. 152). What is at stake is the claim by many who want to make theology scientifically responsible so that it stands on all fours with some other scientific methodology, whether it be that of the natural sciences (D. C. Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science, Macmillan, New York, 1919) or historical science (Van Harvey, The Historian and The Believer, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1966, and Gordon Kaufmann, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective, Scribners, New York, 1968). It is the desire for publicable, demonstrable knowledge in some otherwise authenticated area which has dominated much theology. Torrance rightly rejects this and in so doing is philosophically, scientifically and theologically sound. Cf. also The Future of Empirical Theology, ed. Meland, Bernard E. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969)Google Scholar. The essays in this book explore a wide range of topics from empirical perspectives.

What should be made clear is that Torrance is taking a stand against those who want to describe scientific understanding as only the utilisation of operational definitions, as though there is no relation between man's thoughts and theories and the reality being described.

^{158 1} The chief effort at qualification is found in his insistence upon the personal being of God which is communicated through the person of Jesus Christ to persons. The response, therefore, cannot be only intellectual, it must conform to personal qualities of communication (I42f). But this, as Torrance develops it, does not remove the problem for he does not thoroughly discuss any of tne other dimensions. The category of ‘truth’ remains, throughout, at the centre in his explication of faith (see how ‘way’ and ‘life’ are subordinated to truth on pp. 157–61, also 325).

^{158 2} Nonetheless, it is this character which makes Torrance congenial to contemporary Roman Catholic theology. As with Barth, this theological approach promises rich ecumenical possibility. This is another reason for taking it with seriousness while also with keen criticism.

^{160 1} For a more complete expression see the very important passage on p. 127. ‘Therefore in order to set out our theological thinking in a coherent sequence that faitlifully reflects the nature and the pattern of the Truth itself, we have to re-live encounter with the Object, allowing ourselves to be re-addressed by him, rethinking his Word to us, and responding to his action upon us, and at the same time translate that into our statements in such a way that their necessity does not lie in themselves but in the Object, and their interconnexion reflects the order or action of the Object.’.

^{160 2} This emphasis on auditory knowledge has been made by others; among the best statements is that of Funk, Robert, Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God (Harper and Row, New York, 1966)Google Scholar. Two aspects of Funk's presentation are valuable additions to Torrance's position. First, Funk reflects upon the problem of the failure of language. Since language and understanding arise reciprocally and because of a shared reality, the failure of language and understanding reflect a failure of that reality. ‘The failure of language is commensurate with the disappearance of the reality to which it refers’ (9: see also pp. 5–6). This is a sensitivity to the difficulty of theological language in the present setting which must be taken with seriousness. Second, Funk is aware that a ‘word’ need not be phonetic. Understanding through the presentation of a ‘word’ may be communicated through a gesture, a deed or even silence (13). Cognition, of course, is conjoint with the reciprocal understanding which arises with the givenness of a word, and as cognition theology takes its initiation. But Funk's recognition of the variety of the forms of the word—even the Word, Jesus Christ—constitutes a valuable enlargement of the idea of ‘language’. It should also be noted that, in spite of the initial emphasis on auditory knowledge, Torrance does not make extensive use of the notion. He, of course, wants to say that it is illicit to construe all knowledge on the mociel of vision. But the full dimensions of a change to audition are not worked out. See for instance his discussion of existence-statements (I64f).

^{162 1} Diem, Hermann, Dogmatics (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959), p. 62Google Scholar, where Diem argues that Barth does not provide for an adequate interaction of dogmatic work with scriptural exegesis. Ratner, ‘ …Barth sets to work only after the conclusion of the canon, and assumes the latter to be a unified and closed dog-matic whole …‘. Robinson, J. M. points out this same issue in The New Hermencutic (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1964), pp. 30–32Google Scholar. In this crucial matter Torrance has not yet gone beyond his mentor. But he does recognise the need for further elucidation as he clearly states in his preface (vii).

^{163 1} See his distinction of the logical levels in the theological task. ‘Thus, in theological science we operate witn the actual knowledge which we have through rational assent or faith …, the orderly and coherent account of this in dogmatics, the pure science of theology, and the philosophy of theology or its metascience, including its logic and epistemology (e.g. the concern of the present work)’ (259–60).

^{164 1} Especially on p. 197 where such a stress would be most natural; and, indeed, is necessary both for Torrance's work and for an adequate interpretation of Polanyi with his emphasis on the convivial community. On pp. 21 of the emphasis becomes clearer.

^{169 1} For further discussion of Polanyi‘s position see Langford, Thomas A., ‘Michael Polanyi and The Task of Theology’, Journal of Religion (January 1966), XLVI, 0. I, pp. 45–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar